Hernandez v. City of San Antonio

• Decision Date: 17 March 1897
• Citation: 39 S.W. 1022
• Parties: HERNANDEZ et ux. v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

39 S.W. 1022

HERNANDEZ et ux. v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO.¹

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

March 17, 1897.

Appeal from district court, Bexar county; J. L. Camp, Judge.

Suit by the city of San Antonio against Jesus H. Hernandez and wife. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Bryan Callaghan and C. S. McGill, for appellants. R. B. Minor and Houston Bros., for appellee.

FLY, J.

Appellee instituted this suit to recover of appellants the sum of $581.96, alleged to be due by them for taxes for the years from 1877 to May 31, 1894. The suit was tried by the court, and resulted in a judgment for the city for the amount sued for, and a lien was foreclosed on each lot or parcel of land for the taxes due thereon. We conclude from the statement of facts that appellants were justly indebted to the city of San Antonio for taxes in the amount for which judgment was rendered, with interest at 8 per cent., as prescribed in the charter.

The second assignment, which appears first in the brief, presents as error the action of the court in rendering judgment for the taxes for the period of time denominated in the petition as the "fiscal period ending May 31, 1892," for the reason that the tax levied for that time was in excess of the maximum rate of taxation prescribed by the constitution and laws of the state of Texas and charter provisions of the city of San Antonio, and for the reason that the city had no power or authority to create a fiscal period of 15 months. The charter of the city authorizes the levy and collection, for general purposes, of an annual tax not exceeding 1 per cent. On February 25, 1892, at a special meeting of the city council, a tax, for general purposes, of $1.005 on every $100 valuation of property was levied. Prior to 1891 the fiscal year for the city of San Antonio ended on March 1st, but, by virtue of an amendment to the charter, the fiscal year commencing with 1892 was to begin on June 1st, and end May 31st. It followed that there was an interim from March 1 to June 1, 1892, for which no taxes would be collected on the levy of the previous year, or for that year, unless there was a separate levy for the three months, or they were included in the levy for the year beginning March 1, 1891, and ending February 18, 1892. At the meeting of the council, on February 25, 1892, the above facts were reported to the council by its finance committee, and, in addition, it was shown that it would require $75,000 expenditures for the extra three months, and that to meet the general expenses from March 1, 1891, to May 31, 1892, would require a levy of $1.005 on the $100. The report of the committee explained fully the condition of affairs, and showed the necessity, on account of change in fiscal year, of a levy for 15 months, instead of 12 months. The report was adopted, and in direct connection with it, at the same meeting, following out its recommendations, the city council levied a tax of $1.005 on each $100 for general expenses for the fiscal year ending May 31, 1892. Taken alone, the ordinance would indicate an attempt to levy more taxes than the law would authorize or permit; but, in the light of the report of the committee and the circumstances surrounding the council at the time, it is clear that the intention was to levy the taxes for the period of 15 months. Had the ordinance been introduced alone, or had it been explained by parol testimony, we would be constrained to hold, as we did in the case of City of San Antonio v. Raley, 32 S. W. 180, that the levy was invalid. The case presented is different from that cited, and we are of the opinion that the report of the committee made and adopted contemporaneously with the adoption of the ordinance levying the tax was properly admitted in evidence, and showed that the council did not violate the provisions of the city charter in laying the tax that it did. It is admitted by appellants that the council could have provided for a tax for the three months separately, in order to fill the gap caused by the adoption of the amendment, but they insist that a tax for 15 months would violate the provision that the fiscal year should begin on June 1st, and end on May 31st, following. It would seem clear that, if that provision would prohibit the levy of a tax for more than a year, it would for less than a year. The exigencies of the case demanded a levy of taxes for 15 months, whether done all together or for 12 and 3 months, and we can see no difference in...