Henderson v. State

Decision Date09 June 1952
Docket NumberNo. 17830,17830
Citation209 Ga. 238,71 S.E.2d 628
PartiesHENDERSON v. STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The evidence in this case was not sufficient to support the conviction of the defendant of the offense charged.

2. The special grounds of the motion for new trial, some of which have some merit, do not of themselves require a reversal.

This is the third appearance of this case in this court. See Henderson v. State, 207 Ga. 206, 60 S.E.2d 345, and Henderson v. State, 208 Ga. 73, 65 S.E.2d 175. When the case was first here, it was held that the evidence was not sufficient to authorize a conviction. The facts need not be again stated here, except as will appear in the opinion. In the instant case, the plaintiff in error was convicted without recommendation and sentenced to be electrocuted. He filed his motion for new trial, which was amended by the addition of eighteen special grounds. The motion as amended was duly denied. The exception here is to that ruling.

Daniel Duke, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., R. L. Addleton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boykin & Boykin, Shirley Boykin, Carrollton, Wright Lipford, Solicitor-Gen., Newnan, John J. Flynt, Jr., Solicitor-Gen., Griffin, for defendant in error.

WYATT, Justice.

1. When this case was first here, it was held that the fact that the jury was 'authorized to find that, on the night of the killing, the defendant owned the pistol from which the bullets were fired that killed the deceased,' was not sufficient to authorize a conviction. In that case, Justice ALMAND, writing for the court, points out very clearly why the evidence adduced upon the trial was not legally sufficient to sustain the verdict of guilty.

In the instant case, the evidence was substantially the same as in that case, with the additional circumstance that the defendant had at one time lived in the locality where the crime was committed and was familiar with the territory. This additional fact, without more, would, of course, not be sufficient to sustain the verdict.

In the instant case, the lady witness, whom the defendant was alleged to have attempted to attack at the time of the killing, testified: 'I see Clarence Henderson in this court room. I heard the man talking. I heard all that he said out there that night. I have heard Clarence Henderson talk since he was apprehended. I heard him talk to Newnan, Georgia, one Sunday in Sheriff Potts' office. In my opinion, based upon my observation of the man that night that I have testified to, and having heard him talk over in Sheriff Potts' office, the man was Clarence Henderson. Clarence Henderson did that.' It appeared that the witness did not know the defendant before the night of the alleged crime, and that she therefore at that time did not know his voice. It also appeared that, at the first trial, 'The only evidence in the record as to a description of the person who did the killing is that of the lady witness, who testified that he was a Negro man, and she, who heard his voice and saw him, made no attempt to say that he resembled the defendant in any manner.' Henderson v. State, 207 Ga. 206, 215, 60 S.E.2d 345, 350.

Boiling this testimony down to what it really means, it simply means that the witness gave it as her opinion, based upon the voice and size of the defendant, that he was the man who perpetrated the crime; notwithstanding the fact that she did not know him or his voice at the time of the crime, and the further very significant fact that at the first trial she made no effort to identify the defendant or to tesfity that he 'resembled the defendant in any manner.' 'The averment that, on the day after the signing of the note by the plaintiff in error, 'he called the bank by telephone' and communicated the conditions to one whose voice 'he took to be' that of the assistant cashier, was fatally defective as a plea of knowledge in the bank. It is not a sufficiently positive allegation of a necessary fact.' Thompson v. Bank of Chatsworth, 30 Ga.App. 443, 118 S.E. 470, 471.

It is true that 'personal identity of...

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10 cases
  • State v. Jonas
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • September 16, 1975
    ...that the identification by voice is, as a matter of law, insufficient. Several states have espoused such a principle; see Henderson v. State, 209 Ga. 238, 71 S.E.2d 628; People v. Abelson, 309 N.Y. 643, 132 N.E.2d 884; while others have required proof of either prior knowledge of the defend......
  • Ramsay v. Sims, 17824
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    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 9, 1952
    ... ... of Pittsburgh ... 'Policy No. 987265 issued by Reliance Life Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh ... 'Policy No. 97287 issued by the Volunteer State Life Insurance Company ... 'The beneficiary now named in said policies numbers 987264 and 987265 is Mrs. Lida Ramsay Sims. The beneficiary in each ... ...
  • Willingham v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • April 23, 1975
    ...is inadmissible unless the witness discloses the basis for his opinion. Patton v. State, 117 Ga. 230, 43 S.E. 533; Henderson v. State, 209 Ga. 238, 71 S.E.2d 628. But see Taylor v. State, 75 Ga.App. 205, 42 S.E.2d We also note that a witness may identify a defendant by voice recognition eve......
  • Ramsey v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • April 9, 1956
    ...the majority being of the opinion that it does have such right. Glustrom v. State, 206 Ga. 734, 740, 58 S.E.2d 534; Henderson v. State, 209 Ga. 238, 241, 71 S.E.2d 628. Justice Head, in his dissenting opinion in the Glustrom case, concurred in by Presiding Justice Wyatt and Justice Almand, ......
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