Hernandez v. Roche

Decision Date16 September 2021
Docket NumberEP-20-CV-00263-DCG
PartiesALEJANDRO HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT STEWART ROCHE, JR., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Texas
MEMORANDUM ORDER

DAVID C. GUADERRAMA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Presently before the Court are Defendant Robert Stewart Roche Jr.'s Motion to Dismiss, which he filed as part of his “Original Answer, affirmative Defenses, and Motion to Dismiss (ECF. No. 12); Defendant's Motion for Sanctions and to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigant (ECF No. 14); United States Magistrate Judge Robert F. Castaneda's “Report and Recommendation” (ECF No. 23) on these motions; as well as Plaintiff Alejandro Hernandez's “Objections to [the] Report and Recommendation” (ECF No. 24). Plaintiff and Defendant are each proceeding pro se in this action. For the reasons that follow, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's objections ACCEPTS IN PART, REJECTS IN PART the Magistrate Court's Report and Recommendation GRANTS IN PART Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and DENIES Defendant's Motion for Sanctions.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Hernandez claims that Mr. Roche, who is an estate sale agent, violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by failing to accommodate his disability. The events giving rise to this lawsuit take place against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic and the existence of face mask mandates aimed at slowing the spread of the virus. See Compl. ¶¶ 7-8. Face mask requirements, Mr. Hernandez's suggests, cannot be universally or strictly applied because some people, like him, have disabilities that prevent them from wearing a face mask. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 13.

Mr. Hernandez's specific claim arises from his visit to one of Mr. Roche's estate sales in El Paso, Texas. Compl. ¶ 10. On October 11, 2020, Mr. Hernandez attempted to visit an estate sale, but Mr. Roche denied him entrance because he was not wearing a face mask. Id. Mr. Hernandez asserts that he cannot wear a face mask due to his physical and mental disabilities, which include asthma and PTSD. Compl. ¶ 9. Wearing a face mask, Mr. Hernandez claims, will cause him “breathing difficulties, anxiety, and mental distress.” Id. Because of this, Mr. Hernandez alleges to have requested a modification of Mr. Roche's policy requiring face masks to shop at his estate sales, though he did not specify what modification he requested. See generally Compl. ¶¶ 6, 15, 19. According to Mr. Hernandez, Mr. Roche did not modify his policy and ultimately did not let him shop at the estate sale. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 10.

So, Mr. Hernandez filed suit. On October 23, 2020, Mr. Hernandez filed a Complaint (ECF No. 2) in which he alleges that Mr. Roche violated Title III of the ADA, which prohibits disability discrimination in places of public accommodation. Then, on November 13, 2020, Mr. Roche filed Defendant's Original Answer, affirmative Defenses, and Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12). In his motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Mr. Roche argues, in relevant part, that Mr. Hernandez does not state a claim because his desired modification to the face mask policy is neither reasonable nor necessary. Mot. to Dismiss, at 4-5. On November 26, 2020, Mr. Hernandez filed his “Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13).

On July 13, 2021, the Court referred Mr. Roche's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Sanctions to the Magistrate Court. ECF No. 18. On August 19, 2021, the Magistrate Court issued its “Report and Recommendation” (ECF No. 23). The Magistrate Court recommended that Mr. Hernandez's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice for being frivolous and for failure to state a claim. R. & R. at 8. The Magistrate Court further recommended that Mr. Roche's motion for sanctions against Mr. Hernandez be denied. Id. On August 20, 2021, one day after the Magistrate Court issued its Report and Recommendation, Mr. Hernandez filed “Objections to [the] Report and Recommendation of [the] Magistrate Judge” (ECF No. 24). Mr. Hernandez objects to the Magistrate Court's reasoning and conclusion regarding Mr. Roche's Motion to Dismiss and requests review of the Report and Recommendation. Pl.'s Objs.

II. STANDARDS
A. Standard for Reviewing a Report and Recommendation.

When a party files timely written objections to a magistrate court's report and recommendation, the district court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980) ([I]n providing for a de novo determination' rather than de novo hearing, Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations.”). After completing its review of the report, the district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

As to the portions of a magistrate court's report and recommendation that were not objected to, the district court applies a “clearly erroneous, abuse of discretion and contrary to law” standard of review. United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989). A finding “is clearly erroneous if the court ‘is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' Alphonse v. Arch Bay Holdings, LLC, 618 Fed.Appx. 765, 768 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).

B. Standard for Reviewing a Motion to Dismiss.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to seek dismissal of a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court accepts well-pleaded facts as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012). A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if its facts, accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

To meet the “facial plausibility” standard, a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). [A] plaintiff's obligation [is] to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, [which] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555- 56 (internal quotations omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” (citations and quotations omitted)).

Additionally, pro se pleadings are reviewed under a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Such pleadings are entitled to a liberal construction that includes all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam). Even a pro se complaint, however, may not merely set forth conclusory allegations. The pro se litigant must still set forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief may be granted. Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Establishing a Claim under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The ADA defines discrimination to include:

a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).

A four-prong test guides the inquiry into whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disability discrimination by failure to accommodate a plaintiff's disability. To assert a viable claim a plaintiff must allege:

(1) [they are] disabled as the term is defined by the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; (3) the defendant employed a discriminatory policy or practice; (4) the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff based upon the plaintiff's disability by (a) failing to make a requested reasonable modification that was (b) necessary to accommodate the plaintiff's disability.[1]

Fortyune v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Kooster v. Young Men's Christian Assoc. of Greater St. Louis, 855 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2017); Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 333 F.3d 299, 307 (1st Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1058-59 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing burdens of proof).[2]

The antidiscrimination provisions in Title III are not without limitations. “The ADA does not require a place of public accommodation to provide a plaintiff with the ideal or preferred accommodation;...

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