Hendrickson v. Olson, 20080164.
| Decision Date | 03 February 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 20080164.,20080164. |
| Citation | 760 N.W.2d 116,2009 ND 16 |
| Parties | Melanie HENDRICKSON, Appellant v. Carol K. OLSON, Director North Dakota Department of Human Services, Appellee. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Edwin W.F. Dyer III, Dyer & Summers, P.C., Bismarck, N.D., for appellant.
Jean R. Mullen, Special Assistant Attorney General, Bismarck, N.D., for appellee.
[¶ 1] Melanie Hendrickson appeals from a district court judgment affirming a decision by the North Dakota Department of Human Services ("Department") denying her application for Medicaid benefits after the Department found she was not eligible for benefits as an incapacitated parent. Hendrickson argues she was not afforded a fair administrative hearing and the evidence does not support the Department's decision. We hold Hendrickson was afforded a fair hearing, and we affirm.
[¶ 2] Hendrickson was the mother of a child receiving Medicaid benefits, and Hendrickson had gall bladder surgery on April 24, 2007. On May 3, 2007, Hendrickson informed her doctor, Dr. Colin MacColl, that she was a "self-pay" patient and wanted to return to work as soon as possible. Dr. MacColl released Hendrickson to return to work, but restricted her from lifting for four weeks. Hendrickson's job with a daycare provider required her to lift children, and her employer was unable to accommodate the doctor's lifting restriction. As a result, Hendrickson did not return to work with her employer until May 23, 2007.
[¶ 3] Hendrickson applied to Grand Forks County Social Services for Medicaid benefits, claiming she was eligible for benefits as an incapacitated parent of a child receiving benefits under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-02.1-15(1), which requires the parent of an eligible child to have a "physical or mental defect ... of such a debilitating nature as to reduce substantially or eliminate the parent's capacity either to earn a livelihood or to discharge the parent's responsibilities as a homemaker and provider of child care for a period of thirty days or more." Under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-02.1-15(2), "[t]he incapacity must be such that it reduces substantially or eliminates employment in the parent's usual occupation or another occupation to which the parent may be able to adapt," and "[t]he fact that a parent may have to change occupation or work location does not establish incapacity or limited employment opportunities for a disabled parent."
[¶ 4] A State Review Team recommended finding that Hendrickson did not meet the criteria for incapacity because she "[w]ould be capable of other than usual and customary work as of the 5/3/07 visit with Dr. Colin MacColl." Grand Forks County denied Hendrickson's application, and she appealed to the Department.
[¶ 5] At an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), Laura Krause, an eligibility specialist with "HRS-Erase," appeared with Hendrickson as a non-lawyer patient advocate. Krause described "HRS-Erase" as "a contracted company [with Altru Health Systems] that assists self-pay patients acquire some type coverage," and Krause described her role as At the hearing, the ALJ allowed Krause to question Hendrickson, and the following colloquy occurred:
MS. KRAUSE: Okay. I do have a quick question then. Ms. Mullen had stated that she would not like me to ask any open-ended questions. Is that what I'm understanding?
Yes. You need to ask specific questions rather than [saying] Melanie, tell us about and then have her give a, a narrative.
MS. KRAUSE: Okay.
Yes, I understand. It's, it's, what you're doing is actually testifying. Your, the questions are very leading. You need to, you need to either ask specific questions or, or let Ms. Hendrickson go ahead.
You know, there's a, there's a couple of documents that were submitted. I think the one is already, the progress note from May 3rd. I need to look to be sure that that may already be there. But there was another, another document from [your employer]?
MS. HENDRICKSON: Yes, ma'am.
You know, that you may want to address. But why don't you go ahead and, and give me your testimony at this time?
Hendrickson thereafter provided narrative testimony about "what [she] was trying to prove," and she introduced into evidence a letter from her employer, which the ALJ admitted into evidence for "whatever weight" it would receive.
[¶ 6] After the administrative hearing, an attorney for "HRS-Erase" wrote the ALJ, claiming Krause "was not allowed to present [Hendrickson's] case [at the hearing], was prohibited from asking leading questions, and was prohibited from submitting evidence from Ms. Hendrickson's employer." The attorney requested a rehearing, claiming because Krause and Hendrickson had no legal training and were not familiar with the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, the ALJ should have waived application of the rules of evidence under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-01-03-15(6). The ALJ responded:
I expressly allowed Ms. Krause to present Ms. Hendrickson's case. She even began questioning Ms. Hendrickson. What I did not allow her to do, was ask leading questions because it amounted to her testifying and asking Ms. Hendrickson to agree. I would not allow anyone, whether an attorney or not, to ask leading questions of their witness. While I did not specifically waive the rules of evidence, I allowed Ms. Hendrickson considerable latitude in presenting her case because she is not an attorney. Ms. Krause was given the choice to ask specific questions or have Ms. Hendrickson proceed with her own testimony, but not both. As the record reflects, Ms. Krause chose to have Ms. Hendrickson present her own case.
In regard to the last point, Ms. Krause sent a letter to me, dated September 18, 2007, with two enclosed documents, the letter from Ms. Hendrickson's employer and a medical record. Ms. Krause stated in her letter that "Mrs. Hendrickson would like to present these documents as evidence at the hearing." I admitted the letter from Ms. Hendrickson's employer as an exhibit for Ms. Hendrickson, over objection from counsel for the Department.
Ms. Hendrickson's request for a rehearing is denied. However, if she has additional relevant evidence she wishes to introduce, I will consider a request to reopen the hearing for the limited purpose of considering the additional evidence.
[¶ 7] The ALJ thereafter issued a recommended decision stating that Hendrickson had not sought to reopen the hearing. The ALJ recommended finding that Hendrickson failed to establish she was an incapacitated parent under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-02.1-15 because the medical evidence established "she was capable of going back to work well within the 30-day time period, albeit with restrictions on lifting." The Department adopted the ALJ's recommendation, and the district court affirmed the Department's decision.
[¶ 8] Our standard of review of the Department's decision is the same as the standard applied by the district court under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46. Christofferson v. North Dakota Dep't of Health, 2007 ND 199, ¶ 7, 742 N.W.2d 799. We will reverse the Department's decision only if:
1. The order is not in accordance with the law.
2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant.
3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in the proceedings before the agency.
4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing.
5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported by its findings of fact.
7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.
8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not sufficiently explain the agency's rationale for not adopting any contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an administrative law judge.
N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46. On appeal we consider whether the agency's findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the conclusions of law are sustained by the agency's findings of fact, and whether the agency's decision is supported by the conclusions of law. Ohlson v. North Dakota Dep't of Human Servs., 552 N.W.2d 73, 75 (N.D.1996). In determining whether an agency's findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, we do not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency; rather, we determine only whether a reasoning mind could have reasonably determined the agency's factual conclusions were supported by the weight of the evidence. Powers Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214, 220 (N.D.1979). Questions of law are fully reviewable on an appeal from an administrative decision. Tedford v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2007 ND 142, ¶ 7, 738 N.W.2d 29.
[¶ 9] Hendrickson argues she was not afforded a fair administrative hearing, because the ALJ waived the rules of evidence for the Department but...
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