Hendricks v. State

• Decision Date: 12 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. 48A02-0805-CR-407.,48A02-0805-CR-407.
• Citation: 897 N.E.2d 1208
• Parties: Montas L. HENDRICKS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

897 N.E.2d 1208

Montas L. HENDRICKS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 48A02-0805-CR-407.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

December 12, 2008.

David W. Stone, IV, Anderson, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Joby Jerrells, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BARNES, Judge.

Case Summary

Montas Hendricks appeals his conviction for Class A felony dealing in cocaine. We affirm.

Issues

We restate the three issues before us as:

I. whether Hendricks waived his right to appeal the admission of the cocaine found on his person because he testified to possessing it at trial;

II. whether the trial court properly admitted the cocaine found on Hendricks' person; and

III. whether the trial court properly admitted the statement Hendricks made to police.

Facts

In July 2007, Hendricks was arrested for Class A felony dealing in cocaine and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Hendricks was arrested at the house of Carol Aynes. Hendricks had previously sold cocaine to Aynes on numerous occasions; however, at the time of this sale, Aynes was serving as a confidential informant for the Madison County Drug Task Force.

In March 2007, Aynes and Hendricks were in a drug treatment group together at the Crestview Center in Anderson. Aynes told Detective Earley of the Task Force that Hendricks was dealing cocaine, and Detective Earley told Aynes to let him know when Hendricks had cocaine available to sell. Hendricks finished treatment before Aynes, but he gave Aynes his new cell phone number.

Aynes subsequently made a number of calls to Hendricks inquiring about buying one ounce of cocaine, and Hendricks agreed to sell Aynes one ounce of cocaine for one thousand dollars. Next, Aynes contacted Detective Earley and let him know that she had arranged to purchase cocaine from Hendricks.

Detective Earley asked Aynes to make another phone call to Hendricks, this time recorded, in an attempt to buy an additional half-ounce of cocaine. Hendricks agreed to the sale, stating the price would now be sixteen hundred dollars. When Hendricks was on his way to Aynes' house to complete the transaction, he made a phone call, which was also recorded, to Aynes asking her for directions. During that phone call Hendricks indicated he had the cocaine with him.

Detective Earley and two other officers were hiding at Aynes' house waiting for Hendricks' arrival. When Hendricks arrived, Aynes told him she needed to go into the other room to get the sixteen hundred dollars. When Aynes went into the other room, the officers came out of hiding and Detective Earley identified himself as a police officer. He told Hendricks to get on the floor, and Hendricks did not respond. The officers forced Hendricks to the floor and handcuffed him. Hendricks physically struggled with the officers and "headbutted" Detective Earley. Tr. p. 99.

The officers shook Hendricks' clothing and checked his pockets for the cocaine. When the cocaine was not found, Detective Earley pulled Hendricks' waistband back, and saw a yellow object protruding from "the cheeks of [Hendricks'] butt." Tr. p. 98. The detectives lowered Hendricks' pants and retrieved the yellow item from Hendricks' buttocks. The yellow item was a napkin wrapped around a piece of clear plastic holding 41.25 grams of cocaine.

The officers took Hendricks to the police station. After reading Hendricks his Miranda rights, Detective Earley asked Hendricks to sign a waiver of those rights. Hendricks did not seem to understand well, but did state "so I can do this in front of an attorney or something?" and "I am not saying nothing." Tr. pp. 3-4. After some verbal exchanges between Hendricks and Detective Earley, Hendricks signed the waiver and gave a statement to the police.

Before trial, Hendricks filed a motion to suppress his statement given to the police. He argued he had asserted his right to remain silent under the United States Constitution. The motion was denied. Hendricks filed a second motion to suppress, this time to suppress the cocaine found on his person. He argued the search performed was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The second motion was also denied.

Hendricks did not file interlocutory appeals for the motions to suppress, and pled guilty to resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor. On December 6, 2007, Hendricks was found guilty of the dealing in cocaine charge. Hendricks now appeals that conviction.

Analysis

Hendricks challenges his conviction based on the assertion that the trial court improperly admitted the cocaine found on his person and the statement given to the police. Although Hendricks filed two motions to suppress evidence, upon denial of those motions he did not file interlocutory appeals and proceeded to trial; thus, the sole claim now is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. See Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 425 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Turner v. State, 878 N.E.2d 286, 292 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. See Kelley, 825 N.E.2d at 427. In reviewing the trial court's ultimate ruling on admissibility, we may consider the foundational evidence from the trial as well as evidence from the motion to suppress hearing that is not in direct conflict with the trial testimony. Id.

I. Waiver

As a preliminary matter, we reject the State's argument that Hendricks waived or abandoned his right to object on appeal to the introduction of the cocaine by later admitting at trial that he possessed it. The State first cites as authority Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind.1994), and argues "the right in section 11 is personal and can be waived by consent or abandonment." Appellee's Br. p. 5. The court in Moran held the Indiana Constitution did not provide a defendant protection when that person "abandoned" trash at the curb for pickup. See Moran, 644 N.E.2d at 541. The State implies that because Hendricks testified to possessing the cocaine at trial, he "abandoned" his right to object to the evidence on appeal. At least with respect to "abandonment", the reasoning in Moran is no longer good law. See Jefferson v. State, 891 N.E.2d 77, 81 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) trans. denied. Even if it were, we feel it is an illogical leap to link trash being left at a curb and a defendant's testimony at trial.

Additionally, the State cites Speybroeck v. State, 198 Ind. 683, 154 N.E. 1 (1926). We conclude the State misinterpreted or misapplied the reasoning in Speybroeck. In Speybroeck, the defendant testified he was not the owner or in possession of the place searched or the property found by the search. See Speybroeck, 198 Ind. at 685, 154 N.E. at 2. The court therefore held he could not object to the search and seizure. See id. at 685-86, 154 N.E. at 2. It was not the fact that the defendant testified that caused him to "abandon" his interest in the premises searched at trial as the State argues, but instead his actual testimony revealed he had no interest in the premises and, essentially, no standing to object to the search.

The State also argues we should adopt a rule discussed in Professor LaFave's Search and Seizure treatise. This rule provides a defendant may not complain on appeal about the trial court's admission of evidence if the defendant testified to possessing the evidence at trial. Even though the rule is discussed in Professor LaFave's treatise, LaFave points out that this rule is adopted only by a minority of states. The minority view also thwarts the purpose of the exclusionary rule. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.1(c) (West 3rd ed. 1996).

Professor LaFave explains:

A few jurisdictions adhere to the position that a defendant may not complain on appeal about the admission of evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, notwithstanding a timely objection at or before trial asserting such grounds, if the defendant gave testimony at trial admitting the possession of that evidence ....

The rationale of the rule is unclear. Some cases refer to the defendant's admission as a "waiver" of his Fourth Amendment objection ... [one] explanation is that the defendant's admission had reduced the allegedly improper search and improper introduction of the fruits thereof to "nothing more than harmless error...."

Of the distinct minority of states who have followed the rule that a defendant waives his objection to the admission of illegally seized evidence if he testifies to having owned or possessed that evidence, about half have abandoned the rule in recent years. This is an encouraging development, for the rule is unsound. It serves no legitimate state interest, and places the defendant in the dilemma where he must either ignore the damaging evidence introduced against him or waive his right to appeal its erroneous introduction. Indeed, it has been concluded that application of the rule will except in extraordinary circumstances be unconstitutional....

5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.1(c) (West 3rd ed. 1996), (citations omitted) (alteration in original).

The exclusionary rule provides evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure is inadmissible at trial—it is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard the right of people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by deterring police misconduct. Cole v. State, 878 N.E.2d 882, 887 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). If the evidence of cocaine in this case would have been suppressed, Hendricks would not have been required to decide whether to testify about it. Logic and sound policy considerations lead us to agree with the majority view discussed by Professor LaFave.

We...