Hernandez v. State

• Decision Date: 14 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-621.,99-621.
• Citation: 750 So.2d 50
• Parties: Humberto HERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

750 So.2d 50

Humberto HERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 99-621.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

July 14, 1999.

Rehearing October 13, 1999.

Milton Hirsch, Miami, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Katherine Fernandez Rundle, State Attorney, and Angelica D. Zayas and Penny H. Brill, Assistant State Attorneys, for appellee.

Before GERSTEN, FLETCHER, and SHEVIN, JJ.

Rehearing En Banc October 13, 1999.

FLETCHER, Judge.

Humberto Hernandez was convicted and sentenced at the conclusion of a trial during which time his defense attorney was carrying on a sexual relationship with Hernandez' wife. The question is whether Hernandez is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his post-conviction motion for a new trial, because of his attorney's conduct, notwithstanding that Hernandez has not alleged any concrete act demonstrating that his attorney's performance in the trial court fell below the standard of competent counsel or was influenced by the relationship.¹ Our conclusion is that Hernandez is entitled to an evidentiary hearing for the reasons that follow. Hernandez was a City of Miami commissioner when he was charged by an information with one felony count of fabricating physical evidence, in violation of section 918.13(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1997); one misdemeanor count of conspiracy to fabricate physical evidence, in violation of section 918.13(1)(b) and section 777.04, Florida Statutes (1997); and one misdemeanor count of accessory after the fact, in violation of section 777.03, Florida Statutes (1997), all charges relating to an election in the City of Miami. The jury trial began on August 3, 1998, Hernandez being represented by Jose Quinon, known in the community for his abilities as a criminal defense attorney. On August 14, 1998, the jury found Hernandez not guilty on the felony of fabricating physical evidence and not guilty on the conspiracy misdemeanor. The jury did convict him of the misdemeanor of accessory after the fact. On August 19, 1998, he was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to serve 364 days in the county jail.

Two months later, on October 24, 1998, an article appeared in The Miami Herald in which Hernandez' wife, Esther, admitted to having a sexual relationship with Hernandez' attorney, which relationship began on the eve of jury selection and continued throughout and beyond the trial. Thus Quinon counseled Hernandez as to all aspects of the trial and made those countless decisions that attorneys must make during jury trials—all the while knowing that when the day was done he would rise from his seat next to Hernandez at the defense table, say goodnight to his client, and then perhaps retreat from court to Esther Hernandez and their sexual relationship.

Hernandez filed a motion for post-conviction relief, contending (1) that, because of an actual conflict of interest between him and his attorney, he was deprived of due process under Article I, section 9, Florida Constitution, or the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (2) that he was deprived of his right to assistance of counsel under Article I, section 16, Florida Constitution or the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State responded, contending that Hernandez was not deprived of due process as there was no actual conflict of interest; the actions were those of Hernandez' privately retained attorney and not the actions of the State, the court, the jury, or any other agent of the state; and Hernandez made no attempt to demonstrate that his attorney's actual performance fell below the standard required for competence, or that his attorney's performance was in any way influenced by the illicit relationship. The State also denied that Hernandez was deprived of his right to counsel under Article I, section 16, Florida Constitution or the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as Hernandez did not show that, because of his attorney's illicit relationship with Esther, his attorney's actions in representing him were either deficient, prejudicial, or had an adverse impact under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), or Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980).²

When presented with the motion for post-conviction relief, the trial judge, in a very difficult situation, there being precious little precedent to guide him,³ was of the opinion, contrary to the State's position, that "common sense must acknowledge the existence of an actual conflict." The trial judge is not alone in reaching such a conclusion. In one of the very few cases dealing with this specific situation, People v. Singer, 226 Cal.App.3d 23, 275 Cal.Rptr. 911, 921 (1990), the California First District Court of Appeal stated:

"There appears to be no direct precedent holding that an affair with a client's spouse raises a conflict of interest. However, such a conclusion is inescapable."

The court went on to observe, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 921:

"Just as with the sexual-romantic relationship in Jackson[⁴] between defense counsel and the prosecutor, the relationship here between defense counsel and defendant's wife deprived defendant of his constitutional right to the `undivided loyalty and effort' of his attorney. [cite omitted]. The validity of our adversarial system depends upon the guaranty of this `undivided loyalty and effort' for every criminal defendant. Given the instant facts, a defense attorney, in the extreme, might be influenced to see his client convicted and imprisoned so that the affair can continue or remain undiscovered."

We agree that there was a conflict of interest because of the affair.

Conflicts of interest between attorneys and clients are abhorred in Florida and throughout the United States. In United States v. Urbana, 770 F.Supp. 1552, 1553 (S.D.Fla.1991), Chief Judge Davis eloquently stated the reasons why:

"In the face of accusation by the people, an accused has but one person in whom he can confide, his counsel, whose allegiance shall be undivided, his trust uncompromising, his efforts tireless. Immersed in proceedings far too complex for the unacquainted, the accused blindly places faith in his attorney to protect him at every turn."

Quiñon's having a secret sexual relationship with Hernandez' wife most certainly did not meet the standards of undivided allegiance and uncompromising trust. As to tireless efforts, there lies the rub, as we shall shortly discuss.

Notwithstanding the conflict of interest between Hernandez and Quinon, the trial court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion for post-conviction relief as the motion did not allege any prejudice or adverse impact on Hernandez that entitled him to relief. In other words, the trial court ruled that Hernandez had to allege and prove that, because of the illicit affair, Quinon's trial performance was reduced to some unacceptable level, possibly resulting in the misdemeanor conviction. And, as the State points out, Hernandez was acquitted of the felony charge and of one of the two misdemeanor charges. According to the State then, Quinon's efforts, if not tireless, were sufficiently effective.

Strickland, relied on by the State, requires that a defendant show (1) his attorney's deficient performance; and (2) a reasonable probability that but for the attorney's deficient performance the result of the proceeding would have been different. The State's reliance is misplaced as Strickland did not involve conflict of interest, but involved entirely different matters, i.e., assertions that defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to move for a continuance, failed to present a psychiatric report, etc. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675-76, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

Cuyler v. Sullivan, however, did involve a conflict of interest, though not one arising from an illicit sexual relationship. The Cuyler court held under its circumstances that in order to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his attorney's performance. Hernandez contends that Cuyler does not require that prejudice be alleged or proven in order to entitle him to a new trial, relying in part on this court's conclusion from its prior analysis of Cuyler. See Washington v. State, 419 So.2d 1100, 1100-01, 1103 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), wherein this court stated:

"[T]he only arguable ground for reversal is that the record reveals that counsel for these defendants had an actual conflict of interest, so that either or both of them was prejudiced by the failure of the court, sua sponte, to appoint a separate lawyer for each.... Cuyler v. Sullivan,...

[FN2] An actual conflict of interest is, ipso facto, prejudicial. The language in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718, `a defendant ... must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance,' has not been read to mean that a defendant must show prejudice beyond actual conflict, e.g., that the result would have been otherwise. See United States v. Benavidez, 664 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir.1982); Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391 (5th Cir.1981)." (emphasis supplied)

In United States v. Benavidez, cited in the above quotation, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, 664 F.2d at 1259:

"`In order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718. The defendant does not have to demonstrate prejudice from the joint representation; but he must `show ( )[sic] that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests.' "

The court in Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d at 395 stated:

"Once we have found an actual conflict of interest, however, we

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