Hennigan v. I.P. Petroleum Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. D-3427,D-3427 |
| Citation | 858 S.W.2d 371 |
| Parties | Lois Ann HENNIGAN, Petitioner, v. I.P. PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC. and GCO Minerals Company, Inc., Respondents. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Richard Ellis Turkel, Nick C.E. Lebleu, Orange, for petitioner.
Tynan Buthod, Kevin M. Jordan, Houston, for respondents.
Lois Ann Hennigan sued I.P. Petroleum Company, Inc. and GCO Minerals Company, Inc. (collectively, I.P. Petroleum) for statutory gender discrimination, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. The trial court granted I.P. Petroleum's motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court of appeals affirmed. 848 S.W.2d 276. We conclude that the summary judgment concerning the gender discrimination claim was improper.
After I.P. Petroleum terminated Hennigan from her employment as a security guard, she filed a complaint with the Texas Employment Commission (TEC) and eventually sued I.P. Petroleum. At her deposition, Hennigan gave the following testimony:
I.P. Petroleum moved for summary judgment asserting that Hennigan had negated an essential element of her gender discrimination claim through her deposition testimony. In response, Hennigan filed an affidavit asserting that she did not understand the questions asked of her at deposition and reasserting her claim of gender discrimination.
Hennigan did not abandon or waive her claim of gender discrimination through her deposition testimony. Hennigan's statement in her deposition is a quasi-admission and, as such, is merely some evidence and is not conclusive. This court has explained the difference between a quasi-admission and a judicial admission as follows:
A party's testimonial declarations which are contrary to his position are quasi-admissions. They are merely some evidence, and they are not conclusive upon the admitter.... These are to be distinguished from the true judicial admission which is a formal waiver of proof usually found in pleadings or the stipulations of the parties. A judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it, and it relieves the opposing party's burden of proving the admitted fact, and bars the admitting part from disputing it....
Mendoza v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 606 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex.1980). The requirements for treating a party's testimonial quasi-admission as a conclusive judicial admission include that the statement be "deliberate, clear, and unequivocal" and that "[t]he hypothesis of mere mistake or slip of the tongue must be eliminated." Griffin v. Superior Ins. Co., 161 Tex. 195, 338 S.W.2d 415, 419 (1960). Hennigan's averment that she was confused in responding to deposition questions raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding Hennigan's gender discrimination claim.
I.P. Petroleum also argues that Hennigan's gender discrimination claim was barred by her failure to comply with statutory requirements. We disagree.
Hennigan was terminated...
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