Hercules Powder Co. v. Nieratko

• Decision Date: 12 July 1934
• Docket Number: No. 231.,231.
• Citation: 173 A. 606
• Parties: HERCULES POWDER CO. v. NIERATKO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

173 A. 606

HERCULES POWDER CO.

v. NIERATKO.

No. 231.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

July 12, 1934.

Certiorari to Court of Common Pleas, Middlesex County.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Doris Nieratko, administratrix of Martin Nieratko, deceased, employee, against the Hercules Powder Company, employer. An award of compensation was affirmed in the court of common pleas, and the employer prosecutes certiorari to review.

Affirmed.

Argued October term, 1933, before BROGAN, C. J., and TRENCHARD and HEHER, JJ.

R. E. & A. D. Watson, of New Brunswick, for prosecutor.

David T. Wilentz and James F. Patten, both of Perth Amboy, for respondent.

HEHER, Justice.

On February 19, 1929, decedent, an employee of prosecutor, suffered injuries by an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. He died on January 28, 1930, as a result, his administratrix claims, of the injuries so sustained. The deputy commissioner awarded compensation to decedent's dependents, computed as prescribed by the statute. He also made an award for disability suffered by decedent. The judgment so rendered was affirmed in the Middlesex common pleas. This certiorari brings up the latter judgment.

The first insistence of prosecutor is that it did not have actual knowledge of the occurrence of the claimed injury, or notice thereof, within the time required by paragraph 15 of section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Pamph. L. 1911, pp. 134, 140 [Comp. St. Supp. § **236—16]), and that, therefore, no recovery of compensation can be had under the act.

This claim is not well founded. Concededly, decedent, on the day mentioned, suffered an injury which entitled him to compensation under the provisions of the act referred to. He sustained a hernia. He continued to "report for work almost daily" until March 6, 1929. Apparently, at this time, he became incapacitated, and made claim for compensation. There was an informal hearing in the compensation bureau, and prosecutor agreed to pay decedent compensation for a period of twenty weeks from March 6, 1929. Compensation was paid for this period, with the exception of the last four weeks, which decedent declined to accept. On October 7, 1929, a petition for compensation was filed with the compensation bureau, in decedent's behalf, in which it was claimed that he suffered his injuries as a result of the falling of a barrel. The petition alleged that, while he was engaged in lifting the barrel, "it fell, striking him and knocking him unconscious, causing hernia," and that there ensued "permanent disability consisting of brain injury, causing insanity."

Prosecutor maintains that, while it had notice of the accident on the day of its occurrence, its "knowledge was limited to an accident resulting in a claim for hernia, and not one causing insanity." But there was testimony, which we regard as entirely credible, that decedent's widow, in the month of April, 1929, informed prosecutor's safety employment supervisor, who delivered the compensation checks and was apparently in charge of the matter for his employer, and also the company's general superintendent, that symptoms of brain trouble had been observed. She said that she conveyed this information to prosecutor's agents as soon as one of decedent's physicians informed her of the existence of this condition. This was a timely notice. Paragraph 15 of section 2 of the act provides that if the notice is given, or the knowledge obtained, within ninety days after the occurrence of the injury, and the employee, or other beneficiary, shall show that his failure to give prior notice was due to his mistake, inadvertence, ignorance of fact or law, or inability, or to the fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit of another person, or to any ether reasonable cause or excuse, compensation may be allowed, "unless, and then to the extent only that, the employer shall show that he was prejudiced by failure to receive such notice." Paragraph 16 provides for the service of a written notice, in substantially the form therein prescribed. As to injury, it requires notice only that the employee sustained a "personal injury," without specification thereof.

It is evident, therefore, that the requirements of the statute were substantially met. Actual knowledge of the occurrence of injury is the equivalent of notice thereof. Prosecutor concedes that it had notice, or actual knowledge, within the time limited by the statute, of the happening of the accident, and of the hernia suffered by decedent in consequence thereof; but it insists that in respect of the alleged head injury, and the consequences thereof, the statutory prerequisite of notice or actual knowledge did not exist. But this is manifestly not the case. In the first place, the statute requires notice only that the employee has sustained a "personal injury," without a particularization. The statutory conception of the injury that is the subject of notice is generic rather than specific. As to the nature and extent of the injury no specification is required. The injured employee is required, if so requested by the employer, to submit immediately to. an examination by a physician selected by the employer, and to such further examinations as may be reasonable under the circumstances. Paragraph 17 (Comp. St. Supp. § **236—18). Secondly, the prosecutor derived actual knowledge of the alleged additional injury from the information conveyed to its agents by decedent's widow. "Firsthand personal knowledge" is not required. The statute is satisfied if the employer is in possession of what is called "knowledge in common parlance, such knowledge as most of us are confined to in the daily affairs of life." And a corporate body, as a legal entity, cannot itself have knowledge. If it can be said to have knowledge at all, that must be the imputed knowledge of some corporate agent. Knowledge of the proper corporate agent must be regarded as, in legal effect, the knowledge of the corporation. Allen v. City of Millville, 87 N. J. Law, 356, 95 A. 130, affirmed 88 N. J. Law, 693, 96 A. 1101. It would seem, therefore, that the provision of paragraph 16 of the act (Comp. St. Supp. § **236—17) that notice in writing shall be served upon the employer, is merely directory. Any notice, verbal or written, which conveys to the employer knowledge of the fact that the employee has received an injury by an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment, is sufficient. The purpose of the notice is to give the employer the benefit of a timely investigation of the circumstances attending the alleged accident.

It can hardly be gainsaid that the prosecutor in the instant case, through its mentioned agents, acquired knowledge that decedent suffered from the additional injury, and that it was claimed that this resulted from the accident in question. And it is clear that the failure to make an earlier disclosure was due to ignorance of fact, and was therefore reasonably excused. There is no showing that prejudice thereby resulted to the employer.

We are not called upon to determine when the time begins to run where the employee is not conscious of the injury, or a resultant injury does not develop, until the expiration of the statutory period for the giving of notice. See Hustus' Case, 123 Me. 428, 123 A. 514; Case of Brown, 228 Mass. 31, 116 N. E. 897; Hines v. Norwalk Lock Co., 100 Conn. 533, 124 A. 17. In the last-cited case, Chief Justice Wheeler, speaking for the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, in construing a statute that, like our own, provided for notice to the employer of an "injury" sustained, held that the statute contemplated an injury resulting in incapacity, and that, consequently, notice is required when incapacity results, and not forthwith upon the occurrence of the accident which caused the injury. An injury that does not produce disability is not compensable under our statute. Sigley v. Marathon Razor Blade Co., 111 N. J. Law, 25, 166 A. 518. There is a clear distinction between the terms "injury" and "accident," and the Legislature undoubtedly had it in mind in giving...