Henriquez v. City of Farmers Branch

• Docket Number: 3:16-cv-868-M-BN
• Decision Date: 08 July 2022
• Parties: ANA HENRIQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FARMERS BRANCH, TEXAS and KEN D. JOHNSON, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

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ANA HENRIQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FARMERS BRANCH, TEXAS and KEN D. JOHNSON, Defendants.

No. 3:16-cv-868-M-BN

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

July 8, 2022

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DAVID L. HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case, reopened on September 30, 2021, see Dkt. Nos 43, 46, remains referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from Chief Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn. Through a first amended complaint [Dkt. No. 47] (the FAC), Plaintiff Ana Henriquez asserts civil rights violations and assault and battery against Defendants City of Farmers Branch, Texas and Ken Johnson based on Johnson's shooting to death her minor son.

The City moved to dismiss the claims asserted against it in the FAC. See Dkt. No. 52. Henriquez responded. See Dkt. No. 56. And the City replied. See Dkt. No. 58.

Johnson responded to the FAC by answering it, asserting qualified immunity, see Dkt. No. 50, and moving to dismiss it based, in part, on qualified immunity, see Dkt. Nos 48, 49, 50. And the Court converted the portion of Johnson's motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 51.

As further allowed by the Court's conversion order Henriquez filed a motion for leave to conduct limited discovery in order to respond to the qualified immunity issues raised in the converted summary judgment motion. See Dkt. No. 54. After Johnson responded, see Dkt. No. 55, the Court granted the motion for leave in part, see Dkt. No. 57. As ordered, see id., Henriquez notified the Court that she received the authorized qualified immunity discovery, see Dkt. No. 59. She then filed a court-ordered response to Johnson's assertion of qualified immunity. See Dkt. Nos. 61-63. And Johnson replied. See Dkt. No. 64.

The undersigned now enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that, for the reasons and to the extent set out below, the Court should grant both motions.

Discussion

I. The Court should grant the City's motion to dismiss and dismiss the claims against it with prejudice unless - through her objections to these findings, conclusions, and recommendations - Henriquez shows that she should be granted leave to allege a plausible claim ofmunicipal liability through a second amended complaint.

A. Legal Standards

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007). Such a motion is therefore “not meant to resolve disputed facts or test the merits of a lawsuit” and “instead must show that, even in the plaintiff's best-case scenario, the complaint does not state a plausible case for relief.” Sewell v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 2020).

Even so, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” id. at 555.^[1]

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. And “[a] claim for relief is implausible on its face when ‘the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'” Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679); see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Where the well-pleaded facts of a complaint do not permit a court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]' - ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting, in turn, FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)))).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not mandate detailed factual allegations, but it does require that a plaintiff allege more than labels and conclusions. And, while a court must accept a plaintiff's factual allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Consequently, a threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id. Instead, “to survive a motion to dismiss” under Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); see also Inclusive Communities, 920 F.2d at 899 (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief' is ‘a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; citation omitted)).

These general pleading standards apply to a claim against a municipality. See also Hutcheson v. Dall. Cnty., Tex., 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021) (“There is no heightened pleading standard for [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claims against municipalities. To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations but still must state sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim on its face.” (citing Littell v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Cir. 2018))).

But, because “[a] person may sue a municipality that violates his or her constitutional rights [only] ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,'” id. (quoting Section 1983; citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)), a plaintiff alleging a Monell claim “has two burdens: to [plausibly allege] (1) that a constitutional violation occurred and (2) that a municipal policy was the moving force behind the violation,” Sanchez v. Young Cnty., Tex., 956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

So, “[i]n municipal-liability cases,” the threshold question “is whether the complained-of ‘act may fairly be said to represent official policy.'” Id. at 792-93 (cleaned up; quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); see also Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 483 (rejecting the argument that a district court errs by dismissing a Monell claim without first analyzing the underlying constitutional violation).

And a plaintiff may proceed on a Monell claim only by

identify[ing] “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose moving force is that policy (or custom).” Pineda v. City of Hous., 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). Municipalities are not liable “on the theory of respondeat superior” and are “almost never liable for an isolated unconstitutional act on the part of an employee.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009).

Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 482; see also Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 985 F.3d 489, 497 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting that where a plaintiff's claim fails as to one prong, a court “need not consider whether [his] claim also fails the other two Monell prongs” (citing Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 168-69 (5th Cir. 2010))).

“Official policy can arise in various forms. It usually exists in the form of written policy statements, ordinances, or regulations, but may also arise in the form of a widespread practice that is ‘so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.'” James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting, in turn, Webster v. City of Hous., 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc))); see also Brown, 985 F.3d at 497 (“An ‘official policy' may take two forms -either a ‘policy statement formally announced by an official policymaker' or a ‘persistent widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.'” (quoting Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 168-69)).

“[T]he failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the [municipality] is responsible, and for which [it] may be held liable if it actually causes injury.” Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)).

So an alleged failure to train (or to supervise) “is a separate theory of municipal liability, but the same standard applies both to a failure to train [or to supervise] claim and to a municipal liability claim.” Pinedo v. City of Dall., Tex., No. 3:14-cv-958-D, 2015 WL 5021393, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2015) (citations omitted); see Pena v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 623 (5th Cir. 2018) (A “failure-to-train theory requires a plaintiff to prove that ‘1) the...