O'Hern v. Bowling
| Decision Date | 26 January 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 10968,10968 |
| Citation | 505 P.2d 550,109 Ariz. 90 |
| Parties | David O'HERN, Director of Elections, Pima County, Douglas B. Risner and Pima County, a body politic, Appellants, v. Sandy BOWLING, Appellee. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Risner, Wolf & Raven by Roger Conant Wolf, and Dennis W. DeConcini, Pima County Atty. by Rose Silver, Deputy County Atty., Tucson, for appellants.
David S. Wine, Tucson, for appellee.
The defendant, Douglas B. Risner, appealed from the judgment of the Superior Court of Pima County which ordered that the name of the defendant not be placed on the ballot at the primary election for the office of County Supervisor, District No. 3, Pima County. Since the judgment by the trial court arose out of a special action, we granted an application for acceleration of all appeal procedures pursuant to Rule 8(a), Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, 17 A.R.S. Oral argument on the issues of the appeal was heard on August 16, 1972, and thereafter on the same date the Court ordered that the judgment of the Superior Court be affirmed with a formal written opinion to follow in due course.
In April, 1972, the Board of Supervisors established the boundaries for five supervisorial districts in the county. One of these districts was designated Supervisorial District No. 3, and it is this district that the defendant, Douglas B. Risner, sought to qualify as a candidate for Supervisor subject to the Democratic primary. The plaintiff, Sandy Bowling, an elector of District No. 3, brought a special action in the Superior Court of Pima County to prevent the county official charged with preparing the official ballot from printing Risner's name on the ballot as a candidate for County Supervisor, District No. 3, because the defendant had not filed sufficient valid signatures on his nomination petitions. The issues were joined, the matters tried, and the judgment above described was rendered.
It is agreed by the parties that under applicable law the defendant Risner was required to file at least 78 valid signatures before he could qualify to have his name placed on the ballot for the primary election. He filed petitions containing 110 signatures. The parties by stipulation agreed that some 14 signatures were invalid, and the trial court for various reasons not material ruled out an additional number, but the crucial issue was the validity of seven pages of signatures which bore the certification of the defendant Risner. If the defendant's certification of the seven pages of signatures was invalid, he did not have sufficient signatures to qualify for placement on the ballot.
The plaintiff maintained that the certification by the defendant Risner was invalid because Risner was not a qualified elector in Supervisorial District No. 3; therefore, he could not certify the nomination petitions. See A.R.S. § 16--304, subsec. B. The issue presented to us is whether the trial court was correct in finding that the defendant Risner was not a qualified elector of the district.
The evidence disclosed that on July 7, 1972, approximately a week before the final date for filing nomination petitions, the defendant Risner rented a duplex within the boundaries of the district, and on the same date he changed his voter registration from his previous precinct to the precinct which encompassed the rented duplex. The defendant Risner testified that he intended the duplex to be his home and residence for voting and all other purposes.
The rules for determining residency for voting purposes are governed by A.R.S. § 16--925. Subsection A, par. 1 of the cited statute provides:
'The residence of a person is that place in which his habitation is fixed, and to which he has the intention of returning when absent.'
and Subsection A, par. 9 provides:
'The mere intention of acquiring a new residence without the act of removal avails nothing and neither does the act of removal without the intention.'
The statutory provisions require that residence be a combination of physical presence and intention. This dual requirement is, of course, the long standing standard for determining residence. The intentions of a person are to be judged not only by his statements but also upon his conduct and the surrounding circumstances. See Arizona Board of Regents v. Harper, 108 Ariz. 223, 495 P.2d 453, 459 (1972).
The evidence presented by the defendant Risner was that prior to July 7, 1972, he had been living at a motel owned by his parents and that this location was a temporary place of abode until he could find...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Leyva v. Dome Ctr., L.L.C.
...form of Tuffly's own sworn affidavits — supports the trial court's resolution, we will not disturb it on appeal. O'Hern v. Bowling, 109 Ariz. 90, 93, 505 P.2d 550, 553 (1973) (citing In re Estate of Harber, 104 Ariz. 79, 89, 449 P.2d 7, 17 (1969)).¶38 The trial court also concluded Tuffly f......
-
Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-75482, In re
...of the trial court as to the weight and effect of evidence will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. O'Hern v. Bowling, 109 Ariz. 90, 505 P.2d 550 (1973). All reasonable inferences must be taken in favor of supporting the findings of the trial court, and if there is any evidence......
-
In re Non-Member of State Bar, Van Dox
...by any reasonable evidence. Moreno v. Jones, 213 Ariz. 94, 98, ¶ 20, 139 P.3d 612, 616 (2006) (citing O'Hern v. Bowling, 109 Ariz. 90, 92-93, 505 P.2d 550, 552-53 (1973)).3 Deference to a hearing officer's factual findings is appropriate because, having had the opportunity to observe and he......
-
State v. Warren
...reasonable inferences drawn from conflicting evidence, such findings and judgment will not be disturbed on appeal. O'Hern v. Bowling, 109 Ariz. 90, 505 P.2d 550 (1973); United Sec. Corp. v. Anderson Aviation Sales Co., Inc., 23 Ariz.App. 273, 532 P.2d 545 THE QUASHING OF SUBPOENAS ISSUE As ......