Hendrick v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 31 August 1973
• Citation: 10 Pa.Cmwlth. 392,309 A.2d 187
• Parties: Edward HENDRICK et al., Appellants, v. Gerald JACKSON et al., Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

309 A.2d 187

10 Pa.Cmwlth. 392

Edward HENDRICK et al., Appellants, v. Gerald JACKSON et al., Appellees.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

August 31, 1973

Argued Feb. 4, 1973.

S. Jay Sklar, Asst. City Sol., John Mattioni Deputy City Sol., Philadelphia, for appellants.

Bruce E. Endy, Joseph Wenk, Community Legal Services, Inc. Philadelphia, for appellees.

Before BOWMAN, President Judge, and CRUMLISH Jr., KRAMER, WILKINSON, MENCER, ROGERS, and BLATT, JJ.

BOWMAN, Presiding Judge.

There are two basic issues raised in this appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, which decreed that the Philadelphia prison system as it is presently being operated is in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in its treatment of its inmates and detainees.

In deciding whether or not the lower court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the present prison conditions constitute a violation of Eighth Amendment rights, we do so within the scope of our review. In a recent decision, this Court exhaustively considered this issue. The scope of review is limited to manifest error or clear abuse of discretion. If there is sufficient evidence to justify the findings and if reasonable inferences and conclusions are derived therefrom, the Chancellor's decision will stand. Ross v. Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, 8 Pa.Cmwlth 204, 301 A.2d 405 (1973).

A careful review of the record below indicates that the extensive findings of fact are based on substantial evidence and thus will be sustained. As Judge Spaeth, one of the three hearing judges, points out in his opinion at page 4:

'. . . on every important matter there is little or no disagreement, and often the evidence in support of a particular finding is overwhelming.'

Having found that there is sufficient evidence to support the findings of fact, the next consideration is whether or not those conditions found to exist constitute, as a matter of law, a violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The leading Pennsylvania decision in this area is Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971). Although the Bryant appeal resulted from the granting of habeas corpus relief and this case has arisen in equity, Bryant is controlling in the instant case on the issue of what facts constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court in Bryant cites with approval and relies on Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.Supp. 362 (E.D.Ark.1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8 Cir. 1971), on the Eighth Amendment constitutional issue. Holt, like the instant case, was a class action in equity involving a fact situation similar to both Bryant and the case at bar. Since the Supreme Court has approved the Holt decision as regards Eighth Amendment principles and that case arose in equity, Bryant is, therefore, directly applicable here.

In Bryant, supra, the Court, quoting the lower court, states 444 Pa. at 93, 280 A.2d at 115:

'. . . petitioners have been imprisoned in overcrowded, wet, badly ventilated, and verminous cells.'

And at pages 94 and 95 of its opinion, 280 A.2d at 115--116, the Court discusses the inadequate medical care, threat of assault, both sexual and otherwise, in addition to the other living conditions.

In determining whether such conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme Court indicates a test to be employed. Quoting from Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968), it said in Bryant, 444 Pa. at 97--98, 280 A.2d at 117:

"In summary . . . we have a flat recognition that the limits of the Eighth Amendment's proscription are not easily or exactly defined, and we also have clear indications that the applicable standards are flexible, that disproportion, both among punishments and between punishment and crime, is a factor to be considered, and that broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency are useful and usable.'

'Using the above as a litmus test . . ..'

The facts as found by the lower court in the instant case are similar to those of Bryant. In fact, both decisions concern the same institution--Holmesburg. Therefore, we affirm the lower court's conclusion that the current conditions in Holmesburg constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

A most difficult issue involves that portion of the order of the lower court which provides for the appointment of a master and sets forth in broad terms the scope and nature of his responsibilities and those of the parties, particularly the defendants, to the master. The order concluded by stating that the master's report and recommendations will be considered by the court in 'framing its final decree.'

Appellants contend that the appointment of a master under these circumstances and the nature of responsibilities assigned to him is without authority in law.

We are asked to resolve this issue prior to any master having been appointed let alone having made a report and recommendations leading to a final decree; yet, it is before us on appeal from a 'final decree.' Although not entirely clear from the record, this unorthodox posture of the case appears to have resulted from exceptions having been filed to the decree nisi which were overruled following argument thereon and a 'final decree' then being entered. Thus, as a matter of law we have an appealable order in the technical form of a 'final decree' but are asked to resolve this legal issue when the case is far from final as a matter of fact.

The use of masters or referees by courts except in most unusual cases and within narrow limits has been strongly condemned as an 'abdication of the judicial function depriving the parties of a trial before the court. . . .' La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256, 77 S.Ct. 309, 313, 1 L.Ed.2d 290 (1957). For much the same reason, the history of Pennsylvania jurisprudence reveals an increasingly tight rein being placed upon the use of masters by our courts as exemplified by Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 1514 and 1515 and their predecessor Equity Rule 65.

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1514, governing equity actions, now provides:

'Except as otherwise provided by Act of Assembly or rule of the Supreme Court, no examiner, master or auditor shall be appointed.'

Unless the appointment of a master in this case to perform the functions assigned to him by the lower court falls within an exception to this Rule, his appointment is without authority in law. The only exception possibly applicable here is that found in Pa.R.C.P. No. 1515, which provides:

'In action involving complicated accounts, or questions requiring the evidence of experts, the court may employ an accountant or other expert to aid in the proper disposition of the action. The report or evidence of such accountant or other expert shall be available to any party and he shall be subject to examination or cross-examination by any party. He shall be paid reasonable compensation for his services.'

The leading case interpreting these rules, and the one upon which the lower court relies in providing for a master in this case, is Arcadia Theatre Co. v. Sablosky, 418 Pa. 34, 209 A.2d 375 (1964). In addition to discussing the historical role of a master, the growing concern over the use of a master as impinging upon the judicial function and the adoption of new procedures to rectify the problems, our Supreme Court, after observing that the dominant issue as to the propriety of the use of a master in an equity case 'is the extent of the master's participation' states, 'A master may not be appointed to take testimony, make findings of fact and suggest a decree. He cannot make a judicial determination.' Arcadia, supra, 418 Pa. at 40, 209 A.2d at 378.

In discussing the exception found in Equity Rule 65 (as restated in Pa.R.C.P. No. 1515) and approving the appointment of a master by the lower court in that case, the Supreme Court, quoting Rowley v. Rowley, 294 Pa. 535, 540, 144 A. 537, 539 (1928), continued:

'But express provision was made by Rule 65 where the final decree for an accounting had been entered, to name experts or assessors to pass on debits and credits, and strike the balance due, . . . 'Whether the person to whom the case is sent be called an assessor, an auditor, a referee or a master, is of no importance, the substance of the matter is the right of the court in exceptional cases to avail itself of exceptional assistance, in executing or supervising the execution of the details of its work, not requiring the exercise of exclusively judicial functions.' (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Archbald, 195 Pa. 317, 320, 46 A. 5, 6 (1900)).'

418 Pa. at 42, 209 A.2d at 378.

'Of course, master in chancery had been abolished in 1894, and any functions of a judicial nature as performed by a master in chancery were abolished. The name Master, however, has persisted with sometimes well-defined duties, and at other times with no particular definition. In this case, however, the parties, by stipulation, outlined the duties of Mr. Ott, who was named master. His function by that agreement was to perform certain duties under the jurisdiction of the chancellor, and not as a substitute for the chancellor. It is necessary in some equitable actions for the court to avail itself of persons who can see to the performance of certain duties, either defined and outlined by the court, or by agreement of the parties and approved by the court, just so long as those duties are not judicial. The record indicates that Mr. Ott supervised the collection and distribution of receipts of the theatre, and otherwise supervised the personnel operating the theatre. He held numerous meetings and conferences and decided upon the time to hold the meeting of shareholders for the purpose of electing the Board of...