Henderson v. State
Docket Number | W2023-00515-CCA-R3-ECN |
Decision Date | 25 January 2024 |
Parties | KENNATH ARTEZ HENDERSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE |
Court | Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
Session November 7, 2023
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Fayette County No. 4465 J. Weber McCraw, Judge
The Petitioner, Kennath Artez Henderson, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court's summary denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, challenging the sentence of death that the trial court imposed after his guilty plea to the first degree premeditated murder of a law enforcement officer. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that newly discovered evidence of severe brain damage and serious mental illness at the time of the offense may have resulted in a different judgment if presented at trial, that he was without fault in failing to present the evidence at the proper time because trial counsel were ineffective for failing to discover and present the evidence at sentencing, and that due process requires tolling the statute of limitations. Based on our review of the oral arguments, the record, and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.
Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
Kelley J. Henry, Chief, and Amy D. Harwell, Assistant Chief, Capital Habeas Unit, Federal Public Defender, and Katherine M. Dix Assistant Federal Public Defender, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kennath Artez Henderson.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Andree Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor General; James Gaylord, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Mark E. Davidson, District Attorney General; and Falen M. Chandler, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
On May 13, 1997, the Fayette County Grand Jury returned a ten-count indictment, charging the Petitioner with one count of first degree premeditated murder, three counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnaping and one count each of attempted especially aggravated kidnaping, aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and felony escape. On July 6, 1998, the day trial was scheduled to begin, the Petitioner pled guilty to all of the charges except the charges for the three counts of first degree felony murder. Our supreme court summarized the facts in its opinion from the Petitioner's direct appeal of his convictions as follows:
State v. Henderson, 24 S.W.3d 307, 310-11 (Tenn. 2000) (footnotes omitted).
One week after the Petitioner's guilty pleas, he waived his right to have a jury empaneled to determine his sentence, and the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Id. at 311. Four witnesses, including the Petitioner, testified in mitigation at the hearing. Henderson v. State, No. W2003-01545-CCA-R3-PD, 2005 WL 1541855, at *41 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 5, 2005).
A brief review of the relevant testimony is in order. The Petitioner testified that he was twenty-four years old at the time of the crimes. Henderson, 24 S.W.3d at 311. He was heavily involved in extracurricular activities and sports in high school but had "some 'problems'" that were never addressed. Id. While the Petitioner was in jail in 1996, he requested counseling because he thought he "'needed help psychologically.'" Id. The Petitioner's mother testified that she did not think the Petitioner needed any help or intervention in his high school years and that she did not pursue obtaining help for him in jail because he "'seemed to be doing fine when [she] talked to him.'" Id. at 311-12. Dr. Lynne Zager, a forensic psychologist who evaluated the Petitioner for the sentencing hearing, testified about her findings and conclusions, which were based on two interviews with him, a personality test she administered, and information supplied by the defense. Id. at 312. She concluded that the Petitioner was suffering from dissociative disorder at the time of the crimes and that he "possessed an unspecified personality disorder which exhibited some narcissistic and anti-social traits." Id. She thought his dissociative state began after he fired the first shot and lasted at least twenty-four hours. Id. She opined that he was "'[acting] under duress, and that his judgment was not adequate'" at the time of the crimes but that his "condition at the time of the murder would not support a legal finding of insanity." Id.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that all four aggravating circumstances argued by the State had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) that the defendant created a great risk of death to two or more persons during the act of murder; (2) that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding an arrest; (3) that the murder was committed during the defendant's escape from lawful custody; and (4) that the murder was committed against a law enforcement officer, who was engaged in the performance of official duties.
Id. at 312 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(3), (6), (7), (9)). The trial court imposed a sentence of death for Deputy Bishop's murder and a consecutive effective sentence of twenty-three years for the remaining convictions. Id. fn.4.
On direct appeal of his convictions to this court, the Petitioner argued only that his death sentence was disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. State v. Henderson, No. 02C01-9808-CC-00243, 1999 WL 410421, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 1999). This court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. Id. at *5. On automatic direct appeal to our supreme court, that court held that the Petitioner's sentence of death was not disproportionate or arbitrarily applied, that the evidence supported each of the four aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Henderson, 24 S.W.3d at 319.
The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief on February 12, 2001, and an amended petition on November 30 2001, claiming, in pertinent part, that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to consult with him, which prevented them from monitoring his mental health, and for failing to develop and introduce mitigation evidence. Henderson, 2005 WL 1541855, at *1, *40. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial