Henson v. Scoggins

• Decision Date: 14 April 1948
• Docket Number: No. 16166.,16166.
• Citation: 47 S.E.2d 643
• Parties: HENSON. v. SCOGGINS, Sheriff.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

47 S.E.2d 643

HENSON.

v.SCOGGINS, Sheriff.

No. 16166.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 14, 1948.

Error from Superior Court, Cobb County; J. H. Hawkins, Judge.

Habeas corpus proceeding by Lee Thomas Henson against H. R. Scoggins, sheriff. To review the judgment, Lee Thomas Hen-son brings error.

Affirmed.

Dorsey & Hawes, of Marietta, for plaintiff in error.

H. G. Vandiviere, Sol. Gen., of Canton, for defendant in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court.

JENKINS, Chief Justice.

Lee Thomas Henson was indicted for the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act. The jury returned a verdict of "guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act or acts." No exceptions were taken to the verdict and sentence. The movant in his habeas corpus proceeding contends that this verdict and consequently the sentence based thereon are wholly void, in that the verdict omitted the words, "without due caution and circumspection." Upon the trial of the habeas corpus proceeding the movant was remanded to custody, to which order exception is taken. Held,

1. "It is not the function of the writ of habeas corpus, however, to determine the guilt or innocence of one accused of crime. Its only purpose is to ascertain the legality of the detention * * *." Stephens v. Henderson, 120 Ga. 218, 220, 47 S.E. 498, 499. Thus, "The writ of habeas corpus cannot be substituted for a motion for new trial, writ of error, or other remedial procedure, or be used as a remedy for the review of alleged errors in the trial court." Blackstone v. Nelson, 151 Ga. 706, 108 S.E. 114.

The writ "is the appropriate remedy only when the court was without jurisdiction in the premises, or where it exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the sentence by virtue of which the party is imprisoned, so that such sentence is not merely erroneous, but is absolutely void." Fleming v. Lowry, 173 Ga. 894, 162 S.E. 144; Wells v. Pridgen, 154 Ga. 397, 114 S.E. 355; Stewart v. Sanders, 199 Ga. 497, 34 S.E.2d 649.

2. While a judgment or sentence such as here involved must be supported by a verdict, "Verdicts are to have a reasonable intendment, and are to receive a reasonable construction, and are not to be avoided unless from necessity." Code, § 27-2301. Accordingly, a verdict may be construed "in the light of the issues actually submitted to the jury under the charge of the court; and if, when so construed, it expresses with reasonable certainty a finding supported by the evidence, it is to be upheld as legal." Barbour v. State, 8 Ga.App. 27, 28, 68 S.E. 458. In Arnold v. State, 51 Ga. 144, 146, the court used this language: "Here the charge was assault with intent to murder A B, at a certain time and place, illegally and feloniously, by shooting at him with a loaded pistol with intent to murder. In this is involved, as a legal necessity, that he did shoot at A B not in his own defense andwithout justification. The jury negative [sic] the malice, the intent to murder and simply find the shooting. But what shooting? The shooting charged, but without the intent to murder. The verdict to be perfectly formal might go further and say shooting at A B not in his own defense and without justification. But we see no imperative requirement for this additional detail. All this is charged in the indictment, and the verdict of the jury may just as properly be aided by the indictment as to these things, as it may by the name of the party shot at, and the time and place of the occurrence."

3. It is the duty of a movant to make out his case, and, in the absence of the charge of the court in the former trial where the defendant was convicted being shown in the present record, it will be presumed that the judge in the trial of that case not only instructed the jury as to the law of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act, but gave the defendant the benefit of the lesser grade of involuntary manslaughter by instructing the jury on the law of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act, and that he defined the meaning of such lesser offense. Here the jury did not convict the accused of involuntarily taking a human life in the...