Henderson Bridge Co. v. Alves, &C.

• Citation: 122 Ky. 46
• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decision Date: 16 February 1906
• Parties: Henderson Bridge Co. v. Alves, &c.

Page 46

122 Ky. 46

Henderson Bridge Co. v. Alves, &c.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

February 16, 1906.

Appeal from Henderson Circuit Court.

J. W. HENSON, Circuit Judge.

Judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

HELM, BRUCE & HELM for appellant.

J. B. HARRISON, JR., and YEAMAN & YEAMAN of counsel.

J. L. DORSEY, City Attorney, for appellees.

OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE HOBSON—Reversing.

This suit was brought by the Henderson Bridge Company to enjoin the collection of a franchise tax upon the assessment made by the city assessor of Henderson. The circuit court held the assessment valid, and the bridge company appeals.

The first question in the case is as to the validity of the act under which the assessment was made. On March 19, 1898, the General Assembly passed an act entitled "An act concerning the assessment and valuation for taxation of corporate franchises and intangible property by cities of the first and second class." Acts 1898, p. 96, c. 38. This act gave the local assessor of cities of the first and second class power to assess for taxation the corporate franchises of certain corporations; the previous law requiring these assessments to be made by the State board. By an act approved March 23, 1900, the provisions of this act were extended to include cities of the third class. The title of the act of March 23, 1900, is as follows: "An act to amend and re-enact an act approved March 19, 1898, entitled `An act concerning the assessment and valuation for taxation of corporate franchises and intangible property by cities of the first and second class.'" Acts 1900, p. 89, c. 29. It will be observed that the act of March 19, 1898, only applied to cities of the first and second class. The act of March 23, 1900, extends the provisions of the former act to cities of the third class; but there is nothing in the title of the act to indicate that the amendment applied to any other cities than those of the first and second class. In other words, in amending an act which by its title as well as its body applied only to cities of the first and second class, the Legislature extended its provisions to cities of the third class without anything in the title of the amending act indicating that the amendment related to anything more than cities of the first and second class. The Constitution requires the Legislature to divide the cities and towns of the State into six classes and to provide by general laws for their government. The Constitution also provides that an act shall relate to only one subject, and that this must be expressed in the title. There is nothing in the title of the act of March 23, 1900, to show that it in any way applies to cities of the third class. The purpose of the constitutional provision is that the title of an act must be such as to inform members of the General Assembly and others as to the subject of legislation. The title of the act of March 23, 1900, would inform the members of the General Assembly that the assessment and valuation for taxation of corporate franchises and intangible property by cities of the first and second class was regulated by the act; but it would not inform them that any regulation was made as to cities of the third class. Those interested in cities of the first and second class would understand from the title that these cities were interested in the act; but when the body of the act was read they would see that it made no change in the law respecting them, and so would take no interest in the amendment. On the other hand those interested in third-class cities would not be informed by the title of the act that legislation as to these cities was contemplated, and so would not have their attention directed to the act. In this way such legislation might go through, when, if the title showed what was proposed, it might be defeated.

The government of third-class cities is not germane to the government of first and second class cities in the sense that an act which professes to govern only cities of the first and second class can be made to govern cities of the third class when there is nothing in the title to so indicate. To illustrate: If the act of March 19, 1898...