Hendrick v. State

Decision Date05 April 1911
Citation81 A. 18,115 Md. 552
PartiesHENDRICK v. STATE.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

John T Hendrick was convicted in a justice court of operating his automobile without having paid the registration fee, and he appealed to the circuit court, where the judgment was affirmed. On application for certiorari to the circuit court. Application denied.

Ralston, Siddons & Richardson, for appellant. Isaac Lobe Straus, Atty. Gen., for the State.

Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, BURKE, PATTISON, and URNER, JJ.

BOYD C.J.

John T Hendrick filed a petition in this court for a writ of certiorari directed to the circuit court for Prince George's county, to the end that the case against him referred to in the petition may be reviewed, and that the judgment of the circuit court may be quashed. The petitioner was arrested for operating his automobile without having paid the registration fee required by section 133 of the motor vehicle law of Maryland passed in 1910 (chapter 207), and was taken before a justice of the peace for Prince George's county. He filed a motion to quash the warrant on the ground that the act was unconstitutional, which was overruled by the justice, and he was then tried, found guilty, and fined the sum of $15. He then entered an appeal to the circuit court for that county, and, the record of the proceedings before the justice having been transmitted to that court, the petitioner was there tried, and the judgment of the justice was affirmed. Section 140p of the act of 1910 gives any person convicted by a justice of any offense under the subtitle of the act the right to appeal to the court of criminal jurisdiction of the county in which he may be convicted, which is the circuit court. The petitioner availed himself of that right, but contends that he is entitled to the writ of certiorari on the ground that the act is unconstitutional, and that for that reason the court was acting outside of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law, the contention of the petitioner being that the circuit court was in error in assuming jurisdiction of the case when it had before it an agreed statement of facts showing that he was a citizen of the United States, a resident of the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, and conducted and operated his automobile from the city of Washington into Prince George's county, and while temporarily operating the same as aforesaid was arrested in Hyattsville, in said county, on the charge of operating his said automobile on the highways in the state of Maryland without having procured the certificate of registration required by section 133 of the motor vehicle law of said state.

So far as we are aware, this is the first time an application has been made to this court to grant the writ of certiorari to the circuit court (or any court having like jurisdiction) on the ground that the latter, when sitting in its appellate capacity, hearing an appeal from a justice of the peace or other tribunal which was authorized by law to be taken to it, had exceeded its jurisdiction. That fact alone should cause us to be extremely cautious in entertaining such an application, for our reports contain many decisions in which the jurisdiction of the circuit court (we need not mention other courts exercising like jurisdiction) has been attacked on the ground that the justice of the peace or other tribunal appealed from did not have jurisdiction, and hence the lower court did not have it. If it had been supposed by the profession that there was a remedy by the writ of certiorari, it would surely have heretofore been resorted to by some of the attorneys engaged in such cases.

We have frequently decided that, although when a statute gives the right of appeal to the lower court and no appeal is expressly given to this court, ordinarily we have no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the judgment of the lower court. If the lower court and the justice or other tribunal appealed from did not have jurisdiction, we would entertain an appeal or writ of error on that ground. As that is thoroughly established in this state, it would of itself be sufficient reason for refusing to grant a writ of certiorari to test the question of jurisdiction, as appeals or writs of error are the usual methods of bringing cases before this court for review, and nothing could be accomplished in such cases by writs of certiorari, which could not be by one of those methods. It is true it was said in Gaither v. Watkins, 66 Md. 576, 8 A. 464, that we were not prepared to go to the extent of saying that "a writ of certiorari ought not to issue in any case where a party has a remedy by appeal or by writ of error," but it was also there said that "the writ ought not to be granted in any case where the party has a right of appeal, except for the purpose of testing the jurisdiction of the tribunal below." That had reference to an application to such a court as the circuit court for the writ of certiorari, to be issued to an inferior tribunal, and the reason why that court should allow the writ to test the jurisdiction is given in that opinion, and is not in any way applicable to this court. The reason there assigned was that an appeal to the circuit court from an inferior tribunal "brings up the case generally on its merits, and this would in a case like the one before us, involving the question whether the public convenience required the road to be open, subject the parties to an expensive and protracted litigation; whereas, by certiorari, to test merely the jurisdiction of the commissioners, the question is one to be decided on the face of the proceedings themselves. In such cases it is a more efficient remedy than by appeal." In this court we could not consider the merits of the case, but could only entertain the question of jurisdiction, which could be done as fully and as thoroughly by appeal or writ of error as by certiorari. There is therefore no valid reason for granting the latter.

It would certainly be contrary to all precedents, and not in accordance with the purposes for which this court was constituted, to issue the writ of certiorari in such a case as this. In many of the states there are constitutional or statutory provisions authorizing their highest appellate courts to issue this writ, as will be seen by a reference to 4 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 15, et seq. But this court is one of appellate jurisdiction only. In Sevinskey v. Wagus, 76 Md. 335, 25 A. 468, we held that a statute which provided that "the Court of Appeals, and the chief judge thereof, shall have the power to grant the writ of habeas corpus, and to exercise jurisdiction in all matters relating thereto throughout the state," was unconstitutional and void, as the Legislature had no power to confer upon the appellate court such original jurisdiction. In passing on the question Chief Judge Alvey said: "The Constitution (article 4, § 14), in defining the jurisdiction of this court, declares that 'the jurisdiction of said Court of Appeals shall be coextensive with the limits of the state, and such as now is or may hereafter be prescribed by law'; that is to say, such appellate jurisdiction as the court then had or might thereafter have conferred upon it. The court at the time of the adoption of the present Constitution had, under former Constitutions, appellate jurisdiction only; and the terms by which the jurisdiction is defined in the present Constitution are substantially the same in meaning as those employed in the Constitutions of 1851 and 1864. It would therefore seem to be clear that the jurisdiction of this court is appellate only; for, if not so, and the Legislature could confer original jurisdiction upon it in cases of habeas corpus, it could also confer such jurisdiction in cases of mandamus, or in cases of any other subject-matter of original jurisdiction. This manifestly was never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution; and therefore the attempt by the Legislature to confer such jurisdiction is simply nugatory and void. Ex parte O'Neill, 8 Md. 227; State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301; State v. Glenn, 54 Md. 594." It will be observed that the Legislature had attempted to confer the power sought to be enforced in that case.

Of course, it was not intended by that decision to say that this...

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