Henderson v. Dickey
| Decision Date | 31 March 1864 |
| Citation | 35 Mo. 120 |
| Parties | WILLIAM W. HENDERSON et al., Respondents, v. JAMES DICKEY et als., Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis Land Court.
Glover & Shepley, for respondents.
The plaintiffs brought their suit against the defendants, stating that they were the grantees of one Warson, and wife, for certain lots and blocks in Carondelet; that Warson derived his title from one Taylor, the father of the defendant Jane Dickey, wife of defendant Dickey, and the only heir of said Taylor; that Taylor, in making the conveyance to Mrs. Warson, had misdescribed the lots, making the description confused, ambiguous and erroneous; that he intended to convey block E. and the south-east quarter of H. The petition recited the conveyances from Carondelet, until they came to Bowlin, and the deed of Bowlin and wife to Mrs. Warson, as also the deed of Warson and wife to Henderson.
The answer admitted that Bowlin had title by mesne conveyances from Carondelet to block E., and also the south-east quarter of block H.; that he conveyed them to Taylor; that Taylor intended to convey to Mrs. Warson, by his deed to her, the south-east quarter of block H., but says it was a donation from Taylor to Mrs. Warson.
Upon the trial, among other testimony, the plaintiff called John W. Warson as a witness, who proved that he purchased the lots of James B. Bowlin, and took the deeds in the name of Taylor, (witness paying the purchase money,) as he was then embarrassed; that finding Taylor was getting into bad habits, he tried to induce him to convey them to him; that he would only convey them to his (Warson's) wife; that Warson did not have the deeds with him, but gave the description of the lots to the justice who wrote the deeds, as he recollected it, and that both he and Taylor supposed them to be a correct description of the lots conveyed by Bowlin to Taylor; that he afterwards conveyed said lots to Henderson, in payment of rent he owed Henderson for a farm he occupied.
The court, after hearing other evidence and documentary proofs clearly establishing that Taylor had no other lots or blocks in Carondelet, except the lot and block in controversy, and the inaccuracies and misdescriptions in the deed, and that it was intended to convey said block E., and the south-east quarter of block H., gave judgment for plaintiffs.
Broadhead and Cates, for appellants.
We suggest that there is no cause of action stated in petition to reform the deeds of 1842; because there is no averment that the mistake, &c., was mutual, or, in other words, that Taylor intended to convey block E. and south-east quarter of block H., and that Mrs. Warson intended to receive and accept the same; for, in the absence of fraud or bad faith, the rule of law is that the mistake must be certain and mutual on the part of the parties, in order to reform a written contract or deed. (1 Story Eq. Juris. §§ 151 to 156; and cases cited.)
That a latent ambiguity in a deed may be explained by parol evidence, in order to identify an estate in land, or the person who may receive the same, where doubt in that regard is created by parol proof; but such parol evidence, to explain the words of a deed, must be certain and manifest, and leave no doubt on the mind of the court as to the meaning of the words used in the deed and the object to which they refer. But parol proof can never be introduced to ascertain and establish the intention of the parties as an independent fact. (Hammond v. Ridgely, 5 Har. & John. 245, 254; Jackson v. Barkhurst, 4 Wend. 369, 373; Add. on Con. 848.)
That the rule of law is fixed, that a party plaintiff who claims the right of specific performance of an executed or executory contract, must clearly manifest to a court of equity, that he, and those under whom he claims, acted in good faith; that he and they, by implication or otherwise, are free from all fraud and bad faith; that the contract which is prayed to be ““reformed” or ““enforced,” is based on a valuable consideration, not voluntary; that it is certain and mutual in all its parts, freed from all doubt or difficulty in its execution.
With all proper respect we ask, does the proof of respondents make out that kind of case? Certainly not. Instead of Taylor being a bona fide purchaser for value from Bowlin and wife, he is proved to have been a volunteer to aid Warson to defraud his creditors. Instead of Mrs. Warson being a bona fide purchaser for value, she is proved to be a fraudulent substitute for Taylor, who had become a poor, silly drunkard, unsafe to shield Warson from his just creditors. Instead of Henderson being a bona fide purchaser for value he is proved to be the landlord of Warson, and, for pretended rent due, is substituted for Mrs. Warson as stakeholder for Warson. Certainly the judgment of the Land Court violates all wise and just rules of specific performance or reformation; such matters are at all times addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Hence in this case the question is presented, did the Land Court wisely, justly and properly exercise that discretion.
Again, lapse of time and statute of limitation was pleaded as a bar. The rule of equity is, that he or she who sleeps on his rights will be allowed to sleep on. There being no cause assigned in the petition for the delay of fifteen years, the same was bad on its face, and should have been dismissed.
Glover & Shepley, for respondents.
The defendants seem to rest their grounds for reversal upon three propositions:
1. That, admitting every thing stated in petition to be true, the plaintiffs could not recover.
2. The facts as proved did not warrant the finding.
3. That Warson should not have been admitted to prove that Taylor paid Bowlin nothing for the land conveyed to Taylor by Bowlin, but all was paid for and purchased by Warson, and that Taylor held it for him; and, also, that he ought not to be permitted to prove that he (Warson) caused the conveyances to be made to Taylor for the purpose of hindering and delaying creditors of Warson.
To these propositions we say:
I. That a court in chancery will always interfere (when others' rights have not vested) in reforming an instrument and making it carry out the obvious intent of the grantor. (1 Story Eq. Juris. §§ 152-6.)
II. The facts as proved all tended to the one point, that it was intended to convey the block E. and the south-east quarter of block H.
III. The evidence of Warson was admissible. 1. As to the facts that Taylor paid nothing to Bowlin for...
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