Herndon v. State

Decision Date11 April 1990
Docket NumberNo. 020-89,020-89
Citation787 S.W.2d 408
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals
PartiesThomas Michael HERNDON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

Molly Meredith LeNoir, Martin L. LeNoir, Dallas, for appellant.

Jerry Cobb, Dist. Atty., and Gwinda Burns and Ed Brownlee, Asst. Dist. Attys., Denton, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REHEARING ON PETITION FOR

DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

TEAGUE, Judge.

Appellant was convicted by a jury of possession of phenylacetone, a precursor to the manufacture of amphetamine or methamphetamine. After having found appellant guilty the jury assessed punishment at fifty (50) years in the Texas Department of Corrections 1 along with a fine of $35,000.00. The conviction was affirmed by the Fort Worth Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion. Herndon v. State, No. 02-88-031-CR (Tex.App.--Fort Worth, delivered November 23, 1988).

We granted appellant's motion for rehearing after initially refusing his petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

The court of appeals summarized the evidence as follows:

This conviction involves a drug bust in which several law enforcement agencies and numerous law enforcement officers were involved. A house in a remote area of Denton County was targeted by a search warrant as a place where amphetamines were manufactured. The house was surrounded by the peace officers and the four people inside (three of whom fled from the house) were arrested and charged with possession of phenylacetone for the purpose of manufacturing amphetamines.

There was testimony that the house had an odor common to drug labs and that many items of paraphernalia used in concocting drugs were seized along with over 400 grams of phenylacetone. No other ingredients for the manufacture of amphetamines were found.

Some testimony placed defendant at the house but none placed him in the house or even on the porch. Testimony did place him as coming from the vicinity of the front porch and running to a white automobile as the officers were closing in on the house. One officer testified to calling out to him when he got into the vehicle, freeze, police. Freeze he did not, instead he spun his wheels and raced the vehicle away and through a closed gate into a dirt side-of-the-road embankment (having failed to negotiate the turn onto the public road). [sic et passim] He was arrested at that time.

Minutes before the bust climaxed, Herndon was observed driving a vehicle coming from the direction of the staked out house. He stopped where two narcotics officers were posing as a couple of beer drinkers, out having a good time. In the white automobile with him was a man, Robert Simonds, who was one of the three who fled from inside the house when the officers flushed them. Testimony by the narcotics officers was that Herndon demanded to know what in the hell they were doing there. They further testified that he acted nervous and agitated and told them that there had been several burglaries and he expected the police to show up at any time. After this he drove at high speed back toward the house from whence [sic] he shortly returned at high speed to crash the gate.

To this recitation of the facts we add the following. The only controlled substances found were within the house. No drugs were found in the car which appellant was driving nor was he found to be in possession of any such substances. Appellant did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs at the time, although there was testimony that he appeared to the officers to be a drug user. No weapons were found anywhere during the raid. No evidence was introduced by the state to show that appellant had any interest in the house at all. None of his possessions were found inside nor was he found to have rented or occupied the house in any way. The laboratory equipment that was seized was not assembled. No fingerprints were taken from any of the items seized by the police.

From this evidence the court of appeals concluded that there were no reasonable hypotheses other than appellant's guilty knowledge and joint control of the phenylacetone and that the evidence as a whole furnished an "affirmative link" to the operation. We are compelled to disagree with the court of appeals' conclusions.

This is a circumstantial evidence case. The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a circumstantial evidence case is no different from that involving a direct evidence case. However, in circumstantial evidence cases, the "reasonable hypothesis" analysis is also utilized. See Wilford v. State, 739 S.W.2d 854 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Vaughn v. State, 607 S.W.2d 914 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). In this instance, we need not concern ourselves with whether there is a "reasonable hypothesis" extant in this cause because, even after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, which we must do, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), we find that the evidence is insufficient to affirmatively link appellant to the controlled substance for which he was charged and convicted of possessing within his residence.

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27 cases
  • Molitor v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • March 18, 1992
    ...386, 387 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). The standard for review is the same in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Herndon v. State, 787 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); cf. Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App.1991......
  • Skillern v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • December 7, 1994
    ...2575, 109 L.Ed.2d 757 (1990). The standard of review is the same in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Herndon v. State, 787 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). It is not the reviewing court's duty to disregard, realign or weigh the evidence. Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 86......
  • Hood v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • January 8, 1992
    ...234, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). The standard for review is the same in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Herndon v. State, 787 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). See now Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App.......
  • Edwards v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • June 25, 1991
    ...if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Herndon v. State, 787 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). We cannot sustain a conviction on circumstantial evidence if the proof does not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis ......
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