Henry v. White

• Decision Date: 07 June 1952
• Parties: , 194 Tenn. 192 HENRY et al. v. WHITE et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 70

250 S.W.2d 70

30 Beeler 192, 194 Tenn. 192

HENRY et al. v. WHITE et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 7, 1952.

Reuben H. Nichols, Knoxville, for appellants Keith M. Henry et al.

Wayne Parkey, Knoxville, for appellants Ralph M. White et al.

Richard L. Carson, Knoxville, for appellee City of Knoxville.

TOMLINSON, Justice.

The charter of the City of Knoxville, and particularly that part thereof enacted by Chapter 473 of the Private Acts of 1929 authorizes the City Council to zone the City. By Ordinance No. 123 the City was zoned. By Section 6 of this ordinance it was provided that in zoning districts "E', 'F' and 'G' Commercial District' buildings may be used 'for any use permitted in the apartment districts or for any other use except the following:' Then follows twenty-one exceptions in Zone E. One of these is '15. Public garage except as provided in section 19'.

The ordinance creates a Planning Commission. By Section 19(6) it provides that the Planning Commission may, with the approval of the City Council, 'permit a public garage in a commercial district where it is deemed necessary for the public convenience or welfare'.

On December 21, 1948 the City Council, by a vote of five to one, enacted Ordinance No. 1749. That ordinance amended Zoning Ordinance No. 123 so as to permit public garages in all commercial districts of the City on lots which abut streets designated as a part of a United States Highway. The effect of the amendment is to permit public garages on Magnolia Avenue in Zone E commercial district. By sub-section 15 of Section 6 of Ordinance No. 123, as above pointed out, a public garage could not be maintained anywhere in Zone E commercial district prior to amending Ordinance No. 1749.

A quite large majority in value, and perhaps number, of the property owners in zoning district E whose property is detrimentally effected (according to the allegations of the bill) by amending Ordinance 1749 instituted this suit. Their bill alleges that amending Ordinance No. 1749 is invalid. A part of the relief sought is that the Court so declare.

Two men named White who are operating a garage on Magnolia Avenue under the purported authority of amending Ordinance No. 1749 and the City of Knoxville are made defendants. By their separate demurrers to the bill these defendants assert the validity of amending Ordinance No. 1749.

The Chancellor sustained the demurrer and adjudged amending Ordinance No. 1749 to be a valid enactment. The complainants have appealed. So, the question here is whether amending Ordinance No. 1749 is valid.

Commencing in perhaps 1945 or 1946 the Whites made an effort to procure from the City Planning Commission the authority to erect and maintain a public garage on the lot in question on Magnolia Avenue in Zone E. The City Commission rejected the application after a hearing which followed the protest of property owners. White procured a permit to erect a building on this lot purportedly to carry on some business permitted in Zone E. When the building inspector examined the plans of building, etc., he called the attention of White to the fact that the building being planned and erected appeared to be a garage building and that, if so, that business could not be maintained there. The Whites went on with their building.

Thereafter repeated efforts were made by the Whites to procure a permit from the Planning Commission to operate a garage there. Each time the application was resisted by affected property owners. Each time the application for such a permit was refused.

Finally the Whites went to the City Council. Although the matter was resisted there the City Council by a large majority vote adopted an oral motion to permit the Whites to operate a public garage on this lot.

By bill in Chancery the effected property owners in Zone E immediately challenged the validity of the above-mentioned action of the City Council. Then it was that the City Council enacted Ordinance No. 1749 purporting to amend the zoning law in the respects mentioned. If valid, the Whites can operate their garage on the lot in question in Zone E. By their supplemental bill these property owners challenge, as above stated, the validity of this ordinance.

Reference to decisions are unnecessary to support the now elementary and conclusively settled fact that the Legislature may empower a municipality to enact a zoning ordinance regulating the use to which land may be put or prohibited in the various zoning districts.

Equally as well settled is the fact that a zoning ordinance enacted pursuant to such statute is valid, except where that ordinance may be in some respect unreasonable or arbitrary. If there be a discrimination between properties in zoning, such discrimination will not be disturbed if it may be rested upon some reasonable basis, and is not forbidden by the Charter.

It will be assumed, in so far as it concerns this case, that a zoning ordinance which permits the maintenance of a public garage on a street within a given zoning district that is designated as a United States Highway, while prohibiting such use as to property on other streets of that district not designated as a United States Highway, is a discrimination which may be rested on a reasonable basis.

Because of the emphasis placed thereon in pleadings and brief, presumably, to imply favoritism, but not fraud, we have detailed the alleged activities of the Whites in this matter. In reality, this is of no importance, in so far as it concerns this case. 'If the enactment is valid, the motive behind the enactment is not to be inquired into by this court.' Madison v. City of Maryville, 173 Tenn. 489, 493, 121 S.W.2d 540, 542.

A zoning ordinance is not invalid merely because it may be detrimental to some properties in the district. This is because the interest of the individual is subordinate to the public...