Henry v. Grant Street Elec. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 March 1901
• Citation: 24 Wash. 246,64 P. 137
• Parties: HENRY v. GRANT ST. ELECTRIC RY. CO.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

64 P. 137

24 Wash. 246

HENRY v. GRANT ST. ELECTRIC RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 11, 1901

Appeal from superior court, King county; Frank T. Reid, Judge.

Action for injuries by Hugh Henry against the Grant Street Electric Railway Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Stratton & Powell, for appellant.

Sachs &amp Hale, for respondent.

DUNBAR J.

On the night of the accident in question, respondent, Henry, became a passenger on one of the appellant's cars at the corner of Yesler and South Second streets in the city of Seattle, to be carried to the power house at the intersection of Charles street and Grant street. The respondent notified the conductor of the car that he desired to be put off at the power house; the proper landing being on Charles street where the respondent was accustomed to be put off for the purpose of repairing to the power house. As the car was nearing Charles street, the conductor called out 'Charles Street!' and the respondent notified him that he wished to get off. The conductor then went out on the rear platform, and gave the bell for the motorman to stop the car. The car, however, did not stop on Charles street, where there is a plank roadway 35 or 40 feet wide, guarded by railings on all sides, but, according to the testimony of the respondent, went about 50 feet beyond, where there is no protection for passengers alighting, where the track passes over a trestle some 12 or 13 feet above the tide flats. The conductor had been informed that the respondent desired to go to the power house, and when the car stopped, and the respondent got off, the conductor, pointing east, remarked 'Right across,' or 'Right across there,' and the respondent, believing that the car was at the usual place of stopping, stepped from the car, striking his foot on the bull rail or scantling some 22 or 23 inches, according to the testimony, from the step of the car, and was precipitated to the ground through an unprotected space between the track and the wagon road, a distance of some 12 or 13 feet, sustaining the injuries complained of. Upon the trial of the cause judgment was rendered in favor of the respondent for $4,000.

Several errors are alleged by the appellant, but from the manner in which they are presented it is difficult to follow them in course. There are two propositions, however, which control this case: (1) Was the appellant guilty of negligence in passing the street where it was accustomed to discharge its passengers, and discharging plaintiff in the dangerous place which the evidence shows this was? and (2) was the respondent guilty of contributory negligence in not noting, under the circumstances, the dangers surrounding the place on which he alighted, and by caution protecting himself against such dangers? We think both of these questions must be answered in favor of respondent's contention, viz. that the company was guilty of negligence and that the respondent was not guilty of contributory negligence. The respondent testified that he thought he was at the place where he was accustomed to get off the car on Charles street, and started right out for the power house, and that the first step he took he stumbled and fell; that the reason that he did not take any precautions was because he assumed that the conductor had put him off where he requested to be put off,--at the regular stopping place. It is said by the appellant that his taking the wrong course was due entirely to his own carelessness,--in the first place, that it was careless for him to assume that it was Charles street; that being familiar with the premises, he knew that the track turned there (it being shown by the testimony that the track turned rather abruptly just after leaving Charles street); that, if he had been using ordinary care for his own safety, in view of his knowledge of the situation of the premises, he could not but have known that he had passed out of Charles street. We do not think the law calls upon a passenger to watch the course of a car, or to notice in what direction it is going. He has a right to rely upon the conductor's putting him off where he directs him to. It would simply be impracticable for passengers on a street car to rely upon their own observations, especially upon a dark night,--which it was shown this was. The cases of Forsyth v. Railroad Co., 103 Mass. 510; Railway Co. v. Hodges (Tex. Civ. App.) 24 S.W. 563; Railway Co. v. Cox (Ark.) 29 S.W. 38; Bradley v. Railway Co. (Mich.) 65 N.W. 102; and Railway Co. v. Jordan (Tex. Civ. App.) 33 S.W. 690,--are cited by the appellant to sustain the contention that the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence under the circumstances of this case. We have...