Henderson v. State
| Decision Date | 10 July 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. A92A0720,A92A0720 |
| Citation | 204 Ga.App. 884,420 S.E.2d 813 |
| Parties | HENDERSON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
James J. Dalton II, Jonesboro, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, Dist. Atty., Tracy G. Gladden, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault with intent to rape (OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(1)).
1. In two enumerations of error, appellant raises the general grounds, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence against him. The evidence at trial showed that the victim, a school teacher, was approached by a man in the school parking lot as she was getting into her car on the afternoon of June 3, 1991. After passing by, the man turned, ran towards the victim in the open car door, jumped on top of her and threw her across the car seat. He began repeatedly hitting her in the head and attempted to pull one of her legs, which remained outside the car, inside the car. The victim was able to press the car horn, which brought others, including the school principal, out from the school; and when the attacker saw them he fled.
The victim was able to produce a composite drawing of her assailant, which closely approximated the photograph of appellant that she, at a later date, picked out of a six photograph line-up. At appellant's preliminary hearing the victim identified appellant as her assailant from among several black males garbed in jail jumpsuits; and she again identified appellant as her assailant at trial. She testified she had absolutely no doubt that appellant was the man who attacked her, and that she particularly remembered his eyes. The school principal, who had known appellant slightly prior to the day of this assault, had seen the assailant running away from the victim's car and also positively identified appellant as the assailant.
The State presented evidence of three similar incidents in which appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault with intent to rape in similar circumstances in the past ten years. Diane Koellman, the victim in the first of these three similar incidents and an employee of the Clayton County Library System at the time, testified that on the afternoon of August 23, 1982, she was delivering and picking up books at the Main Library, which is located adjacent to an elementary school and across the street from a middle school. While she was loading books in her van, appellant approached and asked her for a ride. She was not alarmed because she recognized him as a frequent visitor to the library, but told him she could not give him a ride. As she was putting the last bin of books in the van, he shoved her into the van with him, pulled the door closed and proceeded to wrestle with her, trying to pull her dress up and making comments of a sexual nature. Koellman continued to fight and managed to get an unlatched door open. The struggle continued outside the van until some people in the library looked out the back window, saw what was happening, and came out. Appellant then ran off and jumped on his bicycle. Koellman identified appellant as her attacker when he was arrested for attacking her, and again identified him as her attacker at the trial in this case. The officer who investigated the Koellman assault testified that after appellant was arrested he denied that he had tried to rape Koellman. A certified copy of appellant's guilty plea for aggravated assault with intent to rape Koellman was then admitted.
The second similar incident involved an attack on Judy Hutchens, a kindergarten teacher, as she was getting out of her car in the school parking lot on October 16, 1984. Hutchens testified that she was bending into the passenger side of her car when an attacker grabbed her from behind, threw her to the ground, and pulled up her skirt. Hutchens fought back, scratching her attacker's face. The attacker then quickly left on foot, but turned back to look at her. Hutchens identified appellant as her attacker at a preliminary hearing in her own case, and also identified him as her attacker at the trial in this case. She testified that she particularly remembered his eyes. The investigator on the Hutchens case testified that appellant was apprehended quickly after the Hutchens attack, and that appellant had initially denied the attack but then said he intended to rob her. A certified copy of appellant's plea of guilty to aggravated assault with intent to rape Hutchens was then admitted.
The final similar incident involved an assault on Shirley Alley, a teacher in a correctional institution, on March 4, 1987. Alley testified that she was alone in her classroom when an inmate came in, tried to put a jacket over her head, and pushed her up against a bookcase. When she screamed and flung her arms around, he fled. He was caught by another inmate. Alley identified appellant as her assailant at the time he was caught, and again identified him as her assailant at the trial in this case. A certified copy of appellant's guilty plea to assault with intent to rape Ms. Alley was then admitted.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we find that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of aggravated assault with intent to rape beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. In two enumerations of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the similar acts evidence. He argues first that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative, and second that it improperly placed his character in issue in violation of OCGA §§ 24-2-2 and 24-9-20(b). Because these arguments both go to the relevance of the similar acts evidence and the former contention is generally treated as a corollary of the latter, see Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640(2a), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991), we will address them together.
Evidence regarding the character of a defendant is generally inadmissible unless the defendant puts his character in issue. Id. As a corollary to this principle, evidence of independent offenses committed by a defendant is generally inadmissible due to its inherently prejudicial nature and minimal probative value. Id. These general principles do not apply, however, where the charged offense and the independent offenses are sufficiently similar that evidence of the independent offenses is highly probative of some element of the charged offense. In such cases the probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential for prejudice, and any incidental reflection on the defendant's character does not render this otherwise relevant and admissible evidence irrelevant or inadmissible. Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351(1a), 314 S.E.2d 621 (1984). Thus, evidence of independent offenses may be admitted if the State introduces the evidence for a proper purpose, if there is sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant actually committed the independent offenses, and if there is sufficient similarity between the charged...
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