Henry v. Goins

• Decision Date: 13 May 2003
• Citation: 104 S.W.3d 475
• Parties: Victoria L. HENRY, et al. v. Timothy A. GOINS, et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

104 S.W.3d 475

Victoria L. HENRY, et al. v. Timothy A. GOINS, et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.

February 5, 2003 Session.

May 13, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert L. Whitaker, Nashville, Tennessee, for the plaintiffs-appellants, Victoria L. Henry and Peggy Henry.

Paul M. Buchanan and Julie Bhattacharya Peak, Nashville, Tennessee, for the defendants-appellees, Jason M. Pope and Neal H. Dobyns d/b/a Residue Rescue.

Eugene N. Bulso, Jr. and Julie Murphy Burnstein, Nashville, Tennessee, for the plaintiffs-appellees, Robert Orr-ysco Food Services Company and Timothy A. Goins.

JANICE M. HOLDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J., and E. RILEY ANDERSON, ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined.

OPINION

The trial court entered an Order of Dismissal for failure to prosecute. The order was entered with prejudice and without notice to the parties. After the trial court reinstated Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 60.02"), Plaintiffs prevailed on the merits. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in setting aside the Order of Dismissal and vacated the judgment in Plaintiffs' favor. We granted permission to appeal. Because Plaintiffs presented adequate grounds for relief under Rule 60.02, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reinstating their claims. Therefore, we reverse that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the trial court erred in setting aside the Order of Dismissal. Accordingly, we reinstate the jury verdict, and we remand this cause to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This case arose out of a traffic accident that occurred on November 18, 1996. Three vehicles were involved: a Ford Escort operated by Victoria L. Henry, in which Peggy Henry was a passenger; a tractor-trailer operated by Timothy A. Goins and owned by Robert Orr-Sysco Food Systems Co. ("Robert Orr Sysco") and a tractor-trailer operated by Jason M. Pope and owned by Neil H. Dobyns d/b/a Residue Rescue. Victoria and Peggy Henry filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, seeking recovery for personal injuries against Robert Orr-Sysco, Mr. Goins, Mr. Pope, and Mr. Dobyns. Mr. Goins and Robert Orr-Sysco filed a cross-complaint against Mr. Pope and Mr. Dobyns, seeking recovery for damages resulting from the same accident.

The case had been pending for approximately fourteen months when Judge Walter Kurtz, on April 20, 1998, dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. The dismissal was in accordance with Rule 37.02 of the Local Rules of Practice of the Courts of Record of Davidson County.¹ No prior notice was given to the parties that the trial court was contemplating such an action, and no hearing was held prior to the dismissal. The dismissal was with prejudice because the order failed to provide otherwise. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(3) (stating that an involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute "operates as an adjudication upon the merits" unless the trial court otherwise directs).

On May 19, 1998, cross-plaintiff Goins moved to set aside the trial court's dismissal of "the case." Mr. Goins asserted that the judgment should be set aside because he was never notified that the court had contemplated dismissal. The trial court heard argument on Mr. Goins' motion on June 5, 1998. The motion was unopposed. On June 16, 1998, Judge Kurtz entered an order limiting reinstatement of the case to Mr. Goins' claims against Mr. Pope and Mr. Dobyns.

On June 15, 1998, upon learning that the Order to Set Aside Dismissal would not apply to all of the plaintiffs, counsel for the Henrys filed a separate motion to set aside the dismissal. The defendants opposed the motion. The Henrys argued that their counsel of record was never notified that the court was contemplating dismissal and that a paralegal employed by their counsel "inadvertently misread the Motion [of Mr. Goins], assuming it to have been filed on behalf of all plaintiffs." As to the merits of the dismissal for failure to prosecute, the Henrys submitted an affidavit from their counsel stating that the parties had been actively negotiating alternative dispute resolution as a means of resolving the case.

Judge Kurtz heard argument on the Henrys' motion to set aside the dismissal on July 17, 1998, and granted their motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 60.02") on August 27, 1998. Robert Orr-Sysco requested an interlocutory appeal of the order reinstating the Henrys' claims. Permission to appeal was denied. The case was set for trial before Judge Hamilton Gayden, and the Henrys prevailed on the merits. Robert Orr-Sysco appealed.

The Court of Appeals held that under Rule 60.02 "the conduct of the paralegal cannot be treated as excusable neglect." On this basis, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's reinstatement of the Henrys' claims and vacated the judgment in their favor. We granted permission to appeal. For the following reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals' holding that the trial court erred in setting aside the Order of Dismissal, and we reinstate the jury verdict.

II. Standard of Review

In reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny relief pursuant to Rule 60.02, we give great deference to the trial court. See Underwood v. Zurich Ins. Co., 854 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tenn.1993). Consequently, we will not set aside the trial court's ruling unless the trial court has abused its discretion. See id. An abuse of discretion is found only when a trial court has "`applied an incorrect legal standard, or reached a decision which is against logic or reasoning that caused an injustice to the party complaining.'" State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 832 (Tenn.2002) (quoting State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tenn.1997)). The abuse of discretion standard does not permit an appellate court to merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. See Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn.2001).

III. Analysis

Rule 59.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed within thirty days of the entry of the judgment in question. Because the Henrys did not file a motion to set aside the dismissal of their claims within thirty days after the Order of Dismissal was entered, their sole avenue for relief from the dismissal of their claims became a motion in accordance with Rule 60.02. Rule 60.02 provides relief from final judgments as follows:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (3) the judgment is void; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that a judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1) and (2) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.

It is clear from the content of the Henrys' Motion to Set Aside Dismissal that they sought relief pursuant to Rule 60.02, even though the motion did not mention this rule. Moreover, the trial court considered the Henrys' motion as a motion pursuant to Rule 60.02. Because the Henrys' request for relief did not mention Rule 60.02, they also failed to specify the section of the rule upon which they were relying. It is apparent, however, that the Henrys sought relief from final judgment under Rule 60.02(1).

"[M]istake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" is a ground for relief from a final judgment under Rule 60.02(1). Among other reasons for relief, the Henrys alleged that the "excusable neglect and inadvertent mistake" of a paralegal employed by their counsel caused them to fail to join the Motion to Set Aside Dismissal filed by Mr. Goins. In an affidavit, the paralegal stated that she "inadvertently misread the Motion [of Mr. Goins], assuming it to have been filed on behalf of all plaintiffs." The Court of Appeals held that the paralegal's conduct was not a sufficient basis for post-judgment relief. We agree that the paralegal's conduct in this case does not provide grounds for relief.

Although Rule 59.04 and Rule 60.02 are distinct, there is considerable overlap between them. In this case, the grounds that Mr. Goins successfully asserted in support of post-judgment relief were essentially the same grounds upon which the Henrys relied in seeking relief. Both Mr. Goins and the Henrys argued that their claims should be reinstated because they were never notified that the trial court was contemplating dismissal. The motions of Mr. Goins and the Henrys requesting reinstatement of their claims were appropriately construed as motions pursuant to Rule 59.04 and Rule 60.02, respectively, according to the time when the motions were filed. That the Henrys' motion would be untimely under Rule 59.04 is of no consequence if they meet the requirements for relief under Rule 60.02(1).

Under Rule 60.02(1), the Henrys' request for relief must be evaluated to determine whether the court may "relieve [them] from a final judgment." The final judgment in this case was the Order of Dismissal that was entered without notice. As relief under Rule 60.02 is available "from a final judgment" (emphasis added), generally speaking, the grounds for relief asserted under Rule 60.02(1) must have occurred at or before the entry...