Hendricks v. United States
| Decision Date | 27 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2010-0011,Criminal Action No. 2004-0005 |
| Parties | CRAIG HENDRICKS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
Attorneys:
Craig Hendricks,
Beaumont, TX
Pro Se
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I.
Alphonso G. Andrews, Jr., Esq.,
St. Croix, U.S.V.I.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner Craig Hendricks' ("Petitioner") Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence and Conviction Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Motion to Vacate"). (Dkt. No. 1237). Magistrate Judge Ruth Miller issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") in which she recommended that the Court deny Petitioner's Motion to Vacate on all grounds. (Dkt. No. 1355). Petitioner timely filed objections to Magistrate Judge Miller's R&R. (Dkt. No. 1358). For the reasons that follow the Court will (1) accept Magistrate Judge Miller's R&R as modified as stated herein; (2) deny Petitioner's Motion to Vacate; (3) deny Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing; and (4) decline to issue a Certificate of Appealability.1
Petitioner, along with seven co-defendants, was charged with various federal offenses in a twelve-count superseding indictment filed on September 30, 2004. The superseding indictment charged that Petitioner played a leadership role in the operation of large-scale drug trafficking and money laundering conspiracies from early 2000 until approximately April 2003. In August 2005, a jury convicted Petitioner on eight counts—one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and five substantive counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846; one count of conspiracy to import cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 963; and one count of money laundering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Petitioner was sentenced to a 40-year term of imprisonment to be followed by a 10-year term of supervised release, and was fined $10,000. (Dkt. No. 1131). A Third Circuit panel rejected Petitioner's arguments on direct appeal and affirmed his conviction on August 15, 2008. United States v. Fleming, 287 F. App'x 150 (3d Cir. 2008). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 12, 2009. Hendricks v. United States, 555 U.S. 1125 (2009).
Following the denial of his petition for certiorari, Petitioner timely filed the instant Motion to Vacate pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Petitioner raised seven grounds for post-conviction relief, each asserted under the theory of ineffective assistance of counsel. Magistrate Judge Miller recommended that the Court deny each of Petitioner's seven claims in her R&R, and Petitioner timely filed objections to her recommendations as to each of his claims. In light of Petitioner's objections, the Court will review his Motion to Vacate de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (). However, to the extent that Petitioner's objections "merely reiterate issues already presented to the magistrate judge," the determinations in the R&R with respect to those issues will be examined under a plain error standard. Joseph v. Beard, 2015 WL 1443970, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2015) (citations omitted).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Section 2255") permits a petitioner to collaterally attack his sentence by moving "the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A petitioner may seek post-conviction relief where (1) a "sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States," (2) "the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence," (3) "the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law," or (4) the sentence "is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A court must grant an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in a Section 2255 motion "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner isentitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); United States v. Tolliver, 800 F.3d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 2015).
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims can provide a proper basis for relief under Section 2255. United States v. Travillion, 759 F.3d 281, 289 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Phila., Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1979)). To advance a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner bears the burden of showing that (1) "counsel's performance was deficient;" and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). "[B]oth deficiency and prejudice must be proven to have a valid claim for relief." Travillion, 759 F.3d at 289-90 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
As to the first prong, Petitioner must show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A reviewing court's "evaluation of counsel's performance is 'highly deferential,'" and courts "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). In other words, Petitioner carries the burden to demonstrate that "trial counsel's actions 'were not supported by a reasonable strategy.'" United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 204 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 713 (2018) (quoting Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003)).
As to the second prong, Petitioner must establish prejudice through a "showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have beendifferent." Id. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" of the proceeding. Id.
As a first ground ("Ground One") for post-conviction relief, Petitioner asserts that his counsel failed to apprise him of the strength of the Government's evidence against him and, as a result, he "made an uninformed decision to withdraw the cooperation agreement that had been signed under the position that the Government had absolutely no case against him." (Dkt. No. 1237 at 20-21).2 The Government argues that Petitioner's claim must fail because his counsel did in fact advise him of the extent of the Government's case against him. In support of this assertion, the Government attaches to its response a sworn affidavit from Petitioner's trial counsel—Andrew Capdeville, Esq.—attesting thereto. (Dkt. No. 1280 at 4-5). Petitioner filed a reply to the Government's opposition—attaching his own (unsigned and unsworn) affidavit in which he attests that Attorney Capdeville did not discuss the extent of the Government's case with him. (Dkt. No. 1295-1). Petitioner argues that, because an evidentiary hearing is required on a Section 2255 motion unless the record conclusively shows that Petitioner is not entitled to relief, an evidentiary hearing is required here to resolve the conflicting accounts. Id. at 9-11.
As a second ground ("Ground Two") for post-conviction relief, Petitioner alleges that his counsel failed to advise him regarding the drug quantities that would be attributed to him forsentencing purposes under the relevant conduct provisions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"), as well as the offense level enhancements that would apply under the Guidelines as a result of Petitioner's role as a boat pilot and leader of the drug trafficking enterprise. (Dkt. No. 1237 at 24). Petitioner alleges that counsel's failure to discuss this information with him prevented him from making a reasonably informed decision as to whether to accept a plea offer. Id. at 25. The Government contends—relying again on Attorney Capdeville's affidavit—that Petitioner's counsel in fact informed him of the applicable Guidelines provisions and explained that Petitioner's maximum sentencing exposure was life imprisonment. (Dkt. No. 1280 at 5-6). Petitioner disputes Attorney Capdeville's attestations in the affidavit attached to Petitioner's reply. (Dkt. No. 1295-1).
Magistrate Judge Miller considered Grounds One and Two together. In examining Ground One, she reviewed the transcripts of suppression hearings held on March 26 and March 30, 2004, and concluded from these records that Petitioner twice acknowledged that Attorney Joseph Mingolla—who represented Petitioner in pre-trial proceedings—warned Petitioner about the strength of the evidence against him. (Dkt. No. 1355 at 9-11).3 She therefore rejected Petitioner's first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding no support in the record for a showing of deficient performance. Id. at 11.
As for Ground Two, Magistrate Judge Miller assumed arguendo that counsel failed to advise Petitioner regarding the impact of the relevant conduct provisions of the Guidelines, "as therecord evidence is limited to competing affidavits." Id. at 11. She concluded, however, that Petitioner had failed to proffer any evidence to support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel under the factors identified by the Supreme Court in Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012)—and in particular, had offered no evidence of Petitioner's "serious consideration of a plea offer." Id. 4...
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