Philadelphia Federation of Teachers v. Ross

• Decision Date: 29 June 1973
• Citation: 8 Pa.Cmwlth. 204,301 A.2d 405
• Parties: , 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2875, 70 Lab.Cas. P 53,034 PHILADELPHIA FEDERATION OF TEACHERS et al., Appellants, v. William ROSS et al., Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 405

301 A.2d 405

8 Pa.Cmwlth. 204, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2875,

70 Lab.Cas. P 53,034

PHILADELPHIA FEDERATION OF TEACHERS et al., Appellants, v. William ROSS et al., Appellees.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Jan. 29, 1973.

Decided March 13, 1973.

Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted June 29, 1973.

Affirmed.

Crumlish, Jr., J., dissented and filed opinion; Blatt, J., dissented and filed opinion in which Mencer, J., joined. Leonard M. Sagot, John J. Poserina, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellants.

Vincent J. Salandria, Philadelphia School Dist., Philadelphia, for appellees.

BOWMAN, President Judge.

In this appeal by the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers two issues are raised. The first--a threshold question of jurisdiction--is whether the lower court properly concluded that it had jurisdiction to entertain a complaint in equity under Section 1003 of the Public Employe Relations Act ¹ (PERA) filed at a time when a strike by teachers in the Philadelphia school system was not yet in progress; the court recognized, however, that the equitable relief sought could not be granted until a strike was in progress.

The second issue is whether the lower court erred as a matter of law in concluding under the facts reasonably reached that the strike then in progress 'created a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety and welfare of the public,' the statutory criteria for the granting of equitable relief under Section 1003 of PERA.

The history of collective bargaining between the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers and the School District of Philadelphia for the 1972--1973 school year must be briefly recited as the factual background for the issue of jurisdiction which must first be resolved.

For the prior school year of 1971--1972, the Federation and the District were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which by its terms expired August 31, 1972. Collective bargaining for a new contract had reached an impasse and while the record before us does not disclose in detail the procedures followed after impasse, it is clear that on September 5, 1972, the member teachers of the Federation did not report for work incident to the scheduled fall opening of the public schools of Philadelphia. The lower court, having justifiably concluded that such action constituted a strike, then recites the undisputed events leading up to the filing of a complaint in equity by the District.

'As a consequence of said strike, the schools of the School District of Philadelphia were closed from September 5, 1972, until September 28, 1972, at which time the parties entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Board Exhibit 1) in which the Union agreed to return to work under the provisions of the September 1, 1970--August 31, 1972, collective bargaining agreement.

'The aforesaid Memorandum of Understanding was due to terminate by its terms on December 31, 1972, if a new contract was not consummated by that time. A new contract agreement was not reached by December 31, 1972, but the Union agreed to a one week contract extension terminating on January 7, 1973.

'On January 3, 1973, the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers conducted a general membership meeting at which meeting a vote of the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers bargaining unit members was taken concerning whether to accept the report and recommendation of Arnold M. Zack, Esquire, the Fact Finder designated by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board to hear the facts relevant to the impasse between the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers and the Board of Education of the School District of Philadelphia. By a vote of 8,745 to 1,850 the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers voted to reject the report and recommendations and to strike the School District of Philadelphia, effective January 8, 1973.'

Faced with this declaration by the Federation to resume the strike, the District filed its complaint in equity seeking injunctive relief on Thursday, January 4, 1973. The Federation promptly filed preliminary objections to the complaint asserting that a court of equity was without jurisdiction under the statute as no strike was in progress as of January 4, 1973.

By opinion and order dated January 5, 1973, the lower court sustained the preliminary objections 'to the extent it deals with the jurisdiction of the court . . . to grant an injunction before a strike actually occurs.' It further ordered hearings on the complaint to begin Monday, January 8, 1973, which was the date fixed by the Federation for resumption of the strike and on which date the strike was in fact resumed.

In Calabrese v. Collier Township Municipal Authority, 430 Pa. 289, 240 A.2d 544 (1968), our Supreme Court clearly delineated the equity jurisdiction of courts of common pleas in Pennsylvania. It said:

'Insofar as the exercise of equity jurisdiction by a court of common pleas is concerned, Pennsylvania's legal history is unique. Although from earliest times courts of common pleas in Pennsylvania did recognize and apply equitable principles As part of the common law of the Commonwealth (Morton's Estate, 201 Pa. 269, 270, 271, 50 A. 933 (1902)), courts of common pleas were strictly common law courts which neither possessed nor exercised the powers of a court of chancery by reason of an existing public prejudice against chancery courts. However, gradually over the years, by constitutional fiat (cf. Art. V, § 20 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania) and by legislation, courts of common pleas were granted chancery powers in certain specified areas. However, the extent to which a court of common pleas may exercise such chancery powers lies within the control of the legislature.

'A court of common pleas is a constitutional court whose jurisdiction is general in all matters involving the law but is limited in matters involving equity to the extent delineated by the legislature.' 430 Pa. at 295--296, 240 A.2d at 547--548 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).

As applied to this case we must, therefore, look to the legislative grant of equity jurisdiction with respect to strikes by public employees. Section 1003 of PERA provides in part:

'If a strike by public employes occurs . . . it shall not be prohibited unless and until such a strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public. In such cases the public employer shall initiate . . . an action for equitable relief including but not limited to appropriate injunctions and shall be entitled to such relief if the court finds that the strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public.'

Appellants would have us conclude that since a strike was not in progress on January 4, 1973, a strike had not occurred and therefore the lower court then lacked jurisdiction to entertain the District's complaint in equity as of that date. Such a contention ignores the reality of the facts and is contrary to the grant of equity jurisdiction conferred upon courts of common pleas by the statute. In reality a strike had long since occurred and had persisted for some three weeks prior to its suspension under the heretofore referred to Memorandum of Understanding. Such a strike having occurred, the condition of the statute upon which the court's equity jurisdiction was predicated was met, and its jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in equity properly attached. That the Court could not then grant the equitable relief provided by the statute until hearing and proof of a clear and present danger or threat to public health, welfare or safety in no way diminishes or further conditions the statutory grant to entertain such an equitable action.

Before considering the second issue, i.e., whether or not the lower court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the strike 'created a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety (or) welfare of the public,' we must first determine this Court's scope of review. A multitude of authorities stands for the proposition that the scope of review in such a case is severely restricted. The most common expressions of this are couched in terms of 'manifest error,' 'clear abuse of discretion,' 'reasonable grounds,' et al. One of the earlier cases so stating was Steinmeyer v. Siebert, 190 Pa. 471, 42 A. 880 (1899), where the Court said that the findings of the chancellor will not be disturbed by the appellate court 'except for error which clearly appears. An apparent preponderance of testimony against (such findings) is not sufficient to lead to a reversal, if there is testimony which, if believed, will warrant (the findings).' 190 Pa. at 475, 42 A. at 881. This position is now stated in 9 Standard Pennsylvania Practice, Ch. 40, § 113. Similarly, in Commonwealth Trust Company, Admr. v. Szabo, 391 Pa. 272, 276--277, 138 A.2d 85, 87 (1957), the Court said that 'a chancellor's findings of fact, approved by a court en banc, have all the force and effect of a jury's verdict if they are supported by adequate evidence and ordinarily will not be disturbed on appeal: (citations omitted).' This was subject, however, to the limitation that the chancellor's "conclusions whether of law or ultimate fact are no more than his reasoning from the underlying facts and are reviewable', especially 'where the underlying facts themselves are not in esse but are matter of inference and deduction': (citations omitted).' Accord, Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 127, 224 A.2d 164, 168 (1966).

The narrow standard of 'manifest error' as to scope of review is stated in 9 Standard Pennsylvania Practice, Ch. 40, § 113, with regard to findings in equity: 'Ordinarily, when the appellate court ascertains that the conclusions of fact reached by the trial court rest upon sufficient evidence and that the record discloses no manifest error in the deduction from the evidence, its duty in this respect has been fully discharged.

'The findings of fact of a...