Heon v. State , 2010–180–APPEAL.
| Decision Date | 03 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2010–180–APPEAL.,2010–180–APPEAL. |
| Citation | 19 A.3d 1225 |
| Parties | Frederick M. HEON, Jr.v.STATE of Rhode Island. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREAppeal from Providence County Superior Court, Francis J. Darigan, Jr., J.Frederick M. Heon, Jr.Aaron L. Weisman.
This case came before the Court at a session in conference pursuant to Article I, Rule 12A(3)(b) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. After reviewing the record and the parties' prebriefing statements, we proceed to decide the case at this time without further briefing or argument.
The applicant, Frederick M. Heon, Jr., appeals from a Superior Court judgment granting the state's motion to dismiss his application for postconviction relief. In 1991, the applicant entered a plea of nolo contendere to charges of first-degree sexual assault, intimidation of a witness, and six counts of assault with a dangerous weapon. He filed the present application for postconviction relief in 2008. The state filed a motion to dismiss Heon's application on the grounds that it was time-barred under the doctrine of laches.
A hearing was held on the state's motion to dismiss the application. The state argued that it would be unfair to ask the state to prosecute this crime eighteen years after Heon's conviction, but it presented no evidence to support this assertion. The hearing justice determined that the state had shown prejudice as a result of the nearly twenty-year delay between the time of conviction and the filing of the application. He concluded that this delay was unreasonable “as a matter of law” and granted the motion to dismiss. Judgment was entered in favor of the state and the applicant filed a timely notice of appeal.
We note that the state failed to clearly state upon which rule the motion was based. As one of the grounds for the motion, the state asserted that the applicant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In its memorandum in support of the motion, however, the state suggested that summary judgment would be appropriate. Because the hearing justice considered matters outside of the pleadings, we treat the motion as one for summary judgment. See Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
This Court has held that the defense of laches may be properly invoked by the state as an affirmative defense to an application for postconviction relief. Raso v. Wall, 884 A.2d 391, 394 (R.I.2005). In order to prove the defense of laches, “the state has the burden of proving by a preponderance...
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Tempest v. State, 2015–257–M.P.
...the PCR “applicant unreasonably delayed in seeking relief” and (2) the state was “prejudiced by the delay.” Id. (quoting Heon v. State, 19 A.3d 1225, 1225 (R.I.2010) (mem.)).It is incumbent upon this Court to review the hearing justice's laches determination in a deferential manner. “Whethe......
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Heon v. RI Attorney Gen.'s Office, CA 12-44 ML
...on June 3, 2010, vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the superior court "for a hearing on the issue of laches." Heon v. State, 19 A.3d 1225, 1226 (R.I. 2010). In its order remanding the matter, the state supreme court noted that "the state did not present any evidence in support o......
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Brown v. State
...specific determination[s] be made in light of the circumstances of the particular case." Santos, 91 A.3d at 345 (quoting Heon v. State, 19 A.3d 1225, 1225 (R.I. 2010)) (internal quotations omitted). With respect to the first prong, unreasonable delay, the State has the burden of proving, by......
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Brown v. State
...specific determination[s] be made in light of the circumstances of the particular case." Santos, 91 A.3d at 345 (quoting Heon v. State, 19 A.3d 1225, 1225 (R.I. 2010)) (internal quotations omitted). With respect to the first prong, unreasonable delay, the State has the burden of proving, by......