Hendricks v. City of Minneapolis
| Decision Date | 09 February 1940 |
| Docket Number | No. 32409.,32409. |
| Citation | 207 Minn. 151,290 N.W. 428 |
| Parties | HENDRICKS v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS et al. (COLLINS, Intervener). |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; E. A. Montgomery, Judge.
Suit by Edwin A. Hendricks against the City of Minneapolis and others to enjoin the city from entering into a contract for installation of parking meters in a restricted area of its "loop" district, wherein Frank J. Collins intervened as a taxpayer claiming a special interest. From an order denying a temporary injunction, plaintiff and intervener appeal.
Affirmed.
Thomas O. Kachelmacher, of Minneapolis, for plaintiff-appellant.
Jacob Garon, of Minneapolis, for intervener-appellant.
Richard S. Wiggin, City Atty., and John F. Bonner, Asst. City Atty., both of Minneapolis, for respondents.
Plaintiff, Hendricks, a taxpayer, sues to enjoin the city of Minneapolis from entering into a contract for the installation of parking meters in a restricted area of its "loop" district. Reinforcing plaintiff, Mr. Collins intervened as a taxpayer claiming a special interest by reason of ownership of an automobile and tenancy in a building located in the proposed parking meter zone. From the order denying a temporary injunction, plaintiff and intervener appeal.
After investigation to determine their practicability, the city council decided to install automatic parking meters and directed the purchasing agent and city engineer to draw plans and specifications. Bids were invited. There were two, one by the Dual Parking Meter Corporation and one by the Graybar Electric Corporation. The former was successful. One provision in the specifications, relating to the method of installation, read as follows:
The lowest and successful bid was $49.50 for each of 1,100 machines. Attached was the alternative that $2 could be deducted if the bidder's method of installation be used. The bid was accepted at $47.50.
At the outset, it should be said that the grounds of attack present questions of fact. There has been no trial, the matter being submitted below on affidavits. So there are issues which can not be finally determined at this stage.
1. The first point for appellant is that the specifications were discriminatory. The law is settled that municipal authorities must frame such specifications so as to permit "free and full competition." Diamond v. Mankato, 89 Minn. 48, 93 N.W. 911, 61 L.R.A. 448. That does not deny the city's right, within reasonable limitations, to require bidders to meet proper standards. The city can, within reason, require specific materials or particular methods of financing so long as the requirements are in the best interests of its inhabitants, and this although the effect is somewhat to limit the number of possible bidders. Davies v. Village of Madelia, 205 Minn. 526, 287 N.W. 1, 123 A.L.R. 569.
The specifications in some respects were quite detailed. For example, "The portion of the pallet which engages the teeth of the escapement wheel shall be of monel metal or steel."
If there is good reason in this instance (and others where the specifications were just as specific and narrow) why such materials should be required rather than others, the provision is not discriminatory, even though it restricted the field of bidders. If, on the other hand, no sound reason exists for such requirement, the provision is discriminatory even though some manufacturers could comply.
It is alleged that the specifications were built around the parking meters made by the Dual company; that they were the only ones able to comply, and that the bid of the Graybar company did not do so. The complete facts are not before us. The trial court can be depended upon to scrutinize the transaction for evidence of unlawful discrimination.
2. The next assault is upon a supposed variance between specifications and successful bid. The point is that the specifications called for supervision of installation by the city engineer, while the bid called for the bidder's method of installation. Even so, the specification controls. It remains for the city engineer to "specify the method of installation with due respect for underground vaults", etc. At the present stage, we see no substantial variance.
3. The next argument is that the contract calls for illegal appropriation of public funds for the benefit of a private corporation. The meters were to be paid for from their own collections. Each month, until the price is paid, the city treasurer is to remit 60% of the receipts from meters operating on an hour basis and 30% from those on a shorter period. The balance is to be used as the council shall prescribe. Even though not paid for at the end of 12 months, the meters are to become property of the city, with no further cost. We see no ground for challenge here. Municipalities have the power to purchase equipment and finance it by the revenue derived from its use. Williams v. Village of Kenyon, 187 Minn. 161, 244 N. W. 558.
It is also charged that there is attempt to violate the city...
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