Henderson v. Henderson
| Decision Date | 01 June 1956 |
| Docket Number | 2,No. 36044,Nos. 1,36044,s. 1 |
| Citation | 93 S.E.2d 822,94 Ga.App. 64 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Mable L. HENDERSON et al. v. Elizabeth M. HENDERSON |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. In a civil action instituted for damages on grounds of negligence for the violation of a penal statute, admissions by the defendant tending to show guilt, whether made in or out of court, are competent evidence as such. The reason that such evidence is admissible is not because a plea of guilty in a court has any particular sanctity on the trial of a civil action, but only because such plea constitutes an admission that the defendant was at fault.
2. The assignment of error based on the discussion by counsel for the plaintiff of the facts of another reported case to the court in the presence of the jury is insufficient to authorize reversal for the reasons set forth in the corresponding division of the opinion.
3. The verdict is supported by the evidence, and, having the approval of the trial court, will not be reversed by this court on the general grounds of the motion for a new trial.
Mrs. Elizabeth M. Henderson brought an action for damages against her son, Miles J. Henderson, as owner of a certain automobile, mobile, and against her daughter-in-law as driver of the automobile. The plaintiff was riding in the automobile as the guest of her daughter-in-law when the automobile collided with another automobile, driven by a third person, at a named intersection, causing the plaintiff enumerated personal injuries. In her petition, as finally amended, the plaintiff charges that her injuries were proximately caused by the gross negligence of her daughter- in-law, which consisted of the following acts:
'(1) In that the said driver [Mrs. Mable L. Henderson] blindly drove into an intersecting public road and highway, as aforesaid, not only without maintaining a lookout along the street and highway ahead of the vehicle, but looked to the left as she entered and proceeded beyond the center of said intersection, and never did look to the right, and struck said 1951 Chevrolet coach which was proceeding from the right, and had the right of way at said intersecting highway, and [she] never did see said automobile approaching from her right, and which had already entered the intersection first, and approaching on a clear day, and with the view of the driver [Mrs. Mable L. [Henderson] of said automobile obstructed by reason of trees growing along and adjacent to said highway on her right hand side.
'(2) In driving said automobile while approaching and entering said intersection at a speed of approximately thirty-five (35) miles per hour, and without keeping a sharp lookout ahead and to the right of the said obstructed intersection for approaching traffic, the view of the said driver being obstructed by reason of dense trees on her said right-hand side of the said highway at said intersection, which speed, under such circumstances, was unreasonable and imprudent, having a regard to the potential hazards then existing, in violation of Code Section 68-1626, * * * which plaintiff alleges to be negligence per se and gross negligence.
'(4) In that the driver of said automobile in which plaintiff was riding failed to keep a lookout ahead and exercise slight care, and discover said automobile approaching from the right, and apply the brakes of said automobile in which plaintiff was riding as an invited guest, and thereby avoid the injuries and damages to plaintiff, * * * but blindly drove into an obstructed intersection as aforesaid.
'(6) Plaintiff alleges that the driver of said automobile was familiar with said highway and said intersection, and had traveled the same on many occasions, and as she entered said intersection blindly was utterly indifferent to the duty she owed her invited guest and utterly forgetful of her safety as aforesaid.
'(7) Plaintiff alleges that said defendant not only did not have said automobile under immediate control, but had no control of said automobile whatsoever, and made no effort to control the same in said intersection in any way before said automobile collided with the vehicle approaching from the right, which had the right of way, and avoid injuring plaintiff.'
Upon the trial of the case the jury returned the verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $10,000. The defendants' motion for a new trial, based upon the usual general grounds and 3 special grounds (numbered 4-6), was denied, and they assigned error upon that judgment. Special ground 1 (numbered 4) of the motion for a new trial, complaining of the illegal admission of certain evidence, is substantially as follows:
During the trial of this case the following took place: The plaintiff used as a witness C. W. Greer, an officer of the Georgia State Patrol, who testified that he went to the scene of the accident for the purpose of making an investigation. At the conclusion of his testimony counsel for the plaintiff stated: 'We would like to tender in evidence photostatic copy of the report of the patrolman (Greer), which has been so identified by him.' Whereupon, counsel for the defendants asked that the jury be excused from the courtroom and after the jury had retired stated: 'We have no objection to this investigator's accident report except insofar as it shows an arrest of Mrs. Mable L. Henderson for a failure to grant the right of way, which is highly prejudicial to the defendants.' Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff stated: 'I will prove that she pled guilty to the violation of the law.' Counsel for the defendants then stated: 'The law is that where a plea of guilty, if she pled guilty, has been entered, the plea itself would be the highest and best evidence.' At which point, counsel for the plaintiff, while the jury was still retired, put the defendant, Mrs. Henderson, on the stand and elicited from her the following testimony:
Counsel for the defendant then propounded the following questions and Mrs. Henderson, the defendant, gave the following answers:
'
Counsel for the plaintiff thereupon put the defendant, Miles J. Henderson, on the stand and he testified as follows:
This witness further testified on examination by counsel for the defendant as follows:
Counsel for the plaintiff examined this witness who testified as follows:
'
Counsel for the defendant stated: 'Your honor certainly recognizes that there has been no plea of guilty and the document is not admissible and we object to it.' Counsel for the plaintiff then stated: Whereupon, the court stated: Counsel for the defendants further stated: ...
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