Henderson v. Smith
| Decision Date | 04 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 21569,21569 |
| Citation | 128 Idaho 444,915 P.2d 6 |
| Parties | Patricia E. HENDERSON, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Vernon K. SMITH, Defendant-Appellant. STATE of Idaho, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, ex rel. Patricia E. HENDERSON, Petitioner in Intervention-Respondent, v. Vernon K. SMITH, Respondent in Intervention-Appellant. Boise, January 1996 Term |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Steven A. Adamson, Boise, for appellant.
Bauer & French, Boise, for respondent Henderson. Charles B. Bauer argued.
In this paternity action, appellant, Vernon K. Smith, appeals from the district court's decision affirming the magistrate's determination that Smith is the biological father of Rachel R. Henderson and order requiring Smith to pay for the future and past support of the child. We affirm the decision of the magistrate in all respects, except for the magistrate's award of attorney fees, which we reverse.
The relevant facts are as follows. On June 7, 1981, respondent, Patricia E. Henderson (Henderson) gave birth to Rachel R. Henderson (Rachel). On March 27, 1992, Henderson filed a paternity action against appellant, Vernon K. Smith (Smith), seeking a judgment declaring Smith the biological father of Rachel and ordering payment of past and future child support payments. Pursuant to Henderson's motion, the magistrate ordered the parties to submit to blood tests for the purpose of determining paternity.
Henderson contacted the State of Idaho, Department of Health & Welfare (the State) The blood samples were taken on March 10, 1993. The samples were sent to Genetic Design, Inc., and the paternity evaluation was performed. The Paternity Evaluation Report concluded that the probability of Smith's paternity was 99.96%.
[128 Idaho 447] and requested assistance in obtaining the blood tests. The State subsequently filed a motion to intervene, pursuant to sections 56-203B and 56-203C of the Idaho Code and Rule 24(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Over Smith's objections, the magistrate granted the State's motion to intervene and ordered that the blood drawing take place on March 10, 1993. The magistrate ordered that the blood testing be performed by Genetic Design, Inc., in Greensboro, North Carolina. The magistrate's order also gave Smith the option of requesting DNA testing in addition to the blood testing.
A trial before the magistrate was held on August 17, 1993. The magistrate rendered its decision concluding that Smith was the biological father of Rachel. The magistrate based its conclusion on Smith's admission of sexual relations with Henderson during the approximate time of conception, the fact that the baby was full term, the lack of evidence of Smith's sterility, and the results of the blood tests, which showed a probability of paternity of 99.96%. The magistrate held that Smith, as the biological father of Rachel, was responsible for paying past support expended by Henderson, limited to the six year period prior to the filing of the complaint. The magistrate further concluded that, based on the Idaho Child Support Guidelines, Smith was responsible for payment of child support in the amount of $373.00 per month beginning April 1993 and continuing until Rachel reaches majority or, if she continues her education, until she reaches the age of 19. Smith was required by the magistrate to pay the State $240.00 for the cost of the blood tests, to carry health insurance on Rachel until she reaches majority, and to split health care costs not covered by insurance with Henderson. The paternity action was held to not be barred by laches or the statute of limitations. Smith appealed the magistrate's decision.
On appeal, the district court affirmed the decision of the magistrate. Smith appealed to this Court.
On appeal, Smith argues (1) that Henderson's paternity action is barred by the statute of limitations, (2) that the magistrate erred in concluding that the defense of laches did not apply, (3) that the magistrate erred in allowing the State to intervene in this action, (4) that the magistrate's findings of fact are contrary to the weight and preponderance of the evidence presented, (5) that the magistrate erred in allowing the admission of the blood test results, (6) that Smith was denied due process of law by Henderson's failure to give notice of the claim within a meaningful time and manner, (7) that the magistrate erred in failing to consider the best interests of the child, (8) that the magistrate erred in entering judgment for a past debt for support for the prior six years, and (9) that attorney fees were improperly awarded to Henderson. The State seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to section 12-121 of the Idaho Code.
This Court reviews a decision of the magistrate division of the district court, independently of, but with due regard for, the decision of the district court sitting in its appellate capacity. Balderson v. Balderson, 127 Idaho 48, 51, 896 P.2d 956, 959 (1995); State Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Annen, 126 Idaho 691, 692, 889 P.2d 720, 721 (1995). The findings of the magistrate will be upheld by this Court, if they are supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record. Balderson, 127 Idaho at 51, 896 P.2d at 959. Issues of law are freely reviewed by this Court. Id.
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Smith contends that the present paternity action is barred by the statute of limitations.
[128 Idaho 448] Smith argues that, under section 7-1107 of the Idaho Code, and the tolling effects of the minority statute at section 5-230 of the Idaho Code, a paternity action must have been brought within nine years of Rachel's birth. Since Rachel was born on June 7, 1981, and the present action was not commenced until March 27, 1992, Smith argues that the action is barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations.
Under the 1969 Paternity Act, a claim for establishing the paternity of a child had to be brought within three years of the birth of the child. I.C. § 7-1107; I.C. § 5-218. When combined with the minority tolling provision of I.C. § 5-230, which tolled the limitations period for minors for up to six years, a paternity action could be brought under the 1969 Paternity Act within nine years of the child's birth. I.C. §§ 5-230, 7-1107. In 1985, the Idaho Legislature amended I.C. § 7-1107, expanding the limitations period to allow for the filing of a paternity action any time prior to the child's reaching the age of majority. 1985 Idaho Sess.Laws, H.B. No. 100, ch. 159, § 4, p. 422. In 1986, the Idaho Legislature again amended I.C. § 7-1107 to provide for the retroactive application of the limitations period "for the benefit of any dependent child, whether born before or after the effective date of this act [July 1, 1986]." 1986 Idaho Sess.Laws, H.B. 645, ch. 221, § 1, p. 584.
Smith argues that the statutory amendments to I.C. § 7-1107 do not permit Henderson to pursue this paternity claim on the ground that the legislature cannot revive a cause of action after the limitations period has lapsed and expired under the pre-amended limitations provisions. We disagree. Under I.C. § 7-1110, proceedings to establish the paternity of a child and to compel support under the Paternity Act may be commenced on the behalf of the child by the mother, guardian, or other person standing in a paternal relation to the child. Henderson brought this paternity action, as permitted in I.C. § 7-1110, in order to establish paternity and obtain support for the child. Henderson's actions were on the behalf of and for the benefit of Rachel. 1 Having brought the action on behalf of the child, the paternity action continued to be a viable claim at the time of the 1985 and 1986 amendments to I.C. § 7-1107.
The application of the 1986 amendments to the present action does not violate I.C. § 73-101's prohibition of the retroactive application of statutes. Section 73-101 of the Idaho Code prohibits the retroactive application of statutes unless the legislature expressly declares its intent that the statute be so applied. State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 247, 796 P.2d 121, 124 (1990); Gailey v. Jerome County, 113 Idaho 430, 432, 745 P.2d 1051, 1053 (1987). Here, the legislature has acted and has clearly expressed its intent that the statute of limitations is not to run on a cause of action for any child, regardless of whether the child was born before or after the effective date of the 1986 amendment. I.C. § 7-1107 (effective 1986). We conclude that the present action is not barred by the statute of limitations.
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES.
Smith argues that the magistrate erred in concluding that the defense of laches does not apply to a paternity action. Smith contends that the magistrate's ruling precluded Smith from presenting facts to support his argument that the doctrine of laches applies to paternity proceedings. Contrary to Smith's argument, the magistrate did not rule that laches is not applicable to paternity cases. Rather, the magistrate held that this particular action was not barred by the doctrine of laches.
The necessary elements to maintain a defense of laches are:
(1) defendant's invasion of plaintiff's rights; (2) delay in asserting plaintiff's rights, the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge by the defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is not held to be barred.
State Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Annen, 126 Idaho 691, 692-93, 889 P.2d 720, 721-22 (1995) (quoting Finucane v. Village...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hill v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.
...not retroactive. No statute is retroactive unless the Legislature expressly declares that it is. I.C. § 73–101 ; Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 448, 915 P.2d 6, 10 (1996). "A statute will not be given a retroactive construction by which it will impose liabilities not existing at the tim......
-
State v. Mubita
...person who has custody of the record as a regular part of his or her work or who has supervision of its creation. Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 450, 915 P.2d 6, 12 (1996) (quoting Altman, 122 Idaho at 1007-08, 842 P.2d at 686-87). The custodian need not have personal knowledge of the a......
-
Chandler v. Chandler
...(Ct.App.1993). The Court reviews the magistrate's award of child support under an abuse of discretion standard. Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 451, 915 P.2d 6, 13 (1996), citing Noble v. Fisher, 126 Idaho 885, 888, 894 P.2d 118, 121 (1995). The appellant bears the burden of establishing......
-
Lois M. Bishop v. Owens
...73–101 (asserting that "[n]o part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared"); see also Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 448, 915 P.2d 6, 10 (1996). Thus, this Court's ruling is dependent on whether Patricia Shelton's legal malpractice claim sounds in pure tort o......