Henderson v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 27 March 1928
• Citation: 160 N.E. 775,247 N.Y. 428
• Parties: HENDERSON v. HENDERSON.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

247 N.Y. 428

160 N.E. 775

HENDERSON

v.HENDERSON.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 27, 1928.

Action by Corrine M. Henderson against Earl H. Henderson. From an order of the Appellate Division (221 App. Div. 787, 223 N. Y. S. 873), affirming an order of the Special Term denying defendant's motion to vacate an order granting counsel fees and to modify an interlocutory judgment granting alimony, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth department.

Robert H. Tew and Glenn L. Buck, both of Rochester, for appellant.

John J. McInerney, of Rochester, for respondent.

O'BRIEN, J.

The parties were married and for several years resided together in this state. Plaintiff still lives here. Defendant became a resident of Pennsylvania and in that state was personally served in an action brought in New York for absolute divorce. Upon his default in pleading, plaintiff moved for judgment. The Special Term heard testimony some of which was elicited by defendant's attorney who was present at the hearing, issued an order allowing counsel fees, made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and granted an interlocutory decree of divorce with alimony. After the entry of that judgment defendant's attorney, asserting that he appeared specially, moved to vacate the order allowing counsel fees and to modify the judgment by striking out all provisions requiring payment of money. His motion was denied and the Appellate Division (223 N. Y. S. 873¹) unanimously affirmed the order. Defendant argues that, in the absence of personal service within this state, a money judgment against him is void, unless obtained after a general appearance and that there was no such appearance.

November 30, 1926, defendant was in Rochester. The next day testimony in this case was heard in Special Term in that city. An attorney, other than counsel who argued the appeal in this court, was present in behalf of defendant to the trial After four witnesses had testified in support of the allegations of parties' marriage and of defendant's adultery and in respect to his income, this attorney stated:

‘I am preserving my rights by not appearing generally, but I would like to ask one or two questions.'

The court replied that counsel would have to take his chances on his appearance but that he had the right to appear at any time. The attorney repeated the statement that he was not appearing generally, received permission to cross-examine, and at that time confined his questions to matters relating to defendant's income. Then he caused three witnesses to be recalled for cross-examination. After a few questions had been asked by him, this colloquy occurred:

‘Mr. McInerney: I call attention to the fact that counsel is appearing generally in this matter.

‘Mr. Buck: No, I am appearing specially.

‘Mr. McInerney: Then I object to the examination at this time as a special appearance. Either he appears generally or specially.

‘The Court: I will receive evidence on behalf of the defendant.'

Counsel then interrogated concerning the presence of a man named Maciejewskiin plaintiff's house, claiming that his questions bore upon the financial condition of the parties. After many questions, clearly implying a recriminatory purpose, had been asked, that line of examination was stopped by the court. The attorney argued:

‘It seems to me it is competent to show whether she is being supported by somebody else, and that is the purpose of my question, to show whether she is cohabiting at this house with another man.

‘The Court: No, I will not go into that.'

Nevertheless, counsel persisted in questions evidently designed to prove such facts as a plea of recrimination might have warranted, and took exception to the court's refusal to admit such testimony in default of pleading.

Here is an example:

‘Q. At the time you talked to Mr. Henderson which you already testified on direct examination, did you or did you say to him in words or substance that you knew that the fault was not all his? * * *

‘The Court: Strike it out.

‘Mr. Buck: Exception.

‘The Court: If you want to defend this case on the mertis, put in an answer.'

Even then, counsel disregarded the warning. He recalled a witness for the express purpose of investigating plaintiff's relations with Maciejewski. He wanted to know if Maciejewski had not visited the Henderson residence at Lake Placid and had a room there after defendant had left. This witness was not at that time cross-examined on any other subject, but after an objection to such questions had been sustained and exception taken, the following occurred:

‘The Court: This witness doesn't know anything about any financial transaction, and that is all we are concerned with here.

‘Mr. Buck: Exception.

‘The Court: You are getting into the record a lot of suspicion and court will make no finding upon any suspicion.'

Counsel then recalled plaintiff and questioned her for the purpose of proving that Maciejewski had been at her house in Rochester the day before the trial and on other occasions, that she had several fur coats, and that she had brought an action against her husband for separation before she sued for divorce. He asserted that by such questions he was ‘endeavoring to show that this case is one of prosecution and persecution. This is a matter where two actions have been brought against him.’ The court declared the evidence closed, and the attorney excepted and asked to have the record show that he had other witnesses to call. They were then in court, but first he refused to divulge the nature of their testimony. At length he admitted that they did not intend to testify in respect to the financial circumstances of the parties. Excepting to the court's refusal to receive their testimony, he said, ‘I want to state that it will relate to the presence of another man in the residence which is now owned by the parties,’ and again excepted.

The certified question requires an answer whether the Supreme Court acquired jurisdiction of defendant's person sufficient to enable it to grant the judgment involved herein.

[1][2][3][4] Before our decision in Muslusky v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 225 N. Y. 584, 122 N. E. 461, many trivial acts by a defendant were viewed as putting him in the position of an actor in litigation. The general rule in this state is that when a defendant becomes an actor in a suit to the extent of participating in the merits he submits to the jurisdiction of the court (Farmer v. National Life Ass'n of Hartford, 138 N. Y. 265, 270,33 N. E. 1075), and that rule has the approval of the Supreme Court of the United States. In Merchants' Heat & Light Co. v. J. B. Clow & Sons, 204 U. S. 286, 290, 27 S. Ct. 285, 51 L. Ed. 488, Mr. Justice Holmes cited the Farmer Case and observed that the difference of opinion grows out of the question as to when a defendant does become such an actor. This question is one largely of degree, and the application of the rule must necessarily depend upon the facts. Matter of Macaulay, 27 Hun, 577; affirmed, 94 N. Y. 574;Thames & Mersey Ins. Co. v. U. S., 237 U. S. 19, 24, 25, 35 S. Ct. 496, 59 L. Ed. 821, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1987;St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. McBride, 141 U. S. 127, 11 S. Ct. 982, 35 L. Ed. 659;Geo. O. Richardson Machinery Co. v. Scott, 48 S. Ct. 264, 72 L. Ed. 497, February 20, 1928. When we said in the Muslusky Case, supra, that...