Hensley v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-1213,85-1213 |
| Citation | 786 F.2d 353 |
| Parties | 27 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 1029, 104 Lab.Cas. P 34,749 Guy J. HENSLEY, Appellee, v. MacMILLAN BLOEDEL CONTAINERS, INC., Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Michael S. Moore, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.
Silas H. Brewer, Jr., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.
Before ROSS, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., (MacMillan) appeals from a final judgment of the district court awarding Guy J. Hensley (Hensley) certain allegedly unpaid wages in his action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 201-219 (1978) (FLSA). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the district court.
Hensley is an over-the-road truck driver employed by MacMillan since 1968. Prior to 1973 Hensley was paid for all hours worked at an hourly rate, including those hours spent on inspecting the vehicles and completing pre-trip and post-trip paperwork. In 1973, at the request of Hensley's union, the United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO, Local 1422, an agreement was reached whereby MacMillan paid its over-the-road drivers at a mileage rate for trips in excess of 150 miles and at an hourly rate for trips less than 150 miles. Time spent on inspections and paperwork for trips less than 150 miles was compensated at an hourly rate. The 1973 agreement did not state whether or not the mileage rate method of compensation included payment for inspection and paperwork time.
During subsequent contract negotiations in 1976 and 1979, the Union submitted proposals to require MacMillan to pay drivers a separate hourly rate for time spent on inspections and paperwork, in addition to the mileage rate, for trips in excess of 150 miles. MacMillan rejected the proposal, contending each time, that the mileage rate already compensated the drivers for the time spent in those activities. Both the 1976 and 1979 contracts were ratified without any change in the method of calculating payments for inspection and paperwork activities.
During the time period relevant to this case Hensley's compensation was governed by a collective bargaining agreement dated October 16, 1979. The agreement provided that drivers would be paid a mileage rate for trips in excess of 150 miles but paid their hourly rate for trips of less than 150 miles. The agreement further provided that drivers would be compensated at their hourly rate for unloading delay time in excess of two hours per round trip. During each workweek relevant to this case Hensley received compensation calculated according to the agreement and the amount of his compensation exceeded the product of the total number of hours worked and the statutory minimum wage.
In 1983 Hensley filed an amended complaint alleging a violation of section 206(a) 1 of the FSLA and sought recovery of allegedly unpaid minimum wages for hours he spent performing inspections and paperwork on trips exceeding 150 miles. Hensley claimed that he was not compensated for those hours and that he should be compensated at an hourly rate for such nondriving time in addition to a mileage rate for driving time. MacMillan contended that its mileage rate was intended to compensate its drivers for these nondriving hours and that there was no violation of section 206(a) because Hensley received weekly compensation exceeding the product of the total number of hours worked and the statutory minimum wage.
Following a brief trial the district court found that Hensley had not been compensated for the time spent on inspections and paperwork and that the case was controlled by Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 750 F.2d 47 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2116, 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985) (Barrentine II ). The district court entered judgment for Hensley and awarded him $3,216.00 for wages due and liquidated damages and $1,500 in attorneys fees. MacMillan now appeals.
In general, to establish a violation of the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA, a plaintiff, such as Hensley, must demonstrate that he was engaged in compensable activity within the meaning of the statute and that the wages received for that activity, if any, were below the statutory minimum wage. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206(a); see Barrentine II, supra. Thus, for purposes of analyzing this case, we must consider: 1) whether the activity performed was compensable activity within the meaning of the statute; 2) whether Hensley was compensated for that activity; and 3) whether the rate of compensation was below the minimum wage.
In the present case the district court determined that although the activity in question was compensable activity, Hensley was not compensated in any amount for the time he spent doing inspections and paperwork for trips over 150 miles and thus found that the FLSA had been violated. Because the parties agree, and we have held in Barrentine II, supra, that all time spent by drivers on pre-trip inspections is compensable activity under the FLSA, our focus shifts directly to the next two stages of the analysis. Thus the first issue to be addressed herein is whether the district court's finding that Hensley was not compensated in the mileage rate for the time he spent on inspections and paperwork for trips more than 150 miles is clearly erroneous. 2
The finding that Hensley was not compensated when engaged in those activities is one of fact and we may reverse this finding only if we conclude that it is clearly erroneous. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 285-90, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1788-91, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982). "[A] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). Despite this stringent standard, after carefully examining the record as a whole, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that Hensley was in fact compensated in the mileage rate for the activities in question.
There exists evidence in the record that MacMillan had an established policy of compensating drivers for time spent on inspections and paperwork. It is uncontested that prior to 1973, MacMillan paid all drivers at an hourly rate for all hours worked including the time spent on inspections and paperwork. It is also undisputed that the practice continues today when drivers take trips of short lengths. All drivers who drive trips of less than 150 miles are paid at an hourly rate for all hours worked including the time spent on inspections and paperwork. Further the record is clear that in 1973, due to a change in the collective bargaining agreement sought by Hensley's union, the method of calculating compensation for drivers who drove trips more than 150 miles changed from an hourly basis to a mileage basis.
It is Hensley's contention that when the parties agreed in 1973 to a mileage rate system of compensation when he drove trips of more than 150 miles, MacMillan ceased paying him for the time he spent on inspections and paperwork incident to those trips. It is MacMillan's position that the mileage rate was set at a level that was intended to compensate Hensley for the time spent on inspections and paperwork. The only circumstantial evidence tending to support Hensley's position is the absence of any express language in the relevant bargaining agreements stating that the mileage rate includes the activities in question and the fact that during contract negotiations after 1973 the union submitted proposals to require MacMillan to pay compensation for that time separately in addition to the mileage rate.
While this evidence supports the inference that MacMillan stopped compensating Hensley separately by-the-hour for each hour spent on inspections and paperwork because that is what his union requested, it does not negate the direct evidence...
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