Hernandez, In re
| Decision Date | 13 July 1966 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 9823 |
| Citation | 415 P.2d 803,51 Cal.Rptr. 915,64 Cal.2d 850 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 415 P.2d 803 In re Arthur A. HERNANDEZ on Habeas Corpus. In Bank |
Arthur A. Hernandez, in pro. per., and Burton Marks, Beverly Hills, under appointment by Supreme Court, for petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Robert R. Granucci and John T. Murphy, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.
Petitioner was convicted of first degree robbery (Pen.Code, §§ 211, 211a) in a non-jury trial on an information charging him with a prior felony conviction in Arizona. He denied the prior conviction, and evidence of its was admitted at the trial. (Pen.Code, § 1025. 1 ) The trial court found that peti tioner was guilty of robbery, that the offense was robbery in the first degree because an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon, and that petitioner had suffered the prior felony conviction. It denied probation and sentenced petitioner to prison. On appeal the Attorney General conceded that the prior conviction had not been proved, because it could not be determined from the Arizona records that the offense would have been a felony if committed in California. (See Pen.Code, § 1203.) The District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction but modified the judgment to strike the prior conviction. (People v. Hernandez, nonpublished opinion, District Court of Appeal, 2 Crim. 9864, July 7, 1965.) We denied a petition for hearing.
In this habeas corpus proceeding petitioner contends that he was denied due process of law by reason of the admission of evidence of his prior conviction and that the District Court of Appeal should have reversed the judgment and remanded the case for resentencing when if found that the prior conviction had not been proved.
There is no merit in petitioner's contention that he was denied due process of law. Even if a jury might be unable under some circumstances to disregard a defendant's prior convictions in determining his guilt or innocence of the crime charged (see Lane v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary (4th Cir.) 320 F.2d 179; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908), the facts of this case preclude the granting of relief. Petitioner waived a jury trial and was tried before a judge, who was presumably able to weigh the evidence without being prejudiced by a charge of a prior felony conviction. (See People v. Purvis, 52 Cal.2d 871, 883, 346 P.2d 22; People v. Powell, 34 Cal.2d 196, 204--205, 208 P.2d 974; People v. Smylie, 217 Cal.App.2d 118, 122, 31 Cal.Rptr. 360.)
Petitioner's second contention, however, is well taken. The third paragraph of section 1203 of the Penal Code provides that, 'except in unusual cases where the interest of justice demands a departure from the declared policy, no judge shall grant probation to any person who shall have been convicted of robbery, burglary or arson, and who at the time of the perpetration of said crime or any of them or at the time of his arrest Was himself armed with a deadly weapon (unless at the time he had a lawful right to carry the same), * * * nor to any such person unless the court shalll be satisfied that he has never been previously convicted of a felony in this state Nor previously convicted in any other place of a public offense which would have been a felony if committed in this state.' (Italics added.) Although the fact that petitioner's accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the robbery made petitioner guilty of first degree robbery (Pen.Code, § 211a), it did not affect his eligibility for probation since he was not 'himself' so armed. (People v. Perkins, 37 Cal.2d 62, 64, 230 P.2d 353. The finding of the prior felony conviction, however, brought petitioner within the limitation on the granting of probation set forth in section 1203 and might have influenced the trial...
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People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna
...of fact was a judge capable of weighing the evidence without being influenced by its inflammatory nature. ( In re Her nandez (1966) 64 Cal.2d 850, 851, 51 Cal.Rptr. 915, 415 P.2d 803.) The trial court expressly noted this point. Appellants claim the trial court made multiple prejudicial evi......
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