Herndon v. Wm. A. Straub, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 4:95-CV-2051 CAS.,4:95-CV-2051 CAS.
• Citation: 17 F.Supp.2d 1056
• Parties: Desiree HERNDON, Plaintiff, v. WM. A. STRAUB, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

Page 1056

17 F.Supp.2d 1056

Desiree HERNDON, Plaintiff, v. WM. A. STRAUB, INC., Defendant.

No. 4:95-CV-2051 CAS.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

September 14, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David C. Howard, Howard and Associates, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff.

John Gianoulakis, Partner, Alan C. Kohn, Partner, Kohn and Shands, Joseph H. Mueller, F. Douglas O'Leary, Moser and Marsalek, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SHAW, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on post-trial motions filed by both parties. Plaintiff's complaint asserted claims under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA"), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Count I); sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (Count II); race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count III); and sex discrimination in violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), RSMo. §§ 213.010, et seq. (1994) (Count IV).

This matter was tried and plaintiff's EPA, Title VII and § 1981 claims were submitted to the jury on Special Verdict Forms A, B and C. The jury returned its verdict in favor of plaintiff on the EPA claim on Special Verdict Form A. After the jury indicated it was unable to render a verdict on plaintiff's Title VII and § 1981 claims, the Court declared a mistrial on those claims. (See Judgment of Feb. 26, 1998.)

Pending before the Court are defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law; plaintiff's motion to dismiss her § 1981 race discrimination claim with prejudice; plaintiff's motion for entry of judgment on her Title VII claim and for judgment of liquidated damages on her EPA claim; plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages on her Title VII claim; and plaintiff's initial motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs. Except for plaintiff's motion to dismiss her § 1981 claim, the motions are opposed. As it is unopposed, plaintiff's motion to dismiss her § 1981 claim will be granted without discussion.

I. Discussion.

A. Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law.

The Court first addresses defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant presents twelve points in support of its motion, and argues that judgment should be entered in its favor on all four counts of plaintiff's Complaint.

In ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court must (i) consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party; (ii) assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved in favor of the prevailing party; (iii) assume as proved all facts that the prevailing party's evidence tended to prove; (iv) give the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the facts proved. Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 844 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2510, 138 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1997). That done, the court must then deny the motion if reasonable persons could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. Haynes v. Bee-Line Trucking Co., 80 F.3d 1235, 1238 (8th Cir.1996) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

"The law places a high standard on overturning a jury verdict." Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1220 (8th Cir.1997). Judgment as a matter of law is proper only when the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of witnesses, there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the verdict. EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 554 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Ryther, 108 F.3d at 845).

The Court has carefully considered defendant's arguments and the evidence presented at trial, and finds there is not a complete absence of probative facts to support the verdict in plaintiff's favor. Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law should therefore be denied with respect to plaintiff's EPA claim in Count I. For the reasons discussed below, the motion should also be denied with respect to plaintiff's Title VII claim in Count II. The motion is moot as to plaintiff's § 1981 claim, but will be granted as to plaintiff's MHRA claim, which was abandoned at trial when plaintiff did not submit an instruction to the jury on the claim.¹

B. Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment on her Title VII Claim.

Plaintiff moves for entry of judgment on her Title VII claim as a matter of law, contending she is entitled to judgment on this claim because the jury found she met her burden of proof on the EPA claim, that defendant paid different wages to her male predecessor for substantially equal work solely on the basis of sex. Plaintiff states that in the Eighth Circuit, a jury verdict on an EPA claim is dispositive of a plaintiff's sex-based Title VII claim founded on the same facts, citing McKee v. Bi-State Devel. Agency, 801 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir.1986) ("McKee"). Plaintiff contends that because the jury found in her favor on the EPA claim, it had to conclude that defendant failed to prove an affirmative defense necessary to preclude liability.

Defendant responds that the jury verdict on plaintiff's EPA claim does not require or even allow the Court to enter judgment on the Title VII claim, because of fundamental substantive and procedural differences between Title VII and the EPA. Defendant asserts that (i) substantively, Title VII requires a showing of discriminatory intent, while the EPA creates a type of strict liability in which no intent to discriminate is required; and (ii) procedurally, the Title VII plaintiff always retains the ultimate burden of proof to show a discriminatory intent and that an articulated justification was pretextual, while in an EPA case once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant has the burden to prove that the wage disparity is the result of one of the four statutory affirmative defenses. Defendant cites several cases from other circuits which hold that liability under the EPA is not necessarily equivalent to liability under Title VII.²

Defendant contends the McKee decision on which plaintiff relies is not controlling because it "does not squarely address the discriminatory intent requirement under Title VII and the different evidentiary burdens of Title VII" and the EPA. (Def.'s Mem. Opp. at 5.) Defendant notes that McKee predates the Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), which emphasized that the ultimate burden of proof remains with a Title VII plaintiff at all times. Defendant argues that McKee is no longer good law to the extent it holds liability under the EPA leads automatically to Title VII liability, because its reasoning does not require the plaintiff to satisfy the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination which is essential under Title VII.

The Court cannot agree with defendant. In McKee, the Eighth Circuit specifically rejected the argument that the different burdens of proof and persuasion under the EPA and Title VII required different conclusions on McKee's claims for gender-based wage discrimination under those acts. See McKee, 801 F.2d at 1019. As plaintiff notes, the circuit split regarding the appropriate analysis of these claims, with respect to the differing burdens under the EPA and Title VII, predates the Hicks decision.³ The McKee holding, that proof of an EPA claim is dispositive of a plaintiff's sex-based Title VII claim founded on the same facts, is consistent with the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the EPA in 29 C.F.R. § 1620.27(a), which states that where the jurisdictional prerequisites of both the EPA and Title VII are met, "any violation of the Equal Pay Act is also a violation of Title VII."⁴

The Eighth Circuit has recently reaffirmed the proposition that where a plaintiff asserts a claim of "unequal pay for equal work on the basis of sex, the standards are the same whether the plaintiff proceeds under Title VII or the Equal Pay Act." Kindred v. Northome/Indus. Sch. Dist. No. 363, 154 F.3d 801, 803 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting EEOC v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 35 F.3d 356, 360 (8th Cir.1994)) (quoting McKee, 801 F.2d at 1019); see EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d 664, 669 (8th Cir.1992) (quoting McKee, 801 F.2d at 1019); Floyd v. Kellogg Sales Co., 841 F.2d 226, 229 n. 2 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 970, 109 S.Ct. 501, 102 L.Ed.2d 537 (1988). From all indications, McKee reflects the law in this circuit on the issue and is controlling in the present case.

Therefore, the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff on her EPA claim entitles her to judgment as a matter of law on her Title VII sex discrimination claim. Plaintiff's motion for entry of judgment of liability on her Title VII claim should be granted.

C. Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial on the Issue of Damages on her Title VII Claim.

Having determined that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of liability on her Title VII claim, the Court turns to plaintiff's motion for new trial on the issue of emotional distress damages under that claim.⁵

Plaintiff asserts that the jury's answers to the written interrogatories in Verdict A in her favor, accompanied by the jury's failure to return a verdict in her favor on the Title VII claim, implicates Rule 49(b), Fed.R.Civ. P., which allows a new trial on damages where a jury's answers to written interrogatories require a finding for plaintiff on the question of liability. Plaintiff also asserts that under Rule 59(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., a new trial limited to the issue of damages is appropriate where there is a finding for the plaintiff but no or inadequate damages are awarded, citing Greenwood Ranches v. Skie Constr. Co., 629 F.2d 518, 522 (8th Cir.1980). Plaintiff states that because the jury determined defendant intentionally discriminated against her because of her sex, there is no need to relitigate that issue in connection...