Hermann v. Sharon Hosp., Inc.

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: Before MANGANO
• Citation: Hermann v. Sharon Hosp., Inc., 522 N.Y.S.2d 581, 135 A.D.2d 682 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
• Decision Date: 21 December 1987
• Parties: Jost H. HERMANN, Appellant, v. SHARON HOSPITAL, INC., Respondent, et al., Defendants.

Page 581

522 N.Y.S.2d 581

135 A.D.2d 682

Jost H. HERMANN, Appellant, v. SHARON HOSPITAL, INC., Respondent, et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Dec. 21, 1987.

DeGraff, Foy, Conway, Holt-Harris & Mealey, Albany (Christopher Massaroni, of counsel), for appellant.

Maynard, O'Connor & Smith, Albany (Brian R. LeCours, of counsel), for respondent, et al. defendants.

Before MANGANO, J.P., and LAWRENCE, WEINSTEIN and RUBIN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Benson, J.), entered January 15, 1987, as granted the motion of the defendant Sharon Hospital, Inc. to dismiss the complaint insofar as it is asserted against it for lack of personal jurisdiction.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In July 1982 the plaintiff, a resident of Queens County, sought treatment at the defendant Sharon Hospital, Inc., located in Connecticut. While being treated there, the plaintiff sustained injuries allegedly due to the negligence of the hospital staff and two treating physicians, Drs. John Curtis and William Bennett. The plaintiff sued the hospital, Dr. Curtis, and the estate of Dr. Bennett, who had died after the events at bar. The defendant Sharon Hospital, Inc., a nondomiciliary of this State, moved for an order dismissing the complaint as to it based on lack of personal jurisdiction (see, CPLR 302). In opposing the hospital's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argued that personal jurisdiction over the hospital had been obtained pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1), in that the hospital had transacted business within New York State, and/or pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3), in that the hospital had committed a tortious act outside New York which caused injury to the plaintiff inside the state. (The hospital also moved for a protective order with respect to certain demands by the plaintiff for discovery of further information to support his claim of jurisdiction which motion was denied as moot.)

The Supreme Court properly found that CPLR 302(a)(3) is inapplicable here, since the alleged injury occurred in Connecticut. The situs of the injury is the location of the original event which caused the injury, not the location where the resultant damages are subsequently felt by the plaintiff (see, McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 273-274, 437 N.Y.S.2d 643, 419 N.E.2d 321; Kramer v. Hotel Los Monteros S.A., 57 A.D.2d 756, 394 N.Y.S.2d 415, lv. denied 43 N.Y.2d 649, 403 N.Y.S.2d 1028, 374 N.E.2d 1249).

We also find that the plaintiff failed to establish a basis for jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1), to wit, that the hospital "transacts * * * business" within New York State. The hospital maintains no offices in New York, and it is licensed and conducts its health-care activities solely in the State of Connecticut. The fact that some of the defendant hospital's physicians are licensed to practice in both New York and Connecticut and that a sizeable portion of its patients reside in New York is due to the hospital's close geographical proximity to New York, and not to any significant purported activities by the hospital in New York State. In any...