Hernandez-Echevarria v. Walgreens De P.R., Inc., Civil No. 13–1757(JAG).

• Decision Date: 04 August 2015
• Docket Number: Civil No. 13–1757(JAG).
• Citation: 121 F.Supp.3d 296
• Parties: Yarelis HERNANDEZ–ECHEVARRIA, Plaintiff, v. WALGREENS DE PUERTO RICO, INC., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

121 F.Supp.3d 296

Yarelis HERNANDEZ–ECHEVARRIA, Plaintiff,

v.WALGREENS DE PUERTO RICO, INC., Defendants.

Civil No. 13–1757(JAG).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed Aug. 4, 2015.

Alfredo Acevedo–Cruz, Alfredo Acevedo–Cruz Law Office, Juana Diaz, PR, for Plaintiff.

Diego Jose Agueros–Jimenez, Gregory T. Usera, Pedro E. Giner–Dapena, Usera Figueroa & Giner, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GARCIA–GREGORY, District Judge.

On July 15, 2015, the Court denied a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Walgreens de Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Defendant") and entered summary judgment in favor of Yarelis Hernandez–Echevarria ("Plaintiff") only as to her claim for failure to provide reasonable accommodation. Docket No. 62. Pending before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration filed on July 21, 2015 by Defendant. Docket No. 66. Plaintiff filed a timely Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration on July 30, 2015. Docket No. 75. For the reasons outlined below, Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration is granted in part and denied in part.

DISCUSSION

Rather than concise and direct, Defendant opted to be largely repetitive throughout its thirty-one page Motion for Reconsideration. First, Defendant claims that the Court's sua sponte grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff as to her failure to accommodate claim violated Defendant's due process rights. Docket No. 66 at 2–7. Second, Defendant argues that the record establishes that Guillermo Rios ("Rios"), Elaine Objio ("Objio"), and Frank Bear ("Bear") made the decision to terminate Plaintiff on July 25, 2012. Id. at 7–12. Third, Defendant contends that it did not have a duty to entertain Plaintiff's request for reasonable accommodation because Rios and Objio had already made the decision to terminate her. Id. at 12–17. Fourth, Defendant asserts that the Court established various facts as uncontested, although these were never conceded or admitted. Id. at 18–21.

Fifth, Defendant claims that the Court erroneously concluded that Plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Id. at 21–24. Sixth, Defendant suggests that the Court erroneously held that an ADA plaintiff need only show that her disability was a motivating factor, as opposed to the motivating factor, of the alleged adverse decision. Id. at 24–27. Seventh, Defendant argues that the Court failed to properly analyze its non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff's termination. Id. at 27. Finally, Defendant asserts that the Court erroneously concluded that the Faragher/Ellerth defense to Plaintiff's disability-based harassment did not apply in this case. Id. at 27–29. With this in mind, the Court now proceeds to analyze the parties' arguments concerning the July 15 Opinion and Order.

I. Establishing Facts for Purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant argues on several occasions that the Court has made "unsupported and spontaneous conclusions" that have effectively deprived Defendant of a fair opportunity to present its evidence at trial. See, e.g., id. at 5–6. According to Defendant, the Court has committed a "manifest injustice" in establishing certain facts as undisputed beyond the summary judgment context. See id. at 7. Defendant also states that the Court's findings have caused an "immediate and extreme prejudice and harm" to its position by prejudging matters that belong to a jury. Id. at 6.

The Court disagrees with Defendant's characterization of the Opinion and Order's analysis. Far from being "unsupported" or "spontaneous," the Court's conclusions were properly grounded in the summary judgment record as developed by the parties. Whether it was because of strategy, negligence, or lack of evidence, the Court notes that Defendant conceded or failed to oppose many facts that made particularly clear that Defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Interestingly enough, Defendant included a somewhat vague and ambiguous footnote indicating that "[a]ny statement of fact which would be contrary to Walgreens' position in this case are exclusively taken as true for the limited purpose of the instant motion for summary judgment." Docket No. 26 at 1 n. 1. In other words, Defendant seems to claim that its concessions or omissions should only be considered for summary judgment purposes.

Despite the footnote's vagueness, the Court recognizes that Defendant is entitled to assume Plaintiff's version of the facts as true and still ask the Court to enter summary judgment in its favor. The Court also understands Defendant's concerns that any finding or conclusion beyond the summary judgment context could affect Defendant's ability to present its case at trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 allows courts to "properly decide that the cost of determining whether some potential fact disputes may be eliminated by summary disposition is greater than the cost of resolving those disputes by other means, including trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(g) advisory committee's note. In light of Defendant's footnote, this might be such a case. Therefore, the Court would like to clarify that its analysis of the record in the instant case was only for purposes of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. ("Even if the court believes that a fact is not genuinely in dispute it may refrain from ordering that the fact be treated as established. The court may conclude that it is better to leave open for trial facts and issues that may be better illuminated by the trial of related facts that must be tried in any event.").

II. Sua Sponte Grant of Summary Judgment—Failure to Accommodate ClaimNotice and Procedural Prejudice

Defendant claims that the Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff as to her failure to accommodate claim violated Defendant's due process rights. Specifically, Defendant indicates that the Court expressly recognized in its July 15 Opinion and Order that no notice was provided. Id. at 3. According to Defendant, the absence of notice is sufficient grounds for reversal. Id. Both statements are false.

First, the Court never acknowledged that Defendant did not have notice. The Court merely stated that "[e]ven if Defendant was not on notice that summary judgment could be entered in favor of Plaintiff, Defendant, as the moving party, had the duty to support its position as a matter of law and therefore had a chance ... to present its evidence on the essential elements of the claim." Docket No. 62 at 18 n. 6 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Second and more importantly, lack of notice by itself is not sufficient grounds for reversal. As Plaintiff correctly points out in her Opposition, Defendant failed to show that it was procedurally prejudiced by the lack of adequate notice. Docket No. 75 at 4. The First Circuit has clearly stated that if the party was not deprived of the opportunity "to present evidence in support of its position as a result of the unfair surprise," then it follows that the "failure to provide notice is harmless error and a remand would be futile." P.R. Electric Power Auth. v. Action Refund, 515 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir.2008) ; see also Vives v. Fajardo, 472 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir.2007).

In the instant case, Defendant moved for summary judgment as to this very claim and, thus, had both the opportunity and duty to demonstrate that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Moreover, in its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant discussed each of the elements of Plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim at length. See Docket No. 26. Finally, Defendant's position becomes even less credible considering that Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration that once again discusses at length Plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim. See Docket No. 66 at 2–18. Therefore, the Court disagrees with Defendant's contention that its due process rights were violated.

Analysis of Plaintiff's Failure to Accommodate Claim

As the Court's July 15 Opinion and Order clearly states, a plaintiff asserting a reasonable accommodation claim must show that (1) she is a disabled individual under the ADA, (2) that is otherwise qualified, and (3) "that the defendant employer knew about her disability and failed to provide reasonable accommodation." Docket No. 62 at 16 (citing Valle–Arce v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 651 F.3d 190, 198 (1st Cir.2011) ). The Court found then that there was sufficient evidence in the record to conclude at this stage that Plaintiff was both disabled and qualified within the meaning of the ADA. Id. at 16.

In its Motion for Reconsideration, Defendant argues that the Court concluded that since Plaintiff had a mental impairment, it necessarily followed that she was substantially limited from performing major life activities and, thus, disabled within the ADA's meaning. Docket No. 66 at 22. This cannot be further from the truth. The Court clearly considered Plaintiff's evidence that her major depressive disorder affected "her ability to work, concentrate, think, take care of herself, do housework, eat, and sleep." Docket No. 62 at 9–10. Defendant even admits that Plaintiff was substantially limited in several major life activities, particularly her inability to work. See Docket No. 26–1 at 6. Defendant now claims that because Plaintiff was working prior to her termination and during some of the alleged adverse acts, she was not substantially limited. Docket No. 66 at 22. Defendant's argument, however, misses the point. It is clearly established that "an impairment can substantially limit a major life activity, even though the plaintiff is still able to engage in the activity to some extent. " Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 22 (1st Cir.2004). Such is the case here. See ADA Amendment Act, 110 P.L. § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3354 (2008) (stating that "the question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis").

The Court did...