Henderson v. State
| Decision Date | 07 November 1956 |
| Citation | 90 So.2d 447 |
| Parties | Jonas HENDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Ernest A. Townsend and Oxford & Oxford, Lakeland, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment of guilt and sentence to the State Prison entered pursuant to a verdict of the jury finding him guilty of manslaughter resulting from the culpably negligent operation of an automobile.
We are called upon to determine the correctness of the ruling of the trial court in denying a motion for continuance. We are also requested to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury.
Sometime around 9:30 p. m. on a clear night, appellant Jonas Henderson was driving his automobile on the highway between Babson Park and Lake Wales in Polk County. In addition to the driver there were four passengers in the car. En route the automobile left the highway at the month of a long 'S' curve, overturned several times and came to rest at a point approximately 366 feet from the pavement. Two of the passengers were killed. The evidence that went to the jury showed that the car was travelling between 80 and 100 miles per hour as the driver approached the curve. Appellant was thoroughly familiar with the road. He knew the location of the curve. He admitted that he had previously attempted to negotiate the curve at 60 miles per hour. He agreed that it couldn't be done at 100 miles per hour. He also admitted that he 'knew it was bad'. One witness testified that upon approaching the curve, he warned appellant to 'slow mony to the effect that one of the deceased mony to the effect that one of the deceased passengers grabbed the steering wheel just before he entered the curve. He states that this caused him to lose control of the car.
All of the evidence went to the jury, which brought in a verdict of guilty and recommended mercy. A ten-year sentence to the State Prison followed. Reversal of the judgment of guilt is now sought.
Appellant contends that the trial judge committed error in denying his motion for a continuance made on the opening day of the trial. He further seeks reversal on the proposition that culpable negligence to sustain a manslaughter conviction cannot be established by speed alone. He asserts that there was no other evidence of negligence to justify the conviction.
The State contends that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for continuance and further that the evidence is more than adequate to sustain the verdict of the jury.
On the morning set for the trial, appellant moved for a continuance on the ground that one of his witnesses was ill and cluld not appear. The absent witness was the employer of the appellant. It was shown that he would testify as to appellant's good reputation and character. According to the order denying the motion, appellant failed to show that the absent witness could have made any othe contribution to the evidence. The reputation or character of the appellant was not otherwise put in evidence.
Admittedly, a motion for a confinuance is addressed to the sound discrction of the trial judge. The exercise of this discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of abuse. Ordinarily, it is not reversible error to deny a motion for a continuance to enable a defendant to obtain evidence as to his character or reputation. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 488(b)(3). We ourselves have held that generally a continuance will not be granted on account of the absence of a witness to the character or reputation of the accused. Jacques v. State, 86 Fla. 137, 97 So. 380. This is especially the rule where no issue is created on the subject.
In the instant case the record fails to reveal any issue on the reputation or character of the appellant. We cannot find that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion for continuance.
Relying on our definition of 'culpable negligence' in ...
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Fowlkes v. State, 57-117
...case to consider the effect of excessive speed as proof or as an element of proof of culpable negligence of a driver, in Henderson v. State, Fla.1956, 90 So.2d 447, 448, where the Court 'Relying on our definition of 'culpable negligence' in Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360, appella......
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Davison v. State, 95-2460
...others. Preston, 56 So.2d at 544, citing People v. Gardner, 255 A.D. 683, 8 N.Y.S.2d 917, 921 (N.Y.A.D.1939); see also Henderson v. State, 90 So.2d 447, 448 (Fla.1956); Jackson v. State, 100 So.2d 839, 842 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); Fowlkes v. State, 100 So.2d 826 (Fla. 3rd DCA), cert. denied, 10......
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McDougal v. State, 5757
...of speed and must be considered with it. And so it was that this legal myth was in time judicially noticed and discarded. Henderson v. State, Fla.1956, 90 So.2d 447; Johnson v. State, Fla.1957, 92 So.2d 651, and Fulton v. State, Fla.1959, 108 So.2d 473, are prime In Henderson the Court said......
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Goswick v. State
...or denial of a motion for continuance will not be disturbed on review unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. E. g. Henderson v. State, Fla.1956, 90 So.2d 447, 448; Andrews v. State, 134 Fla. 450, 184 So. 88. A review of the record before us does not demonstrate an abuse of Having exam......