Henry v. City of Tallahassee
| Citation | 216 F.Supp.2d 1299 |
| Decision Date | 24 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:01-cv-62/LAC.,4:01-cv-62/LAC. |
| Parties | Raymond HENRY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Marie A. Mattox, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiff.
Michael P. Spellman, Assistant City Attorney, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment and documents in support thereof (Docs.42-45, 47-48). Plaintiff timely filed a memorandum and evidentiary materials in opposition (Docs.54-57). Plaintiff and Defendant both requested the Court to take judicial notice of various documents (Docs.45, 57). Defendant moved to strike Plaintiff's request for judicial notice and supporting documentation, as well as the affidavits of Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel (Docs.70-72) and Plaintiff responded (Docs.75-76). The Court has taken the motion for summary judgment under advisement (Doc. 50), and is now prepared to rule on all pending motions. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
For purposes of ruling on Defendant's motion for summary judgment, the following facts are viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving party.1 Since April 1997, Walter McNeil has been the Tallahassee Police Department (TPD) Chief of Police (Doc. 44, p. 10). The two Chiefs that preceded McNeil were Thomas Coe (1994-1997) and Melvin Tucker (1979-1994) (Id.). Under Tucker and Coe, disciplinary measures were not clearly articulated (Id.).2 However, McNeil has worked to codify disciplinary procedures, to gather information from supervisors and the Police Benevolent Association about officers' truthfulness during investigations, to incorporate these principles into the Police Benevolent Association contract, and to set forth specific disciplinary standards (Id.).
Plaintiff is a black law enforcement officer employed by TPD. Prior to filing this action, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant in state court alleging discrimination and retaliation. The case went to trial and concluded in July 1999 in Plaintiff's favor.3
On November 6, 1999, Plaintiff and another TPD officer, Leon Sapp, contracted to provide off-duty security at a teen dance at Club Ground Zero in Tallahassee, Florida (Doc. 44, pp. 2-3). As promoter, Travis Burroughs was responsible for paying Plaintiff and Sapp for their services (Id.).
Shortly after midnight, Burroughs decided to close the dance early (Id.). Burroughs told the officers that he was dissatisfied with their performance and that he might not pay the officers at all or only for one hour of work (Doc. 44, p. 3). Plaintiff stated that he told Burroughs, "All I wanted was to be paid and the police would be out of the way" (Id.).
Plaintiff and Burroughs dispute whether Burroughs then became disorderly and threatening (Id.). Plaintiff handcuffed Burroughs and escorted him to a small office within the club (Id.). Plaintiff radioed TPD dispatch and requested transport of a prisoner (Id.). The dispatch, which went out to the dispatcher and on-duty officers, was interpreted by some officers as a request for emergency support leading some officers to respond in emergency mode (Doc. 44, p. 3). Officers Robert Hamby, Brian Reeder, and Daniel Augustyniak arrived within a minute of Plaintiff's dispatch (Id. at 4-5). At their arrival Burroughs and Plaintiff were outside the office and Plaintiff had removed the handcuffs from Burroughs (Id. at 5). Burroughs claimed that Plaintiff would only remove the handcuffs after Burroughs agreed to pay Plaintiff and Sapp (Id.). Plaintiff claimed that he removed the handcuffs after Burroughs agreed to calm down (Id.).
After being paid by Club Ground Zero owner Charles Watzke, Plaintiff left while the other officers remained on scene (Doc. 44, p. 5). Burroughs told Officer Hamby that he wanted to file a formal complaint, and Burroughs was interviewed by Lt. Ken Bergstrom telephonically and by Sgt. Maurice Laws at the scene (Id.). The other officers wrote contemporaneous memoranda that were included in the investigative file (Id.).
After leaving Club Ground Zero, Plaintiff contacted TPD dispatch (Doc. 44, p. 6). The transmission provides in relevant part:
Dispatch: Good morning, Tallahassee
Police Department, Jermaina
[sic]. How may I help
you
Henry: Yeah Jermaina [sic], this is
Sgt. Henry. How you
doing
Dispatch: Good, how are you
Henry: I'm doing fine. I'm 10-8
(available) from this place
over here. This Signal 80
(off-duty employment)
Dispatch: All right. What's your ID
Henry: 201 (badge ID).
Dispatch: All right.
Henry: O.K. What is [Officer] Hamby's
cell phone number?
Dispatch: Wait. Your [sic] 9201 (off-duty,
badge ID). You're
out on a 23 (miscellaneous
call for service)?
Henry: Yeah I was out, I'm 10-8
(available) from that 23
(miscellaneous call for
service).
Dispatch: O.K., how do you want me to
clear it?
Henry: Go ahead uh, uh B-Boy (no
report written). He paid
me finally. I was gonna
lock him up.
Dispatch: O.K.
Henry: Yeah he trying, he trying to,
trying to abscond from paying
me and Leon Sapp from
working today. Guy that
had this party.
Dispatch: Uh huh.
Henry: So I, that's why I called for a
unit for transport. I was
gonna charge him with defrauding.
Anyway, uh give
me uh Hamby's phone number.
Dispatch: O.K., at home?
Henry: No, no, no. Hamby got a mobile
phone. He was on
scene. I just left there.
Dispatch: O.K., hold on. Let me get the
red sheet.
(Id. at 6-7) (emphasis in Defendant's statement).
On November 8, 1999, Burroughs lodged a complaint with Internal Affairs (IA) (Id.). Because the conduct at issue was potentially criminal, the IA investigation was suspended and TPD's Criminal Investigation Division (CID) commenced an investigation (Id.). Pending the outcome of the CID investigation, Chief McNeil suspended Plaintiff with pay and suspended Plaintiff's abilities to take law enforcement action, to work secondary employment, and to carry a concealed weapon without a permit (Id. at 7-8).
On November 30, 1999, the CID investigation culminated in a Probable Cause affidavit charging Plaintiff with felony false imprisonment and misdemeanor perjury (Doc. 44, p. 8). Florida Circuit Judge John Crusoe reviewed the affidavit and found sufficient probable cause to sign warrants for Plaintiff (Id.). Plaintiff turned himself in that day.
Following the CID investigation, on December 6, 1999, Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) contacted Chief McNeil and requested a complete copy of all documentation relating to "the referenced misconduct (false imprisonment)" to determine "whether or not a basis exists for pursuit of any disciplinary action by the Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission" (Doc. 44, p. 16; Doc. 48, Ex. 02).
The IA investigation renewed after the CID investigation concluded, and IA re-interviewed Plaintiff under oath on January 12, 2000 (Doc. 44, p. 8). IA collected documents and conducted 23 interviews (including the backup officers and two interviews with Officer Sapp) in its investigation (Id. at 8-9).
On February 3, 2000, the State Attorney's Office for Florida's Second Judicial Circuit issued an information charging Plaintiff with felony false imprisonment and misdemeanor perjury .4
The IA investigation culminated in March 2000 with a 79-page investigative report (Id. at 9-10; Doc. 48, Ex. P).5 The report, which was ultimately adopted by Chief McNeil, recommended sustaining 26 counts of improper conduct and one count of improper procedure against Plaintiff, and exonerating Plaintiff of one court of improper conduct (Doc. 48, Ex. P., pp. IA 79-80).6
After reviewing the IA and CID investigations, Chief McNeil spoke with the City Manager and decided to terminate Plaintiff based on his belief that Plaintiff had been untruthful in the IA and CID investigations and had committed a crime (Id.; Doc. 48, Ex. O, ¶ 6). On March 20, 2000, Chief McNeil advised Plaintiff of his intent to terminate Plaintiff, effective March 27, 2000 (Doc. 44, p. 12). On the day of his pre-termination meeting, Plaintiff tendered his written resignation (Id.).
On April 10, 2000, TPD's director of Employee Resources responded to FDLE's December 6, 1999 request for a complete record of documentation (Id. at 16). Pursuant to Florida law, TPD forwarded materials to FDLE (Id. at 17; Doc. 45, Ex. D). FDLE decertified Plaintiff in August 2001 (Doc. 44, p. 17).
On September 21, 1999, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Department of Human Resources claiming race discrimination and retaliation. On March 24, 2000, Plaintiff filed an addendum to his Charge of Discrimination again charging race discrimination and retaliation with the additional claim that "Plaintiff is also subject to termination and will likely be terminated due to malicious, false and contrived charges" (Doc. 48, Ex. L6).7 On February 15, 2001, Plaintiff filed this action alleging (1) race discrimination and (2) retaliation in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes; Title 42, United States Code, Section 2000e et seq.; and Title 42, United States Code, Section 1981(a).8 The parties completed discovery. Thereafter, Defendant filed this motion claiming (1) Plaintiff's claims are res...
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Maps, charts, graphs and diagrams
...charts are properly admitted into evidence if they accurately relect the underlying records or testimony. Henry v. City of Tallahassee, 216 F.Supp.2d 1299 (Fla. 2002). A chart that contains undue editorializing, o൵ered as an exhibit under the exception to the Best Evidence Rule governing su......
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Maps, charts, graphs and diagrams
...charts are properly admitted into evidence if they accurately relect the underlying records or testimony. Henry v. City of Tallahassee, 216 F.Supp.2d 1299 (Fla. 2002). A chart that contains undue editorializing, o൵ered as an exhibit under the exception to the Best Evidence Rule governing su......
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Maps, Charts, Graphs and Diagrams
...charts are properly admitted into evidence if they accurately relect the underlying records or testimony. Henry v. City of Tallahassee, 216 F.Supp.2d 1299 (Fla. 2002). A chart that contains undue editorializing, offered as an exhibit under the exception to the Best Evidence Rule governing s......