Henry v. Landreth

• Decision Date: 14 May 1973
• Docket Number: No. 73--17,73--17
• Citation: 494 S.W.2d 114,254 Ark. 483
• Parties: Roger HENRY and Aclic Ford Company, Inc., Appellants. v. Faye LANDRETH, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 114

494 S.W.2d 114

254 Ark. 483

Roger HENRY and Aclic Ford Company, Inc., Appellants. v. Faye LANDRETH, Appellee.

No. 73--17.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 14, 1973.

Whetstone & Whetstone, Little Rock, for appellants.

Hardin & Rickard, Benton, for appellee.

HOLT, Justice.

Appellants admitted liability in this action brought by the appellee to recover for personal injuries sustained by her arising out of an automobile accident in which her car was rear-ended. Her damages, being the only issue at trial, were set at $31,125 by the jury verdict. Appellants have consolidated some points for reversal. The main thrust of their argument is that the court erred in refusing to permit exploration of testimony on cross-examination of witnesses with reference to an undisputed incident involving a self-inflicted gunshot would by appellee approximately two months before the automobile accident. The court refused to permit appellants to establish this injury was self-inflicted and, also, refused to permit certain other inquiries. We agree with appellants' contention.

On direct examination the appellee, a divorcee, testified that before the automobile accident her medical condition was good and that she was planning to go to work to support her children. In chambers the appellants requested the court's permission, which was denied, to cross-examine the appellee about the episode at the time of the gunshot wound to refute her positive statements with regard to her physical condition. As indicated, it is undisputed that approximately two months before the automobile accident appellee suffered a self-inflicted gunshot wound which was serious enough to warrant hospitalization for approximately 18 days. One of her doctors testified that appellee was asked by him if she had ever suffered a previous injury. Appellee denied to him that she had. This doctor testified further that he was aware of her numerous other medical problems. Her family doctor said that for the past four years she had experienced '. . . a lot of illness. Several illnesses.' The appellants' medical witness testified she specifically reported to him she had suffered no previous accidents or injuries and reported no past illnesses.

Appellants were, also, refused the right to propound questions relative to her asserted instructions to the hospital personnel not to let any one see her hospital records relative to the self-inflicted injury. Appellants were further refused permission to utilize a part of the hospital records, a summary sheet, reflecting the gunshot wound. Appellants were refused in their efforts to show that she was ambulatory and visited in another room on another floor during her hospitalization subsequent to the automobile injury although she had testified she was bedfast and confined to her room.

Certainly the foregoing evidence is contradictory to the appellee's testimony on direct examination. We have long recognized the important significance of cross-examination and the wide latitude which should be permitted the cross-examiner in eliciting any contradictory facts affecting the witness' credibility. Wilson v. Thurston Nat'l. Ins. Co., 251 Ark. 929, 475 S.W.2d 881 (1972). Also, the purpose of cross-examination is to test and sift for the truth of statements made by a witness on direct examination. Huffman v. City of Hot Springs, 237 Ark. 756, 375 S.W.2d 795 (1964). In Washington National Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 249 Ark. 73, 458 S.W.2d 135 (1970), we stated:

'We have said that cross-examination is a leading and searching inquiry of a witness for further disclosure touching the particular matters detailed by him in his direct examination, that it serves to sift, modify or explain what has been said in order to develop facts in a view favorable to the...