Henderson v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 15 February 1978
• Citation: 142 Cal.Rptr. 478,77 Cal.App.3d 583
• Parties: A. Douglas HENDERSON, by Special Appearance only, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; Rosemary G. HENDERSON, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 52289.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 478

142 Cal.Rptr. 478

77 Cal.App.3d 583

A. Douglas HENDERSON, by Special Appearance only, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent Rosemary G. HENDERSON, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 52289.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Feb. 15, 1978.

Max Fink and Rodney T. Lewin, Beverly Hills, for petitioner.

Richard N. Piantadosi, Los Angeles, for real party in interest.

FLEMING, Acting Presiding Justice.

The trial court denied defendant A. Douglas Henderson's motions to quash service of summons on him in Florida for lack of jurisdiction and to dismiss plaintiff Rosemary G. Lepera's action against him in California for inconvenience of forum. We issued an alternative writ of mandate.

FACTS

The motion papers (verified petition, verified complaint, and exhibits) show that defendant Henderson first met plaintiff Lepera in Florida in the latter part of 1971. Henderson, then 26 years old and a domiciliary and resident of Florida, possessed substantial inherited wealth. Lepera then 32 years old, married, and the mother of two children, worked as a hostess in a restaurant owned by Henderson. In January 1972 Henderson and Lepera began a personal liaison which continued until August or December 1976. Lepera divorced her husband in June 1973, and although Henderson never married her or adopted her children, she, apparently without demur from Henderson, called herself Rosemary G. Henderson. The two lived together and held themselves out as husband and wife. Both were interested in horse racing, and plaintiff's complaint asserts that 12 acres of property were purchased in Parkland, Pompano Beach, Florida, for the stabling and training of race horses. Additional property for training and racing horses was purchased at Ocala, Florida, and, according to the complaint, property was also acquired in Vermont.

In plaintiff's verified complaint, filed under the name of Henderson, she alleges that in May 1972 the parties orally agreed they would combine earnings and share equally in any and all property accumulated while they were living together; they would hold themselves out to the general public as husband and wife; Lepera would render services as companion and homemaker; the parties would start and jointly conduct a thoroughbred horse-training and racing business; Henderson would give Lepera $50,000 a year; he would give Lepera's natural parents $400 a month for life; he would support and educate Lepera's two children in a style that would include a full-time governess and separate housing (amounting to $1500 monthly) and private schooling (unspecified additional cost). According to plaintiff, Henderson made timely payment of these various sums.

The only time the parties were in California together was for two days in San Francisco in the summer of 1973.

Sometime in 1975 plaintiff qualified as a professional horse trainer and began to train race horses. After the relationship of the parties terminated on their separation (in August 1976 according to defendant; in December 1976 according to plaintiff), plaintiff desired to establish a reputation in California as a horse trainer. To enable her to do this defendant sent eleven of his and his mother's horses to California to race under plaintiff as trainer at an annual salary of $50,000. Plaintiff arrived in California in January 1977, and raced these horses in meets at Santa Anita, Hollywood Park, and Del Mar. On June 30 defendant terminated plaintiff's salary and undertook to compensate her as an independent contractor on the basis of $30 per horse per day plus a percentage of the horses' winnings. On July 20 plaintiff filed her complaint, which, in reliance upon the doctrine set out in Marvin v. Marvin (1977) 18 Cal.3d 660, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106, sought compensation for her "equitable interest" in the Florida properties, the Vermont property, the horses, and the horse-racing business; payment of $50,000 a year for life; lifetime support for her two parents; support and education for her two children; payment of $1,000,000 for services rendered; interest on $1,000,000 at 7 percent from May 1972; and other unspecified relief. At the time of filing her complaint plaintiff also applied for an Order to Show Cause (Marriage), which sought an injunction against defendant's removing his horses from California, spousal support of $7,500 monthly, attorneys fees of $20,000, and court costs of $5,000. Both in her complaint and her application for spousal support plaintiff asserted that her previously paid salary of $50,000 for training and racing horses was a sham and was in fact money provided her under the oral agreement for her maintenance and personal support.

Defendant was served with the complaint in Florida, apparently under the theory he was doing business in California. Thereafter he entered a special appearance to make these motions.

DISCUSSION

The petition presents two issues: the validity of jurisdiction obtained by personal service outside the state on this nonresident defendant; and the convenience of a California forum for the litigation of the cause of action set out in the complaint.

Exercise of authority by California courts over events occurring and persons located outside the state is controlled by two companion principles: first, the long-arm statutes for service of process can, in appropriate cases, require a nonresident defendant served with process outside the state to respond to suit in California when the cause of action relates to defendant's activities in California, when California can provide a convenient forum, and when the state has an interest in protecting the welfare of its citizens in relation to the subject matter. (Code Civ.Proc., §§ 410.10, 415.40.) Second, the principle of inconvenient forum tempers the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by authorizing the dismissal or stay of an action filed in California when it possesses no substantial connection with defendant's activities in California, when California cannot provide an adequate forum, and when California has no interest in fostering the litigation. (Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 127 Cal.Rptr. 352, 545 P.2d 264.) The principle of inconvenient forum is codified in Code of Civil Procedure, § 410.30: "When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just." When the forum is found inconvenient, the ordinary remedy in a cause involving a bona fide California resident is to stay rather than dismiss the action. (Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels (1976) 15 Cal.3d 853, 126 Cal.Rptr. 811, 544 P.2d 947.)

With the foregoing principles in mind we examine the facts at bench to determine the appropriate disposition of defendant's motions. On both motions we think defendant has the better of the argument.

I

Preliminarily, we note that plaintiff's cause of action does not arise out of defendant's horse-racing activity in California, but relates in its entirety to an agreement made, activities performed, obligations incurred, and services rendered as companion and homemaker during an extramarital and nonmarital relationship that took place in Florida. The parties agree that cohabitation ceased sometime in 1976 prior to plaintiff's removal to California in January 1977.

All pleaded counts clearly refer to an agreement made, activities performed, obligations incurred, and services rendered in Florida prior to plaintiff's departure for California, except the fifth count (a common count for $1,000,000), which refers to labor and services rendered by plaintiff to defendant within four years last past. Considered in isolation, this count might suggest than part of the services for which $1,000,000 is claimed had been rendered in California during the six months that preceded the filing of the complaint in July 1977. However, the services that form the basis for the common count are from other parts of the complaint readily identifiable as nonmarital services rendered in Florida prior to the parties' separation in 1976 and prior to plaintiff's removal to California in 1977. Although the fifth count on its face purports to claim compensation for labor and services rendered up to the filing of the complaint, from the facts pleaded in other counts and from the relief sought in the verified Order to Show Cause (Marriage) it clearly appears that the services referred to are those involved in nonmarital cohabitation as companion and homemaker, services that terminated sometime during 1976. The common count must be read in the light of the more specific facts asserted in other counts and in the Order to Show Cause (Marriage), and the specific facts set out in plaintiff's complaint take precedence over inconsistent general conclusions pleaded in the complaint. It is well-established under California procedure that specific pleading controls, limits, and supersedes general pleading found in the same or a prior complaint. (Orloff v. Metropolitan Trust Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 484, 489, 110 P.2d 396; Hays v. Temple (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 690, 695, 73 P.2d 1248; Harris v. Kessler (1932) 124 Cal.App. 299, 303, 12 P.2d 467; Neal v. Bank of America (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 678, 682, 209 P.2d 825; Witkin, Cal.Proc.2d (1971) pp. 2095-97.) The subject matter of the complaint is identifiable as a nonmarital agreement and relationship initiated in Florida, between Florida residents, for services performed in Florida, involving Florida property, and which terminated in Florida. All rights and liabilities arising out of the nonmarital agreement and its related activities became fixed and vested in 1976 at the time of its termination. Only thereafter did plaintiff take up residence in California. Her status is that of one who...