Hendricks v. Town of Green Cove Springs
| Decision Date | 14 October 1931 |
| Parties | HENDRICKS et ux. v. TOWN OF GREEN COVE SPRINGS. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Suit by the Town of Green Cove Springs against W. L. Hendricks and wife. Decree for complainant, and defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court.
Where under its charter, a city is given ample statutory power to levy taxes, which power is required to be exercised by the city by ordinance instead of by resolution, the levy of taxes by resolution instead of by ordinance is a defect and informality which may be validated by act of the Legislature inasmuch as the Legislature could have provided for the levy to be made by resolution in the first instance.
The town of Green Cove Springs was chartered by chapter 6350 Acts of 1911; by the charter the city is given power by ordinance to levy and collect taxes upon property within certain limitations; in the year 1926 certain taxes were levied by resolution instead of by ordinance; chapter 14069, Special Acts of 1929, provides that certain assessments and levy of taxes for certain years, including the year 1926, be, and the same are hereby, validated and confirmed as to all errors, defects, informalities, or omissions which did not constitute a violation of the rights of any person under the state or Federal Constitutions. Held, that chapter 14069, Special Acts of 1929, cured the levy of taxes by resolution instead of by ordinance. Appeal from Circuit Court, Clay County; De Witt T. Gray, judge.
L. E. Wade, of Green Cove Springs, for appellants.
Edward S. Hemphill, of Jacksonville, for appellee.
This case was before this court in 1930 on appeal from order overruling demurrer to a bill of complaint and from a further order on motion to strike certain portions of the answer. The orders appealed from then were affirmed. Hendricks v. Town of Green Cove Springs, opinion filed July 21, 1930, reported 129 So. 592. The case is now before the court on appeal from final decree in favor of the complainant.
The suit was to foreclose a tax lien for municipal taxes assessed for the year 1926. The town of Green Cove Springs was chartered by act of the Legislature, chapter 6350, Acts of 1911. The power to levy and collect taxes is conferred by article 3 of the Charter Act. This act provides that the commission shall within the limitation of the act have powe by ordinance to levy and collect taxes upon all property, etc. (Italics ours.) The act did not purport to authorize the levy and assessment of taxes except by ordinance. The record shows that no ordinance was passed authorizing the levy, assessment, or collection of the tax. Appellee contends that the noncompliance with the statute is cured by the validating act, chapter 14069, Special Acts of the Legislature of 1929. This act specifically provides that certain assessments and levy of taxes for certain years, including the year 1926, 'be and the same are hereby validated and confirmed as to all errors, defects, informalities or omissions which did not constitute a violation of the rights of any person or persons under the Constitution of the State of Florida or the Constitution of the United States of America.'
To summarize the facts in this case as made by the pleadings, it may be said that the appellant admits that he is a citizen and resident of Green Cove Springs, a municipal corporation, that the property upon which the taxes were assessed is his homestead, and that he has not paid the ordinary property taxes on said land since the year 1926. These taxes were on an assessed valuation of $4,000, and the total levy was 20 mills.
Having waited for the appellant to pay his taxes more than the two years allowed by law for redemption, the municipality brought its suit, as authorized by law, in its own name for foreclosure of the city tax lien against the appellant's property. The only excuse or defense offered against the payment being required to be made is that the charter of the city of Green Cove Springs provides that the city shall assess and collect taxes by ordinance instead of by resolution; resolution being the method alleged to have been adopted and used in regard to the taxes involved here.
Whatever may be the merits of the case as resting upon the original provisions of the charter and the employment of a resolution instead of an ordinance as required by the charter, it appears that in 1929 the Legislature passed a validating act, the only conceivable purpose of which was to cure what, if any, defects, omissions, informalities, and the like that may have theretofore existed in regard to the unpaid taxes of persons situated like appellant. This act was chapter 14069, Special Acts of 1929, hereinbefore referred to.
Conceding that it was indispensable that the city proceed by ordinance instead of by resolution to assess and collect the tax, the validating act was, on its face, clearly sufficient to cure this alleged 'omission,' 'error,' 'defect,' and 'informality.'
There is no question that, under the charter of the city, the city was given ample statutory power to levy taxes for all the purposes embraced in the original levy which is sought to be enforced in this case, so the case of Ex parte Sims, 40 Fla 432, 25 So. 280, relied upon by the appellant for a reversal of the decree in the court below, is not necessarily controlling in this case; the question here being the manner in which the power given was exercised, rather than the complete absence of power, such as was involved in the Sims Case. As has been pointed out, the exercise of the power to levy taxes by...
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