Herbits v. Constitution Indem. Co. of Philadelphia
| Decision Date | 28 June 1932 |
| Citation | 181 N.E. 723,279 Mass. 539 |
| Parties | HERBITS et al. v. CONSTITUTION INDEMNITY CO. OF PHILADELPHIA. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Hampden County; Henry T. Lummus, Judge.
Action by William Herbits and others against the Constitution Indemnity Company of Philadelphia. Verdict for defendant, and plaintiffs bring exceptions.
Exceptions overruled.Louis C. Henin and John I. Robinson, both of Springfield, for plaintiffs.
Ely, Giles & Ely and Dudley B. Wallace, all of Springfield, for defendant.
The four plaintiffs, who are attorneys at law, have sued the defendant in an action of tort. They aver in their declaration that the defendant ‘wilfully and maliciously, and with intent to deprive the plaintiffs of the benefits, advantages and profits' of a contract of emplyment with a client to undertake and prosecute to a trial or settlement her action of tort for personal injuries, ‘did influence, persuade and induce’ the client to settle her action for an inadequate amount, whereby the plaintiffs lost the benefits, advantages and profits of the contract and the the value of the services rendered by them thereunder. The case is before us after a finding for the defendant on the plaintiffs' exception to the ruling of the trial judge that, as matter of law, upon the pleadings and evidence the plaintiffs could not recover. The defendant offered no evidence. The ruling excepted to was in effect a ruling that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, they could not recover.
The evidence tended to establish the following facts: In October, 1928, the plaintiffs' client, Mrs. Edwards, was seriously and permanently injured by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by one Curto, who was insured by the defendant under a motor vehicle liability policy. She successively employed, or authorized the employment of, the four plaintiffs to prosecute her claim, under a contract whereby she agreed to pay them a fee which should be equivalent to one third of any sum secured by settlement or trial of her case and, in the event that the suit was unsuccessful, to pay the disbursemenets and such fee as she should be able to pay. The plaintiffs, under their employment, investigated the circumstances of the accident, entered a suit against Curto, and negotiated with representatives of the defendant. The defendant employed attorneys to defend the suit who entered their appearance and filed an answer. Following negotiations between the plaintiffs and representatives of the defendant, the latter offered to pay $1,250 in settlement of the claim, but this was declined by the plaintiffs' client on the ground that the amount was inadequate. Shortly before the case would have been reached for trial in September, 1930, the plaintiffs were informed by the defendant's attorneys of the fact that in May, 1930, the defendant had settled directly with the plaintiffs' client in Detroit, had paid her $1,250, and had been given a release by her. In December, 1930, the plaintiffs' client was nonsuited at the request of the defendant's attorneys. The plaintiffs have written to their client with reference to compensation but have received no reply. They have been paid nothing for the services they have rendered or in reimbursement for moneys necessarily spent by them in prosecuting the case.
While the evidence does not warrant the finding that the defendant actually knew that by the terms of their contract of employment the plaintiffs' fee was to be based upon the amount, if any, paid in settlement or after trial of the case, it knew that there was an employment and that services had been rendered by the plaintiffs. It could be fairly inferred that the defendant knew that a settlement on a basis more advantageous to it would be reached in dealing directly with the client where the payment of the fee earned by the plaintiffs need be given little or no consideration in fixing the sum to be paid. It could be found on the evidence that, by reason of the settlement made by the defendant without the knowledge of the...
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Sharrow v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1352
...336 N.E.2d 568 (1975); Volz v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Inc., 498 F.2d 659 (5th Cir.1974); Herbits v. Constitution Indemnity Co. of Philadelphia, 279 Mass. 539, 181 N.E. 723 (1932); Tauro v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corporation, 297 Mass. 234, 8 N.E.2d 773 (1937); and Dombey......
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Cavicchi v. Koski
...(here, Limone) was induced to breach a contract with the plaintiff. See id. at 589, 215 N.E.2d 915, citing Herbits v. Constitution Indem. Co., 279 Mass. 539, 181 N.E. 723 (1932); Tauro v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 297 Mass. 234, 8 N.E.2d 773 ...
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Buckley v. John
...3(9). The grounds of the plaintiff's cause of action in this case are entirely different from those asserted in Hebbits v. Constitution Indemnity Co., 279 Mass. 539, 181 N.E. 723, and in Tauro v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., Ltd., 297 Mass. 234, 8 N.E.2d 773, and those case......
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