Hendrix v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 10 April 1909
• Citation: 101 P. 125,2 Okla.Crim. 240,1909 OK CR 54
• Parties: HENDRIX v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

101 P. 125

2 Okla.Crim. 240, 1909 OK CR 54

HENDRIX v. UNITED STATES.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

April 10, 1909

Syllabus by the Court.

This court will not grant a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence, or where the evidence is conflicting. These questions being within the discretion of the trial court, its decisions will not be disturbed unless it appears from the record that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the motion for a new trial.

[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 3068; Dec. Dig. § 1156. ^[*]]

When a statute prescribes a punishment of from one to five years' imprisonment in the penitentiary at hard labor for stealing cattle, it is not cruel and unusual punishment, upon conviction of such crime, to sentence the accused to imprisonment in the penitentiary at hard labor for a period of two years.

[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3304-3309; Dec. Dig. § 1213. ^[*]]

Section 965, Ind. T. Ann. St. 1899, defines "larceny" as follows: "Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking and carrying, riding or driving away the personal property of another." It was not error for the trial court to give the jury the following definition of "larceny," to wit: "Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking carrying, riding, or driving away the property of another. It is the felonious taking; that is, a wrongful and corrupt taking"-said definition not being prejudicial to the rights of the accused.

[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Larceny, Dec. Dig. § 70. ^[*]]

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, pp. 3991-4003.]

In a case where the prosecution does not rely upon circumstantial evidence alone for a conviction, the accused is not, as a matter of right, entitled to have the jury instructed fully upon the law of circumstantial evidence.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1883, 1885; Dec. Dig. § 784. ^[*]]

The statutes of this state provide that, on an appeal in a criminal case, the appellate court must give judgment without regard to technical errors or defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the accused. In the opinion of this court, to reverse this case upon the technical errors and defects contained in the record would be a violation of both the letter and the spirit of the statute.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Dec. Dig. § 1186. ^[*]]

The terms "reasonable doubt" and "moral certainty" may be usedinterchangeably.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1913; Dec. Dig. § 789. ^[*]

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, pp. 4577-4578; vol. 7, pp. 5958-5972; vol. 8, pp. 7724-7779.]

Error from the United States Court for the Central District of the Indian Territory; Thomas C. Humphrey, Judge.

John Hendrix was convicted of larceny and brought error to the United States Court of Appeals, whence the cause was transferred to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, and by that court to the Criminal Court of Appeals. Affirmed.

John Hendrix, who will hereafter be referred to as the accused, was indicted in the United States Court for the Central District of Indian Territory, sitting at Atoka, on the 3d day of October, 1906, charged with having, on the 19th day of August, 1906, committed the crime of larceny, by stealing one head of cattle, of the value of $10, from D. N. Robb. On the 21st day of January, 1907, the accused was tried before a jury, which trial resulted in a verdict of guilty being returned. On February 1, 1907, being the same term of said court in which the verdict was rendered, the accused filed his motion for a new trial, which was, by the court on said date, overruled, to which the accused excepted. Whereupon he was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of two years. From said sentence and judgment he prosecuted error to the United States Court of Appeals, in which court this case was pending at the time of the creation of the state of Oklahoma, when the same was transferred to the Supreme Court of this state, and by the Supreme Court, upon the creation of this court, duly transferred to this court.

M. Humphreys, for plaintiff in error.

Charles West, Atty. Gen., and Charles N. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States.

BAKER J.

The accused alleges in his assignment of errors:

(1) That the court erred in overruling his motion for a new trial; there not being sufficient evidence in this action to warrant a conviction.

(2) The court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as follows: "No. 1. In this case the prosecution seeks the conviction of the defendant by what is known in law as 'circumstantial evidence', and you are instructed that, before you would be warranted in convicting the defendant, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt the facts upon which the prosecution relies to constitute the chain of circumstantial evidence. The true test by which to determine the value of circumstantial evidence in its respect to its sufficiency to warrant a conviction in this case is, not whether the proof establishes circumstances which are consistent or which coincide with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused, but whether the circumstances satisfactorily established are of so conclusive a character and point so unerringly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of his innocence."

(3) The court erred in refusing to give instruction No. 2, which reads as follows: "No. 2. The court instructs you that the force of circumstantial evidence being exclusive in its character, the mere coincidence of a given number of circumstances which the hypothesis of guilt or that they would account for or concur with or render probable the guilt of the accused is not a reliable or admissible test, unless the circumstances are of such a degree of cogency and force as in the order of natural causes and effect to exclude to a moral certainty every other hypothesis except the single one of guilt. The proof must not only coincide with the hypothesis of guilt, but it must be inconsistent with every other rational conclusion."

(4) The court erred in refusing to give instruction No. 3, as follows: "No. 3. When a conviction is sought alone upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances taken together must be such as to be incapable of explanation upon any other rational hypothesis but that of the defendant's guilt."

(5) The court erred in refusing to give instruction No. 4, as follows: "No. 4. The court instructs you that in a case like this, where a conviction is sought upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be proved to your entire satisfaction, and when the circumstances are established they must point conclusively to the person charged and must be inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis."

(6) The court erred in refusing to give instruction No. 5, as follows: "No. 5. If there is a reasonable doubt in your minds as to whether the animal killed at defendant's, which the government witness says he saw, then you will acquit the defendant."

(7) The court erred in instructing the jury as follows: "Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, riding, or driving away the property of another. It is the felonious taking; that is, a wrongful and corrupt taking."

(8) The court erred in the following instruction: "The defendant's plea in this case is that he is not guilty. He goes into the trial of this case presumed to be innocent. He is clothed with this presumption, and it remains with him until you find by the proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty."

(9) The court erred in instructing the jury as follows: "The defendant has gone on the witness stand, and he is a witness in his own behalf, and you weigh his testimony by the same rules whether his statements are reasonable and whether he is interested in the result of the trial."

(10) The court erred in the following instruction: "The government must make out its case of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. That does not mean any doubt, and it does not mean some doubt. The government is not required to prove it to a mathematical certainty that the defendant is guilty, but must prove to a moral certainty, so after you consider and weigh the testimony in this case, if you are morally certain the defendant is guilty from that testimony, then you have no reasonable doubt, and you should convict the defendant."

(11) The court erred in instructing the jury as follows: "You take each circumstance and each item of testimony that the witness has detailed upon the witness stand and each and all of the witnesses, and consider and compare all of it together, and after hearing all of the testimony and weighing it, if you are morally certain the defendant is guilty, you should render a verdict of guilty against him, and if you are not morally certain you should acquit him."

(12) The court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, as requested by defendant, as follows: "The presumption of innocence remains with the defendant throughout the trial of the case, but may be overcome by evidence that satisfies the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant."

(13) The court erred in refusing to charge the law of circumstantial evidence, as requested by the defendant.

(14) The court erred in limiting the time of the defendant's counsel to argue the case to the jury to 35 minutes.

(15) The court erred in requiring the attorney for the defendant, while he was arguing the case to the jury, to desist from further argument, on account of having consumed 35 minutes in argument.

(16) The court erred in assessing punishment of the defendant at a period of two years; said punishment being...