Henderson v. Haverfield
| Decision Date | 24 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21 HA 0005 |
| Citation | 2022 Ohio 2194 |
| Parties | DOUGLAS W. HENDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARY E. HAVERFIELD et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Atty David E. Butz, Atty. James M. Williams, Atty. Matthew W Onest, Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths, & Dougherty Co., L.P.A., for Plaintiff-Appellant and
Atty. T. Owen Beetham, for Defendants-Appellees.
BEFORE: Carol Ann Robb, Cheryl L. Waite, David A. D'Apolito, Judges.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶1} Appellants, Douglas W. Henderson, and his attorneys, David E. Butz, Gregory W. Watts, and Matthew W. Onest, and the law firm of Kruglilak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co. L.P.A., appeal the May 10, 2021 judgment awarding Appellees $22,207.26 attorney's fees and expenses against Henderson and his attorneys, jointly and severally. For the following reasons, we reverse and vacate the trial court's May 10, 2021 decision.
{¶2} Henderson filed suit in August of 2013 against Appellees, Mary E. Haverfield and Edward N. McDonald, husband and wife.[1] Henderson asserted seven causes of action, seeking in part to quiet title and for declaratory judgment under R.C. 5301.56, the 1989 Dormant Mineral Act (DMA), against Appellees regarding the mineral rights relative to the property owned by Henderson. Henderson filed suit to demonstrate that the previously severed mineral rights had merged by operation of law pursuant to the DMA.
{¶3} Appellees filed a joint answer and counterclaim asking the court to quiet title in favor of Mary E. Haverfield and for declaratory judgment finding that she is the owner of all the interest in the oil, mineral, and gas rights underlying the subject property. Appellees' prayer for relief also generally sought costs and attorney's fees. Appellees contend that Haverfield's mother transferred the surface estate to Henderson's relatives while reserving the oil, gas, and non-coal minerals underlying the surface estate. Appellees also claim that the reservation was subsequently passed to Appellee, Mary E. Haverfield. Consequently, they asserted that Appellant Henderson only inherited the surface rights.
{¶4} The case was effectively stayed from September of 2014 through September of 2016 when the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to hear certified questions regarding the DMA in Corban v. Chesapeake Expl., LLC, 149 Ohio St.3d 512, 2016-Ohio-5796, 76 N.E.3d 1089, and several companion cases.
{¶5} After the Supreme Court's Corban decision, Henderson sought leave to file a summary judgment motion, urging the court to allow him to file a motion for summary judgment and claiming new defenses arose via Corban, including that the application of Corban and the 2006 DMA constitutes an unconstitutional taking.
{¶6} Henderson filed his summary judgment motion January 23, 2017, arguing that the 2006 DMA could not be applied against him without running afoul of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; seeking declaratory judgment that he was the rightful owner of the mineral rights; and asking the court to enjoin Appellees from continuing to claim ownership over the rights, trespassing, and conveying said rights.
{¶7} Appellees filed a competing summary judgment motion in February of 2017, urging the court to find that Corban conclusively determined the parties' rights and asking the court to quiet title and for declaratory judgment in their favor. Appellees likewise claimed Henderson's continued arguments after Corban were patently frivolous; not warranted under existing law or a good faith extension of the law; and causing excessive and unnecessary litigations costs. Appellees also generally asked the court to grant them attorney's fees and costs in the conclusion of their motion.
{¶8} Before the court ruled on summary judgment but after the briefing concluded, Henderson moved the court to dismiss the case in its entirety, in May of 2018, based on this Court's decision in Lower Valley Farm, LLC v. Croskey, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 HA 0010, 2018-Ohio-814. Appellees opposed the dismissal of their claims; did not oppose the dismissal of Henderson's claims; and asked the court to grant their summary judgment motion. The trial court dismissed Appellant's claims only. The only remaining claims were Appellees' counterclaims against Henderson, which were decided via summary judgment on September 17, 2018.
{¶9} In its summary judgment decision, the trial court determined that Mary V. Haverfield is the owner of all mineral, oil, and gas rights underlying Henderson's surface estate and quieted title in Haverfield's favor. The trial court concluded without analysis or citation to legal authority that "this matter shall come for hearing on Defendants' prayer for Costs and Attorney's fees * * *." Henderson appealed this September 17, 2018 decision in a prior appeal to this Court before the attorney's fees hearing was held and before the court awarded attorney's fees. We ultimately dismissed his prior appeal in October of 2019.
{¶10} In the meantime, the trial court held the attorney's fees hearing on February 22, 2019 and awarded Appellees $22,207.26, consisting of $15,475 in attorney's fees and $6,732 in expert expenses, via its May 10, 2021 Judgment Entry, against Henderson and his attorneys. Appellants filed the instant appeal and raise two assignments of error.
{¶11} Appellants' first assignment alleges:
"The trial court erred by awarding attorney's fees to Appellees because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to issue that award because a motion for sanctions was not filed within 30 days of the final judgment."
{¶12} This assignment consists of two arguments. Appellants primarily argue the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award attorney's fees because Appellees did not file a motion for attorney's fees within 30 days of the trial court's September 17, 2018[2] decision granting summary judgment. And because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, Appellants claim the trial court's May 10 2021 judgment, ultimately awarding Appellees attorney's fees and expenses pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11, is void.
{¶13} We review a trial court's jurisdiction, a question of law, de novo. Cirino v. Ohio Bur of Workers' Comp., 153 Ohio St.3d 333, 2018-Ohio-2665, 106 N.E.3d 41, ¶ 17.
{¶14} Subject matter jurisdiction is the court's power to decide an issue and render an enforceable judgment. State v. Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880, 951 N.E.2d 1025, ¶ 10. If a court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide an issue and render a judgment, then the judgment is void and has no legal effect. In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205, 2006-Ohio-5484, 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 10; VOID, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
{¶15} Appellants correctly point out that Appellees did not file a formal motion for attorney's fees. Moreover, the court's September 17, 2018 decision states that it would be setting a hearing on Appellees' "prayer" for relief.
{¶16} As stated, Appellees counterclaimed and asserted two claims for relief, i.e., declaratory judgment and to quiet title. Appellees requested costs and attorney's fees as a general prayer for relief. Based on the court's reliance on the prayer for relief in its September 17, 2018 decision, Appellants urge us to find that this decision was a final, appealable order because there was no motion pending before it on which to grant attorney's fees. Consequently, Appellants claim the 30 days in R.C. 2323.51 was triggered and the court lost jurisdiction to award attorney's fees after the expiration of 30 days. For the following reasons, we disagree.
{¶17} Here, the trial court awarded attorney's fees and expenses under Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51 against Henderson and his attorneys in its May 10, 2021 judgment.
{¶18} R.C. 2323.51(B)(1) states in pertinent part:
[A]t any time not more than thirty days after the entry of final judgment in a civil action * * *, any party adversely affected by frivolous conduct may file a motion for an award of court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and other reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the civil action * * * The court may assess and make an award to any party to the civil action or appeal who was adversely affected by frivolous conduct, as provided in division (B)(4) of this section.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶19} Unlike R.C. 2323.51 (B)(1), Civ.R. 11 does not contain an express time limit for filing a motion for sanctions. However, at least one court has inferred a 30-day time limit in Civ.R. 11. Zunshine v. Cott, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-764, 2008-Ohio-2298, ¶ 21; but see Fast Property Sols., Inc. v. Jurczenko, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-015, 2013-Ohio-60, ¶ 69 (). Regardless of whether there is a time constraint upon pursuing a Civ.R. 11 motion for sanctions, the 30-day limit in R.C. 2323.51(B)(1) was not triggered here when the court issued its September 17, 2018 summary judgment decision because it was not a final, appealable order. See Jones v. McAlamey Pools, Spas & Billiards, Inc., 4th Dist. No. 07CA34, 2008- Ohio-1365, ¶ 12.
{¶20} A party's inclusion of a general prayer for costs and attorney's fees in a complaint or counterclaim that is not sought pursuant to an identified statute and that the court does not address in an otherwise final judgment will not render the judgment non-final and non-appealable. PC Surveillance. Net, LLC v. Rika Group, Corp., 7th Dist No. 11 MA 165, 2012-Ohio-4569, 994 N.E.2d 843, ¶ 16, citing Jones. In the absence of...
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