Henry v. Cmty. Healthcare Sys. Cmty. Hosp.
| Decision Date | 15 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CT-2150 |
| Citation | 184 N.E.3d 645 |
| Parties | Amanda HENRY, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. COMMUNITY HEALTHCARE SYSTEM COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant: Neal F. Eggeson, Jr., Eggeson Privacy Law, Fishers, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Michael A. Sarafin, Alan M. Kus, Johnson & Bell, P.C., Crown Point, Indiana
[1] Amanda Henry (Henry) appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Community Healthcare System Community Hospital (Community) on her complaint alleging general negligence, but more specifically pursuing claims of invasion of privacy by intrusion into emotional seclusion, invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts (PDPF), and negligent retention. We hold the court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Community on Henry's negligent retention claim. The remaining issues Henry raises on appeal highlight the mixed signals the bench and bar have received from our appellate courts regarding Indiana's recognition (or not) of the sub-torts of invasion of privacy by intrusion on emotional seclusion and PDPF. Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the court navigated the caselaw appropriately here; therefore, we must affirm in all respects.
[2] Henry presents the following restated issues for our review:
Facts and Procedural History
[3] The record as developed thus far reveals the following facts. Henry injured the tip of her ring finger on her right hand while closing a sliding glass door. Despite the pain, she went to work the following day at Lynn's Doggie Spa where she was a dog groomer. Henry showed her swollen finger to Linda Piljak-Laski, her employer, who then openly took a picture of Henry's finger with her cell phone. Henry shared with Linda that she planned to go to the emergency room to have her finger examined after work that day.
[4] Henry had already finished with her shift that day, at around 1:00 p.m. March 1, 2018, when she received a text message from Linda. The text message was a screen shot of a text exchange between Linda and her husband, Ken Laski. Ken was employed as a radiologic technician with Community Hospital-Munster (the Hospital). The exchange contained the photo of Henry's swollen finger and Ken's assessment of and suggestions for treatment of Henry's injury.
Appellant's App. Vol. III Conf., p. 55.
[7] When Henry returned to work on March 4th, she offered to show Linda her medical note excusing her from work due to her injury. Linda replied, Id. at 42. Henry asked Linda how her husband had learned the details of her fracture. Linda explained that Ken had accessed the images at the Hospital. She then pulled up the x-ray images on her phone and showed them to Henry in the presence of another co-worker, who also saw the x-ray images. Linda said to Henry, "You got really lucky it didn't break on the joint." Id. Linda declined Henry's request to forward the images to her because, "I don't want to get my husband in trouble." Id. at 42.
[8] Henry continued to work at Lynn's Doggie Spa, despite feeling uncomfortable there, until she found other employment approximately six to eight weeks later. Henry did not pursue psychological counseling following the incident purportedly due to the cost. She also alleged that she felt uncomfortable about obtaining follow-up care for her broken finger
at the Hospital. In her deposition, Henry described the feelings she had about the access of her medical records, her issues with trust, and feeling that her privacy had been breached. See id. at 48-49.
[9] Henry made both oral and written requests with Community Hospital's Privacy Officer for an investigation into the confidentiality breach. On September 8, 2018, Community performed an audit of accesses to Henry's electronic health record. The audit revealed that at 3:11 p.m. on March 2nd Ken accessed and viewed Henry's x-ray images.
[10] On October 23, 2018, Henry filed her complaint against Community Health Network, Inc., alleging negligence in its failure to protect the "privacy, security, and confidentiality of health records generated or maintained by providers within its network." Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 22. Community filed a motion to dismiss under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), which the trial court granted. After hearing oral argument in the appeal from that order, we reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings. See Henry v. Cmty. Healthcare Sys. Cmty. Hosp. , 134 N.E.3d 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). On remand, Community filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing on the motion and response, the trial court entered its order granting Community's motion. This appeal ensued.
[11] On appeal, the standard of review of a summary judgment motion is the same standard used in the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) ; Shell Oil Co. v. Lovold Co. , 705 N.E.2d 981, 983-84 (Ind. 1998). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party. Shell Oil , 705 N.E.2d at 984. The moving party bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. If the movant sustains this burden, the opponent must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. T.R. 56(E); Shell Oil , 705 N.E.2d at 984. "And we give careful scrutiny to assure that the losing party is not improperly prevented from having its day in court." Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P'ship , 51 N.E.3d 1184, 1187 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). "To that end, Indiana's distinctive summary judgment standard imposes a heavy factual burden on the movant to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact on at least one element of the claim." Id.
[12] Here, the trial court found that: (1) "Henry's claims for invasion of privacy by means of intrusion upon emotional seclusion and public disclosure of private facts are not recognized in Indiana;" (2) "there is no provision for recovery for emotional damages without satisfying the modified impact rule, which Henry, on the facts set forth above, does not satisfy;" and (3) "Any negligent retention claim fails because the designated materials reveal nothing in the spouse's background that would raise a red flag or prevent him from being hired ... there is nothing in the spouse's employment disciplinary record, consisting mainly of parking violations and tardiness, that would suggest that he had a disciplinary history of conduct dangerous to others or would disclose confidential patient information." Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 19-20.
[13] The Restatement (First) of Torts § 867 (1939) acknowledged the tort of interference with privacy, finding a cause of action where "[a] person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other."
[14] Three early Indiana cases acknowledged the existence of the right of privacy, the invasion of which gave rise to an independent cause of action. See Mavity v. Tyndall , 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946) (); Patton v. Jacobs , 118 Ind.App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948) (...
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