Henry v. Oluwole

• Docket Number: 3:13-cv-826 (SRU)
• Decision Date: 28 September 2021
• Parties: LAURA HENRY, Plaintiff, v. OLAKUNLE OLUWOLE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

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LAURA HENRY, Plaintiff, v. OLAKUNLE OLUWOLE, Defendant.

No. 3:13-cv-826 (SRU)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

September 28, 2021

ORDER

Stefan R. Underhill United States District Judge

In 2015, Laura Henry (“Henry”) filed a motion for default judgment against Dr. Olakunle Oluwole (“Dr Oluwole”) after he failed to answer claims raised against him in a 2013 complaint. Although District Judge Alfred V. Covello granted the motion for default judgment, he postponed the hearing in damages pending resolution of the action against non-defaulting defendants also named in the complaint. After the case was transferred to my docket, I held hearings and reviewed evidence to determine the appropriate measure of damages to award prior to entering final judgment. For the following reasons, Henry's request for an award of $14, 211, 069.00 in compensatory and punitive damages is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Procedural History

The procedural history in this 2013 case is both lengthy and complex. Relevant here, Henry originally filed suit against Dr. Oluwole, Bristol Hospital, and other unnamed defendants on June 10, 2013, generally alleging that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and that Dr. Oluwole, a surgeon employed by the hospital had sexually assaulted her on hospital premises in 2011. See Compl., Doc. No. 1. Henry subsequently amended the complaint on September 9, 2013. See First Am. Compl., Doc. No. 8. After Dr. Oluwole failed to appear and answer the amended complaint, default was entered against him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). See Order, Doc. No. 51. On September 22, 2015, Judge Covello granted Henry's motion for default judgment. See Order on Mot. for Default J., Doc. No. 100, 103. Judge Covello declined, however, to determine damages at that time, instead continuing the hearing in damages until “after the determination of the claims against the remaining defendants.” See Order, Doc. No. 104.

Bristol Hospital, on the other hand, timely appeared and moved to dismiss the amended complaint in January 2014. See Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 17. In September 2014, Judge Covello granted Bristol Hospital's motion in part, dismissing count one (alleging sexual harassment in violation of Title VII), count nine (alleging false imprisonment) and count ten (alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress). See Ruling on Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 37. Specifically, Judge Covello held that Bristol Hospital could not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior on Henry's claims of false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. Thereafter, Henry made several unsuccessful motions for leave to amend the complaint, ultimately filing a Fourth Amended complaint on March 28, 2016. See Doc. No. 122, Doc. No. 128. That complaint then became the operative pleading against Bristol Hospital. See Fourth Am. Compl., Doc. No. 128. In April 2016, Bristol Hospital moved successfully to dismiss counts one, eleven, and twelve of the Fourth Amended Complaint. See Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 140; Order on Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 181. The case was then transferred to my docket. See Order of Transfer, Doc. No. 195.

In 2018, Dr. Oluwole appeared, and, through counsel, moved to set aside the default judgment. See, Mot. to Set Aside Default, Doc. No. 257. In light of evidence that the default had been willful, and additionally because of the significant period of time between the entry of default judgment in 2015 and Dr. Oluwole's appearance in 2018, I denied his motion. See Ruling on Mot. to Set Aside Default J., Doc. No. 284.

In April 2018, following discovery, Bristol Hospital moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts of the Fourth Amended Complaint, including: two counts of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision (counts thirteen and fourteen); one count of negligence (count fifteen); and one count of negligence through agent or supervisor (count sixteen). See Mot. for Summ. J., Doc. No. 227. On March 25, 2019, I granted the motion for summary judgment only with respect to count sixteen. See Ruling on Mot. for Summ. J., Doc. No. 283. In October 2019, the case proceeded to trial against Bristol Hospital.

In my instructions to the jury at the close of trial, I specifically explained that in order for Bristol Hospital to be found liable, Henry needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Oluwole engaged in tortious conduct. In particular, the jury needed to find that Dr. Oluwole had committed sexual assault, assault, or battery in order to return a verdict in Henry's favor. Trans. of Trial. 10.28.2019.^[1] On October 28, 2019, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Bristol Hospital. See Verdict Form, Doc. No. 342. The verdict form reflects that the jury found that Henry had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Oluwole sexually assaulted, assaulted or battered her. Id.

Following the entry of judgment for Bristol Hospital, Dr. Oluwole again moved to vacate the default judgment, arguing that enforcing the judgment was inequitable in light of the jury verdict exonerating the hospital. See Mot. to Set Aside Default J., Doc. No. 345. In support of that argument, Dr. Oluwole cited to Frow v. De La Vega, an ancient Supreme Court case cautioning that where “a bill makes a joint charge against several defendants, and one of them makes default” a court should not enter final judgment pending the disposition of the case on the merits against the non-defaulting defendants. 82 U.S. 552, 554 (1872). I initially declined to vacate the judgment, noting that the Second Circuit has narrowly interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in Frow, and additionally that Henry did not allege a true theory of joint liability against the defendants. See Ruling on Mot. to Set Aside Default J., Doc. No. 359.

Prior to awarding damages, I modified the judgment by vacating the counts of the complaint that were directly inconsistent with the jury's findings-specifically, the counts of the complaint alleging assault and battery. I determined that although Frow has been narrowly interpreted in this Circuit, that case and its progeny caution that a court should strive to avoid the entry of logically inconsistent judgments against defaulting and non-defaulting defendants. See, e.g., Rivera v. Mattingly, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67539, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2021) (vacating default judgment to avoid inconsistent judgments); Chain v. North East Freightways, Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239307, at *55 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2020) (same); see also Farzetta v. Turner & Newall, Ltd., 797 F.2d 151, 154 (3d Cir. 1986) (“we believe that Frow stands for the proposition that if at trial facts are proved that exonerate certain defendants and that as a matter of logic preclude the liability of another defendant, the plaintiff should be collaterally estopped from obtaining a judgment against the latter defendant”).

In my order modifying the judgment, I additionally considered Dr. Oluwole's objection to Henry's demand for damages associated with a stroke that she suffered in 2013.^[2] After carefully considering the testimony of Henry's primary-care physician, Dr. Gary Miller, who testified at the second damages hearing held on October 23, 2020, I determined that Henry had failed to demonstrate that damages associated with her stroke were recoverable by virtue of the default judgment. In particular, I focused on Dr. Miller's discussion of certain underlying conditions that might have predisposed Henry to suffering the stroke when she did. In light of that determination, I held that Henry could not rely on exhibits reflecting damages associated with her stroke in support of her demand.

On June 1, 2021, I held a third and final damages hearing to allow Henry to present additional witness testimony and to offer Dr. Oluwole a further opportunity to contest the amount of damages claimed. Following that hearing, Henry submitted a second memorandum in support of her request for damages. In that memorandum, Henry argues that she is entitled to recover a total of $14, 211, 069.00 in compensatory and punitive damages from Dr. Oluwole.^[3]Dr. Oluwole has not specifically opposed that request, but instead argued at the third damages hearing that Henry should be awarded no damages after the verdict in favor of Bristol Hospital.^[4]

In determining the appropriate measure of damages to award, I will rely on witness testimony presented at the damages hearings, as well as medical records, affidavits, and bills admitted as exhibits in conjunction with those hearings. The medical records, prepared during the course of treatment by medical providers who testified at the damages hearings, are properly admissible under Federal Rule 803(4) and 803(6). See, e.g., Boykin v. W. Express, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14771, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2016); see also Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 1993). Henry's affidavits are additionally admissible in support of her claim for damages, see Antoine v. Brooklyn Maids 26, Inc., 489 F.Supp.3d 68, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (collecting cases), as is sworn witness testimony presented at those hearings. Norcia v. Dieber's Castle Tavern, Ltd., 980 F.Supp.2d 492, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). By agreement of the parties, I will also consider testimony and exhibits previously admitted at the jury trial against Bristol Hospital. See Trans. of H'rg. 10.23.2020. For the reasons explained in my previous order, I will not consider claims for damages associated with Henry's stroke.

II. Standard of Review

A party's default constitutes an admission of liability of “all well-pleaded factual allegations contained in the complaint.” City...