Herbst v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 26 July 1996
• Docket Number: Nos. 95-1611,95-1733,s. 95-1611
• Parties: Arthur L. HERBST, Marvin Rosner, David Zbarz, M.D., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. James E. RYAN, Attorney General of Illinois and John R. Lumpkin, M.D., Director of the Illinois Department of Public Health, Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, and Jack O'Malley, State's Attorney of Cook County, Illinois, as class representative of all 102 Illinois State's Attorneys, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1300

90 F.3d 1300

Arthur L. HERBST, Marvin Rosner, David Zbarz, M.D., et al Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. James E. RYAN, Attorney General of Illinois and John R Lumpkin, M.D., Director of the Illinois Department of Public Health, Defendants-Appellants Cross-Appellees and Jack O'Malley, State's Attorney of Cook County, Illinois, as class representative of all 102 Illinois State's Attorneys, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 95-1611, 95-1733.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Jan. 16, 1996.

Decided July 26, 1996.

Alexandra M. Jackson, Ross & Hardies, Brenda Swierenga Furlow, Deborah M. Neyens, Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal, Harvey M. Grossman, Colleen K. Connell (argued), Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., Chicago, IL, for Marvin Rosner, David Zbarz, William Spellacy and Arthur L. Herbst.

Deborah L. Ahlstrand (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Civil Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for James E. Ryan and John R. Lumpkin, M.D.

Connie R. Barba, Donald J. Mizerk (argued), Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County, Terry L. McDonald, Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County, Federal Litigation Division, Chicago, IL, for Jack O'Malley.

Before CUMMINGS, RIPPLE and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

This appeal involves the appropriate allocation of responsibility for attorneys' fees in a civil rights action. In the underlying action, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of certain amendments to Illinois' Abortion Law. ¹ The Attorney General of Illinois, the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Health, and the class of all 102 Illinois State's Attorneys were named as defendants. The district court approved a consent decree proposed by the parties. The plaintiffs, as the "prevailing parties," then successfully petitioned the district court to enter an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court assessed the entire fee award against the State of Illinois. The plaintiffs and the Attorney General of Illinois appeal this allocation of liability for the fee award. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I BACKGROUND

A. The Underlying Litigation

The plaintiffs in the underlying civil rights action are a group of named Illinois physicians The underlying case was resolved when the parties proposed, and the district court approved, a consent decree enjoining enforcement of some of the challenged provisions. The plaintiffs filed a petition for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, ⁴ and the district court referred the petition to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. The magistrate judge determined that the plaintiffs were "prevailing part[ies]" for purposes of section 1988 and recommended that the district court award the plaintiffs $233,090.19 in fees and costs. The magistrate judge made the further recommendation that this award be assessed jointly and severally against the State Defendants and the State's Attorneys.

                acting as class representatives on behalf of other physicians desirous of performing abortion services and on behalf of female patients desirous of receiving such services. 2  They commenced this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of various amendments to Illinois' Abortion Law of 1975, 720 ILCS 510/1-15.  Relief was sought against:  (1) the State's Attorney of Cook County, in his official capacity and as the representative of a class of the State's Attorneys from 102 Illinois counties;  (2) the Attorney General of Illinois, in his official capacity;  and (3) the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Health, in his official capacity.  Throughout the litigation, the State Defendants were represented by the Attorney General's Office, and the State's Attorneys were represented by the Cook County State's Attorney's Office. 3
                

The district court declined to accept the magistrate judge's allocation of liability for the fee award. ⁵ Noting the absence of Seventh Circuit authority on the question, the district court found helpful the approach of the Fifth Circuit in Echols v. Parker, 909 F.2d 795 (5th Cir.1990) that "[a] county official pursues his duty as a state agent when he is enforcing state law or policy." Id. at 801. The district court noted that a state is liable for attorneys' fees under section 1988 when a state official is sued in his official capacity. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2574-75, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). It also determined that the Illinois State's Attorneys would have been acting as state agents in enforcing the challenged provisions. Consequently, concluded the court, the fee award should be entered solely against the State of Illinois. Accordingly, the district court entered judgment against the State of Illinois in the amount of $233,090.19.

B. The Positions of the Parties

On appeal, the parties advance three different allocations of liability for the fee award. The State Defendants argue in favor of equal apportionment of the fee award between themselves and the class of State's Attorneys. In their view, the district court erred in failing to assess a portion of the fee award against the State's Attorneys who, as officials responsible for the enforcement of The plaintiffs argue in favor of joint and several liability for the fee award. In their view, joint and several liability best serves the broad remedial purposes of section 1988 and avoids the "uncertain" and "cumbersome" process of collecting a judgment from the State of Illinois. Joint and several liability is appropriate, the plaintiffs assert, because the civil rights violation alleged in their complaint--the threatened enforcement of a constitutionally defective statute--was indivisibly effected by all the defendants, and "liability on the merits and responsibility for fees go hand in hand." See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3104-05, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). The plaintiffs contend that state courts and state indemnification law--not the district court--should provide the framework for "appropriate shifting of financial burdens" related to the fee award. Venuti v. Riordan, 702 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir.1983).

                the challenged provisions, also may be held liable for attorneys' fees.   See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731-34, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1974-76, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980);  Crosby v. Bowling, 683 F.2d 1068, 1073 (7th Cir.1982) (noting that "fees can properly be taxed against those whose role is limited to enforcement of regulations that they had no role in promulgating").  According to the State Defendants, the district court erroneously overshot this conclusion and effectively decided which treasury--county or state--should satisfy the State's Attorneys' fee liability. 6  Equal apportionment is appropriate, they conclude, because the State Defendants and State's Attorneys held roughly equal status as defendant enforcement officials and because the two classes of defendants participated equally in the litigation.   See Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 945-46, 950-51 (10th Cir.1987) (affirming equal apportionment of fees).
                

The State's Attorneys defend the district court's allocation of liability for the fee award. The State's Attorneys contend that, given the nature of the plaintiffs' claim--a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute that had yet to be enforced by any State's Attorney--the State of Illinois is the proper party to pay the attorneys' fees generated in this litigation. The plaintiffs commenced this action to prevent the State's Attorneys from enforcing state law. When acting in this capacity--the enforcement of state law--the State's Attorneys are state, and not local, officials. See Ingemunson v. Hedges, 133 Ill.2d 364, 140 Ill.Dec. 397, 400, 549 N.E.2d 1269, 1272 (1990); Scott v. O'Grady, 975 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 942, 113 S.Ct. 2421, 124 L.Ed.2d 643 (1993). Accordingly, the State's Attorneys assert, the district court's allocation of liability for the fee award is proper.

II DISCUSSION

A.

Section 1988 provides that a district court, "in its discretion," may award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in a civil rights action. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Recognizing the fact-sensitive nature of many fee-related determinations, our cases have articulated a "highly deferential abuse of discretion standard for appellate review." McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 518 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Leffler v. Meer, 936 F.2d 981, 984 (7th Cir.1991)). ⁷ A district court does not abuse its discretion in awarding fees if reasonable persons could differ over the view that it adopts. McNabola, 10 F.3d at 518; Leffler, 936 F.2d at 984. The district court is accorded significant deference in fee matters because (1) it possesses "superior understanding of the litigation and [there exists a] desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters"; (2) the need for uniformity in attorneys' fees awards is not great enough to warrant appellate review of minutia; and (3) the desirability of avoiding "a second major litigation" strictly over attorneys' fees is high. Spellan v. Board of Educ. for Dist. 111, 59 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)); see Leffler, 936 F.2d at 984-85. These same considerations lead us to conclude, as have other courts of appeals, that deferential review of a district court's allocation of liability for a fee award among multiple parties is warranted. ⁸

B.

As the case law of the circuits amply demonstrates, the allocation of liability for attorneys' fees remains an area in which there is no simple formula of universal applicability. See Council for...