Hernando County v. Morana
| Decision Date | 22 February 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 5D06-2243.,5D06-2243. |
| Citation | 979 So.2d 276 |
| Parties | HERNANDO COUNTY, Hernando County Water, etc., et al, Petitioner, v. Nicholas J. MORANA and Ann L. Morana, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Jon A. Jouben and Garth C. Coller, of Office of County Attorney, Brooksville, for other Petitioners.
Joseph M. Mason, Jr. and Carole Joy Barice of McGee & Mason, P.A., Brooksville, for Respondents.
Petitioners, Hernando County, Hernando County Water and Sewer District, Hernando County Board of Commissioners, Diane Rowden, Jeffrey Stabins, Hannah Robinson, Thomas Hogan, Sr., and Christopher Kingsley (collectively the "County") and Karen Nicolai, as Clerk of the Circuit Court, seek review of an order of the circuit court denying their joint petition for writ of prohibition1 in which Petitioners sought to prevent the county court in the underlying class action from proceeding with the case based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 Petitioners contend that because the aggregate amount of the individual claims exceeds the $15,000 monetary limit of the county court's jurisdiction, the county court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the matter and should be prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over the class action suit. We agree and reverse.
From 1994 until 2003, the County regulated Florida Water Services, which provided water utility services for the Spring Hill region of Hernando County. To subsidize its regulatory obligations, the County charged Florida Water Services a franchise fee/regulatory assessment fee ("franchise fee") of four and one-half percent (4.5%) of the utility's gross receipts in Hernando County. Florida Water Services passed that cost onto its customers in their water bills. Apparently, Florida Water Services did not list the franchise fees as a separate line item on its customers' water bills, but instead, added that cost into the equation when computing the price of water. After collection, the County deposited the franchise fees into a trust fund maintained by the Clerk. In 2003, the County condemned Florida Water's Hernando County assets (the "Spring Hill System"). Thereafter, the County booked all receipts from its water customers as utility revenue. Over the life of the trust fund, approximately $4,400,000 in franchise fees was collected, of which almost $3,000,000 remains.
In 2004, Respondents, Nicholas and Ann Morana, on behalf of themselves and as representatives of approximately 35,000 customers of the Spring Hill System, filed a class action suit against the County and the Clerk in the county court, seeking (1) an accounting of all of the franchise fees deposited into the trust fund, (2) a refund of the franchise fees to the ratepayers, and (3) mandatory and prohibitory injunctions. Respondents claim that Petitioners collected excessive regulatory fees and that Petitioners made illegal expenditures from the fund. Petitioners seek a refund of all amounts paid. Respondents admit in their class action complaint that no individual class member's damages exceeds $5,000 and that the average reimbursement per class member is approximately $100.
Respondents filed their class action in county court. Petitioners moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that the amount of franchise fees subject to the action exceeded $3,000,000. Hence, the county court lacked jurisdiction because it was not authorized to make an aggregate class action award in excess of $15,000. Following a hearing on Petitioners' motion, the county court denied the motion, concluding that aggregation of individual claims in a class action suit is permissive, not mandatory. Petitioners then filed their joint petition for writ of prohibition in the circuit court. The circuit court denied the petition, concluding that the aggregation of claims is permissive rather than mandatory. Petitioners timely appeal.
Section 34.01(1)(c), Florida Statutes, gives county courts original jurisdiction "[o]f all actions at law in which the matter in controversy does not exceed the sum of $15,000, exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneys fees...." The circuit court has jurisdiction of all matters when the amount in controversy exceeds $15,000. See Art. V, § 20(c)(3), Fla. Const.; §§ 26.012(2)(a), 34.01(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007); see also Allen v. Walker, 810 So.2d 1090, 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (). The question presented in this appeal is whether aggregation of the individual claims for purposes of determining subject matter jurisdiction is mandatory, as Petitioners argue, or permissive, as Respondents argue and the lower courts concluded.
This Court answered that question in Galen of Florida, Inc. v. Arscott, 629 So.2d 856 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). In Galen, we held:
The class action rule contemplates a single judgment, not hundreds or thousands of judgments for each individual claim.... [G]iven the purpose of the class action procedure and the size and complexity of the usual class action, we conclude that the class action rule contemplates that the amount of the claim of the entire class determines the dollar amount jurisdiction. Our circuit courts are designed to hear such complex cases; our county courts are not. If the aggregated individual claims do not exceed the $15,000 jurisdictional amount, the class action belongs in county court. If it exceeds the circuit court threshold, it belongs in circuit court.
Id. at 857 (emphasis added). The Florida Supreme Court approved the reasoning of Galen in Johnson v. Plantation General Hospital Limited Partnership, 641 So.2d 58 (Fla.1994), holding that:
The purpose of the class action is to provide litigants who share common questions of law and fact with an economically viable means of addressing their needs in court. We believe that purpose is served best if jurisdiction is conferred on the circuit court when the aggregated claims of the class meet the monetary jurisdictional requirement even though an individual claim of a class member does not reach that threshold.
Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
As we did in Galen, we hold that if the aggregated individual claims of class plaintiffs do not exceed $15,000, exclusive of costs, interest and attorney's fees, the action belongs in the county court. If the aggregated class claims exceed the circuit court threshold, jurisdiction belongs exclusively in the circuit court. Because we conclude the trial court's order constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law causing sufficient harm to justify certiorari review, we grant the writ and quash the order of the circuit court denying the Petition for Writ of Prohibition.
WRIT GRANTED.
1. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ by which a superior court, having appellate and supervisory jurisdiction over an inferior court or tribunal possessing judicial or quasi-judicial power, may prevent such inferior court or tribunal from exceeding jurisdiction or usurping jurisdiction over matters not within its jurisdiction. English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293, 296 (Fla.1977).
2. We review this case by certiorari in light of the Florida Supreme Court's recent holding in Sutton v. State, 975 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 2008), that orders denying writs of prohibition in circuit court are reviewed in this Court by certiorari.
SAWAYA, J., dissenting.
In this case, the class action suit was filed in the county court and that is where the class members wish to keep it. They contend that none of the claims exceed the jurisdictional limit of the county court and that aggregation of those claims is not mandatory. Hernando County, a defendant in the class action proceedings, argues that aggregation of all individual claims is mandatory in all class action suits and, therefore, jurisdiction of the instant suit lies in the circuit court. The issue we must thus resolve is whether aggregation is permissive or whether it is mandatory in all class action cases.
The Florida Supreme Court has held that
the test for jurisdiction is twofold. In the first instance, the good faith demand of the plaintiff at the time of instituting suit determines the ability of the particular court to entertain the action. However, notwithstanding the bona fides of the plaintiff's demand at the time of institution of suit, as a matter of judicial power the county court is precluded from entering a judgment for damages in excess of its mandated jurisdiction.
White v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 372 So.2d 81, 84 (Fla.1979); see also § 34.01(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007) (). I, therefore, adhere to the view that aggregation is permissive when the amount of each individual claim falls below the jurisdictional limit of $15,000 and when it is not necessary to enter a judgment in excess of that amount.
Turning to the first part of the White test, at the time the class action suit was instituted, the alleged improper fees had already been collected and deposited into an account by Hernando County and the class members want a refund of that money. The complaint filed in this case requests injunctive relief prohibiting Hernando County from collecting any further improper fees; injunctive relief prohibiting Hernando County from disbursing funds from the account in which the money previously collected is held; and an accounting requiring Hernando County to account for the...
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...only after careful attention to the significant privacy issues inherent within such a production. (34) In Hernando County v. Morana, 979 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), a writ of certiorari was issued by the Fifth District to quash the circuit court's denial of a writ of prohibition sought ......