Hendricks v. Isaacs

• Decision Date: 26 November 1889
• Citation: 117 N.Y. 411,22 N.E. 1029
• Parties: HENDRICKS v. ISAACS.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

117 N.Y. 411

22 N.E. 1029

HENDRICKS

v.ISAACS.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 26, 1889.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, first department.

Action by Mortimer Hendricks against Montefiore Isaacs, as administrator of Justina B. Hendricks, plaintiff's wife, to recover certain moneys alleged to have been advanced to defendant's intestate on pledge of her interest in the estate of M. M. Hendricks, plaintiff's father. The money was advanced on six written instruments, each substantially in the following form: ‘Received from father an advance of two hundred dollars, to be repaid him from the interest due mother when received by her, arising out of the estate of M. M. Hendricks, deceased. $200. ROWENA HENDRICKS. I concur and agree to this. J. B. HENDRICKS.’ There was a judgment in plaintiff's favor at special term on the report of a referee, which, on appeal to general term, was affirmed. See 5 N. Y. Supp. 105. Defendant appeals.

William Man, for appellant.

Abram Kling, for respondent.

ANDREWS, J.

The advances made by the plaintiff to his wife in the summer of 1884 were made for the support of the family, and upon her written promise to reimburse the plaintiff, from the interest when received by her, ‘out of the estate of M. M. Hendricks, deceased.’ This was the clear legal import of the writing, interpreted in connection with the circumstances. The money advanced, though received by the daughter, was received for the mother. The daughter entered into no engagement for its repayment. The receipts acknowledged the receipt of the sums advanced, and that they were to be repaid by the mother out of the fund specified. They were signed by the daughter, but the mother undersigned them, and her signature was preceded by the words, ‘I concur and agree to this.’ The mother thereby entered into an original obligation to repay the advances. It was her promise, and not a promise of the daughter, guarantied by her.

The origin and nature of the interest of Mrs. Hendricks in the estate of M. M. Hendricks, deceased, is explained by the evidence. Montague M. Hendricks, the father of the plaintiff, died in May, 1884, leaving a large estate. By his will he devised his real and personal estate to trustees, in trust to receive the rents, income, and profits during the life of his wife, with directions to pay a certain sum thereout annually to his wife, and to distribute the remainder in equal parts to five children, (other than the plaintiff,) and Justina B. Hendricks, the plaintiff's wife, but, in case of her remarriage after the death of the plaintiff, her share was to be paid thereafter to her issue by the plaintiff. The provision in favor of Justina, the wife of the plaintiff, concludes as follows: ‘It is also my will that whatever moneys may be received by the said Justina under this clause are to be by her applied to the maintenance and support of herself and her issue by her present husband.’ The trustees paid to Justina during her life, out of the income to which she was entitled under the will, the sum of $3,000, the first payment being made November 5, 1884. She died in July, 1885, and the trustees paid to her administrator after her death, $2,743.18, for income which had accrued on her share prior to her death, but which had not been paid over.

It appears that the relations between the plaintiff and his wife were not friendly, and in the fall of 1884 they separated and lived apart until the death of the wife, the children, (five in number,) with one exception, remaining with the mother, and being supported by her. The nature of the difficulty between the parents is not disclosed, nor does it appear under what circumstances the separation took place. The plaintiff presented to the administrator of the wife a claim against her estate for the advances made, which was refused under the statute, and judgment therefor has been awarded, and the point on this appeal respects the right of the plaintiff to have the contract made with his wife enforced against her estate. The contract was void at law. The common-law doctrine that husband and wife could not contract with each other has not been changed in this state by legislation respecting the rights of married women. The entire and absolute disability of married women to enter into any legal contract, which was a stubborn and inflexible principle of the common law, has, indeed, in some respects been modified. She may now under our laws purchase real and personal property, and carry on business on her own account, and as incident to these rights she may enter into contracts with third persons for the purchase and sale of property, or in the prosecution of her separate business, enforceable in a legal action to the same extent as though she was a feme sole. But the disability to deal with her husband, or to make a binding contract with him, remains unchanged. Contracts between husband and wife are invalid as contracts, in the eye of a court of law, to the same extent now as before the recent legislation. See Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265;White v. Wager, 25 N. Y. 329;Frecking v. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422; Cashman v. Henry, 75 N. Y. 103. If any exception exists, it has been created by the act of 1887, not applicable to the transaction in question.

But the unity of husband and wife, by which the legal existence of the wife was merged in that of her husband, preventing them from contracting with each other as if they were two distinct persons, never prevailed in courts of equity. It may be more accurate to say that courts of equity disregard the fiction upon which the common law proceeded, and are accustomed to lay hold of and give effect to transactions or agreements between husband and wife, according to the nature and equity of the case. It does not limit its inquiry to the ascertainment of the fact whether what had taken place would as between other persons have constituted a contract, and give relief, as matter of course, if a formal contract be established, but it further inquires whether the contract was just and fair, and equitably ought to be enforced, and administers relief where both the contract and the circumstances require it. The jurisdiction in equity has been frequently exercised to enforce contracts or agreements for settlement, made between husband or wife before or after marriage, in favor of the wife, whether made with or without the intervention of trustees. Reference to the cases will be found in the elementary treatises. It has also been exerted, though less frequently, to enforce agreements in favor of the husband for a settlement out of the property of the wife, or to charge her separate estate in his favor. Cannel v. Buckle, 2 P. Wms. 243; More v. Freeman, Bunb. 205; Livingston v. Livingston, 2 Johns. Ch. 537;Gardner v. Gardner, 22 Wend. 526; 2...