Henriquez v. Total Bike, LLC
| Decision Date | 20 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 13-20417-CIV-MORENO |
| Parties | JEAN EDOUARD HENRIQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. TOTAL BIKE, LLC, d/b/a Ducatimiami; DESMOTORI, LLC, d/b/a Ducatimiami; and DAVID SEGUIAS SIFONTES, a/k/a David Seguias, Defendants. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants Total Bike, LLC, et al. ("Defendants") against the Plaintiff, Jean Edouard Henriquez's ("Plaintiff") pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A) and 29 U.S.C. § 207(1). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that: (a) § 213(b)(10)(A) does not apply because a motorcycle is not an automobile as defined under the statute; (b) § 207(1) does not apply because Plaintiff was not employed in an environment that incentivizes the employees to work efficiently and effectively. This Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden of presenting competent evidence designating specific facts as to which there are genuine issues in contest. Because Plaintiff fails to present any material facts disputing Defendants' arguments demonstrating that he is an exempt employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act as per the mechanics exemption and the retail service commission exception, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and DISMISSES this case.
Summary judgment is authorized where there is no genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not simply rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings; the non-moving party must establish the essential elements of its case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The nonmovant must present more than a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant's position. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986).
The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") requires employers to pay covered employees an overtime premium of one and one-half times the employee's regular rate of pay for any hours worked in excess of forty in one week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). However, if an employee is exempt from the FLSA, the employee is not entitled to overtime pay. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to present competent evidence disputing Defendants' argument that he is an exempt employee under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A), the mechanics exemption, or 29 U.S.C. § 207(1), the retail service commission exception.
Plaintiff has failed to present a material dispute as to his falling into the exception of 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A), which provides, in pertinent part, that the provisions of the FLSA shall not apply with respect to:
[A]ny. . .mechanic primarily engaged in. . .servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he is employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers.
Whether Plaintiff falls within the scope of the mechanics exemption is "ultimately a legal question." Viart v. Bull Motors. Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 713-14 (1986)). As such, the mechanics exemption under 13(b)(10)(A) applies if the Court determines that Desmotori and/or Total Bike: (a) are a non-manufacturing establishment engaged in the sale of automobiles; and (b) employed Plaintiff as a mechanic who was primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles. Id. As both of these requirements have been satisfied, Plaintiff is exempt from overtime coverage.
Defendants readily satisfy the requirement that they are a "nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling [automobiles]. . .to ultimate purchasers." 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10(A). Plaintiff actually acknowledged in deposition that Defendants are a non-manufacturing establishment. Further, the record evidence, including the testimony of Plaintiff, demonstrates that Defendants are primarily engaged in the retail sale of Ducati motorcycles to the general public and service the vehicles. In fact, Plaintiff specifically alleges in his Complaint and testifies in deposition that he was a certified mechanic primarily engaged in servicing and repairing automobiles for Defendants.
As to the application of the exemption under 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10)(A), Plaintiff's sole defense is predicated on the argument that a motorcycle is not an "automobile" as the term is used in § 213(b)(10)(A). Plaintiff argues that Defendants' definition of the term automobile, which would include motorcycles, would deprive the statute of its plain and ordinary meaning. Plaintiff, however, has failed to provide this Court with his interpretation of the word automobile (or its proposedlimitation) or any law supporting his argument. Thus, the Court gives the word "automobile" its ordinary and plain meaning. Florida state courts have found a "motorcycle" to be within the ordinary and plain meaning of the word "automobile", especially in circumstances where the term automobile is not limited to a specified type of vehicle. See, e.g., Dorrell v. State Fire & Casualty Co., 221 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) ().
Interpreting "automobile" to include "motorcycles" does not render the statutory remedy of the FLSA ineffectual; both a car and a motorcycle-and the mechanics who repair and service these vehicles-are within a small industry and class of persons performing substantially the same tasks on similar vehicles. The FLSA was conceived to combat worker exploitation. Congress crafted the FLSA so as to apply to the ranks of the traditionally exploited, creating numerous exemptions for those deemed not in need of federal protection. Here, interpretation of the word "automobile" to include "motorcycle" does not render the FLSA's protections useless or further the exploitation of mechanics that would otherwise not be exempt under the FLSA. Both automobiles and motorcycles are commonly and historically identified as private self-propelled vehicles that transport private persons/passengers; distinguishing them here serves little purpose. Ultimately, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that a genuine issue for trial exists as to the application here of the 13(b)(10)(A) exemption.
The Court also finds that the Plaintiff has failed to present a material dispute as to his falling into the exception of the FLSA's retail service commission exception, codified by 29 U.S.C. § 207(1).
FLSA provides that an employer is not required to pay overtime to an employee of a retail or service establishment if certain elements under 29 U.S.C. § 207(1) are satisfied. Specifically, the § 207(1) exemption applies if:
29 U.S.C. § 207(1). Here, there is no question of material fact that the three elements for the § 207(1) exemption are readily satisfied.
First, Total Bike and Desmotori, which sell motorcycles and motorcycle services, maintenance, and repairs, qualify as "retail or service establishments". Typically, a retail or service establishment is one which sells goods or services to the general public. See 29 C.F.R. § 779.318(a); see also 29 C.F.R. § 779.320 (). Plaintiff has actually confirmed in deposition and his Complaint that Defendants satisfy this requirement.
Second, time and pay records demonstrate that Plaintiff earned in excess of one and one-half times the federal minimum wage required under 29 U.S.C. § 206, which at all material times here was $7.25/hour. Plaintiff's compensation expressed in an hourly rate or regular rate of pay is derived by dividing Plaintiff's total hours worked per pay period by his total compensation per same payperiod. See 29 C.F.R. § 779.419(b). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he worked an average of forty-eight hours per week. Taking Plaintiff's estimate as true for the purposes of this Motion for Summary Judgment, a review of Plaintiff's total compensation demonstrates that Plaintiff was always paid in excess of one and one-half times the applicable federal minimum wage. Even taking Plaintiff's total compensation, $158,308.45, during the entire term of his employment, 128 weeks, Plaintiff's compensation expressed in terms of an hourly regular rate of pay (though at all times he was paid on a commission plus differential basis) was approximately $25.77 an hour [$158,308.45 (total compensation) / (128 weeks x 48 hours per week)]—over three times the minimum wage rate.
Finally, the determination of the § 207(1) exemption requires an analysis as to whether more than half of...
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