State v. Shields
| Decision Date | 27 June 1878 |
| Citation | 49 Md. 301 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF MARYLAND v. TIMOTHY SHIELDS. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Harford County.
The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
The cause was submitted to BARTOL, C.J., BOWIE, GRASON, MILLER ALVEY and ROBINSON, JJ.
Charles J. M. Gwinn, Attorney-General, for the State.
Henry W. Archer, Herman Stump, Jr., and William Young, for the traverser.
This record shows that Timothy Shields was indicted in the Circuit Court for Harford County, for the crime of forgery, that to the indictment he pleaded not guilty, and upon his trial before a jury was acquitted by their verdict. There is nothing to show there was anything in the proceedings making the trial what the law characterizes as a mistrial. On the contrary, no objection was made to the indictment, the accused was duly arraigned, the trial regularly conducted and the verdict of not guilty rendered in due form and duly recorded. It appears, however, that in the course of the trial three exceptions were taken by the State's Attorney to the rulings of the court in admitting certain testimony offered by the accused. These exceptions were signed by the judge some days afterwards, and the question is, are they properly before this court for review?
It has always been a settled rule of the common law that after an acquittal of a party upon a regular trial on an indictment for either a felony or a misdemeanor, the verdict of acquittal can never afterward, on the application of the prosecutor, in any form of proceeding, be set aside and a new trial granted, and it matters not whether such verdict be the result of a misdirection of the judge on a question of law or of a misconception of fact on the part of the jury. 2 Hale's P. C. 310; 2 Hawk's P. C. Book 2, ch. 47, sec. 12; 3 Whart. Cr. Law, sec. 3221; 1 Bishop's Cr. Law, secs. 992, 993. This cardinal rule has been clearly and definitely settled in England, and has never been modified by legislation there, nor in any other State in this Union, nor indeed, so far as we are aware, in any other country where trial by jury under the common law prevails. Has it been abrogated in Maryland, and is this court now clothed with the power to set aside such a verdict and award a new trial? We cannot so decide, unless we find some clear and definite expression of the legislative will to that effect. We cannot impute to the Legislature the intention to overturn a rule like this, founded in the benevolence and mercy of the common law, which has prevailed here since criminal law was first administered in colonial times, and which no court of this State has ever hitherto attempted to disregard, without some statutory provision plainly indicating a purpose to subvert it. We should not be justified in inferring such intent from doubtful language or ambiguous expressions in any statute. Now, the Act of 1872, ch. 316, is the only law from which an inference even can be drawn that such power has been committed to this court. That Act provides that in all criminal trials it shall be lawful for the accused, or for the State's Attorney, in behalf of the State, to except to any ruling of the court, and to tender a bill of exceptions, which shall be signed and sealed by the court, as is now practiced in this State in civil cases, and the party tendering such exceptions may appeal from such ruling to the Court of Appeals, """ provided, that the counsel for the accused shall make oath that such appeal is not taken for delay; and such appeal shall be heard by the Court of Appeals at the earliest convenient day after the same shall have been transmitted to the said court; and after such appeal shall be entered, no judgment shall be rendered against the accused until the Court of Appeals shall have determined upon the exceptions and remanded the cause to the court below." Here the power is plainly enough given to this court where the verdict is against the accused, and upon his appeal, to reverse the rulings if we find them erroneous, and award him a new trial, or to affirm the rulings, if we find them correct, and remand the case in order that the proper sentence of the law may be passed upon him by the...
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State v. Johnson
...be the result of a misdirection of the judge on a question of law, or of a misconception of fact on the part of the jury.State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301, 303 (1878) (emphasis added). This plea has been interpreted broadly. A verdict of “not guilty” invokes the protection against double jeopard......
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State v. Smith
...never afterward, on the application of the prosecutor, in any form of proceeding, be set aside and a new trial granted." State v. Shields , 49 Md. 301, 303 (1878) (citing, e.g., 2 Hale, supra , at 310; 2 Hawkins, supra , ch. 47, § 12).The distinction in Maryland caselaw on which the State's......
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State Of Md. v. Prue
...set aside. Any attempt to do so by the prosecutor is barred by what at common law was the plea of autrefois acquit. Thus, in State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301, 303 (1878), our predecessors declined to construe a statute as permitting the State to appeal a verdict of acquittal, ‘It has always bee......
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Scott v. State
...verdict of acquittal can never afterward, on the application of the prosecutor, in any form of proceeding, be set aside[.]State v. Shields , 49 Md. 301, 303 (1878). As discussed, the Bowman decision was based on a parity of reasoning to Burks : Just as a failure of evidence necessary to pro......
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"incorporation" of the Criminal Procedure Amendments: the View from the States
...States (Amendment 5), and an established rule of the common law, and a plea of former jeopardy is good under either."); State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301 (1878). The court in Shields explained: It has always been a settled rule of the common law that after an acquittal of a party upon a regular ......