Herold v. Computer Components Intern., Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 September 1971
• Docket Number: 70-926,Nos. 70-894,s. 70-894
• Parties: Lloyd HEROLD, Appellant, v. COMPUTER COMPONENTS INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Florida corporation et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 576

252 So.2d 576

56 A.L.R.3d 1101

Lloyd HEROLD, Appellant, v. COMPUTER COMPONENTS INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Florida corporation et al., Appellees.

Nos. 70-894, 70-926.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 17, 1971.

Joseph D. Farish, Jr., of Farish & Farish, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert T. Scott, of Gunster, Yoakley, Criser, Stewart & Hersey, Palm Beach, for appellee Computer Components.

Phil D. O'Connell and Daniel W. O'Connell, of O'Connell & Cooper, West Palm Beach, for appellees Joseph F. Griffin Co. and Florence F. Griffin.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from two final orders of the trial court: (1) a final order striking the complaint and pleadings filed by plaintiff Herold against Joseph F. Griffin Co. and Florence F. Griffin (Griffin) and dismissing the same with prejudice, and (2) a summary judgment in favor of defendant Computer Components International, Inc. (Computer) and against plaintiff Herold.

Plaintiff's complaint seeks to recover the sum of $9,000.00 alleged to be due from defendants under an oral contract arising out of a negotiated settlement of attorney's fees. A complete recitation of the facts giving rise to the complaint is not material to the disposition of the instant appeal.

Apart from the allegations relating to the services alleged to have been rendered from Griffin and Computer giving rise to the settlement, the thrust of plaintiff's allegation with respect to the liability of Computer is predicated upon the assertion that Florence Griffin was the agent for Computer and was acting in that capacity when she undertook to negotiate a compromise settlement for services alleged to have been rendered by plaintiff.

The trial court struck the plaintiff's pleadings and dismissed his complaint pursuant to Rule 1.380(b)(2)(iii), 30 F.S.A. for plaintiff's failure to comply with an order of the court requiring more "complete answers" to interrogatories previously propounded by Griffin. The trial court had, prior thereto, issued several other orders compelling plaintiff to serve better answers to the interrogatories to which he attempted to respond. The interrogatories for which better answers were compelled related to the nature and extent of legal services alleged to have been rendered to Griffin. Plaintiff's answers to these interrogatories were vague, unresponsive and lacked the specificity contemplated by the interrogatories; in some instances the answers made reference to other answers previously filed, i.e. "see answer to interrogatory --- above".

The plaintiff candidly admits that he did not comply with the circuit court's last order requesting more complete answers. Plaintiff, however, submits that he advised the trial court of the reasons for being unable to give more specific answers with the preface that:

" * * * Plaintiff has endeavored in good faith to comply with the Court's Order and for this purpose has again made an investigation of his records and is compelled, in view of the circumstances hereinafter referred to, to state that he is unable to make more complete answers to these interrogatories than as hereto-before been filed * * * ". (Emphasis added.)

A review of the record reflects that the trial court exhibited considerable judicial patience and restraint before applying the sanctions set forth in Rule 1.380, endeavoring to afford the plaintiff every possible opportunity to submit more complete answers to the interrogatories previously propounded. The trial court finally struck plaintiff's pleadings and dismissed his complaint. While we are of the view that plaintiff's answers do not comply with the spirit of the rules relating to discovery, based upon the record in the case sub judice we are unable to conclude that the plaintiff's failure to furnish better answers justified dismissal of his complaint.

Rule 1.380, FRCP, sets forth those consequences that a party may suffer for refusal to make discovery. Upon refusal of a party to answer any interrogatory the court may enter an order compelling an answer (1.380(a)). If any party refuses to obey an order made as aforesaid the court may enter an order striking out pleadings or dismissing the action (1.380(b)(2)(iii)).

The issuance of an order compelling a party to answer and for failure to do so directing a dismissal of the cause would appear to presuppose the refusal of the party to have initially answered or otherwise complied with the order of the court. In the case sub judice plaintiff has not refused to answer but instead has served answers which did not fully or adequately respond to the interrogatories propounded. We feel there is a distinction between a refusal to answer and an incomplete or insufficient answer insofar as it relates to a failure to comply with a court order entered pursuant thereto. In either situation the trial court would be authorized to issue an order either compelling an answer or compelling a more complete answer. In the event of a party's noncompliance the trial court would have a broad discretion under Rule 1.380 to make whatever disposition is just in light of the facts of the particular case, since the purpose of this rule is to make available to the court the means of preventing injustice when one party has by his conduct placed the other party at an unfair disadvantage.

The sanctions provided under this rule, particularly the striking of pleadings and dismissal of a cause should be imposed only in the exceptional case. The federal courts in interpreting the federal counterpart to Rule 1.380 have had considerable difficulty in delineating exceptional cases. There have been indications that the exceptional case is where the recalcitrant party has acted in wilful disregard of or with gross indifference to an order of the court requiring discovery with such deliberate callousness or negligence as to occasion an inability to comply with the court's order. 2 A.L.R.Fed. 811; Wembley, Inc. v. Diplomat Tie Company, D.C.Md.1963, 216 F.Supp. 565; Hinson v. Michigan Mutual Liability Company, 5 Cir.1960, 275 F.2d 537; Roth v. Paramount Pictures Corp., W.D.Pa.1948, 8 F.R.D. 31; Campbell v. Johnson, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1951, 101 F.Supp. 705. In Societe Internationale etc. v. Rogers, 1958, 357 U.S. 197, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255, the Supreme Court of the United States concluded that a "refusal" under this rule simply meant a "failure" to comply and that wilfullness was relevant only to the selection of sanctions, if any, to be imposed. The 1970 revision of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 37, the federal counterpart to Rule 1.380, has completely eliminated the term "refusal" and has substituted the term failure to answer or failure to obey, thereby completely removing any necessity as to the intent of the noncomplying party. In addition, Rule 37(a)(3) spells out with particularity that "an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer" giving rise to the imposition of the appropriate sanctions.

Obviously our rules must be interpreted in light of its present terminology and in view of its intended function and purpose. The rules themselves are to be construed so as to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and the attainment of substantial justice. The rules relating to discovery are intended to limit matters in controversy and to avoid unnecessary testimony thereby assisting all parties in the preparation and defense of their cases. As the Supreme Court observed in Cabot v. Clearwater Construction Company, Fla.1956, 89 So.2d 662, at 664:

" * * * No longer are we concerned with the 'tricks and technicalities of the trade'. The trial of a lawsuit should be a sincere effort to arrive at the truth. It is no longer a game of chess in which the technique of the maneuver captures the prize."

Where interrogatories are propounded and a party refuses to answer (or obey a court order resulting therefrom) such refusal will subject the party to those consequences set forth in Rule 1.380(b). An evasive or incomplete answer may, in certain circumstances, be tantamount to a refusal to answer. A court is therefore justified in issuing an order either compelling a party to answer or compelling a party to submit a more complete answer. In the case where a party refuses to answer, a mere failure to comply with an order of the court compelling an answer may result in sanctions under Rule 1.380 and no wilful disregard or deliberate intent to disobey is required to be shown. On the other hand, where a party has been compelled to submit a more complete answer and indicates his inability to comply with such order, the sanction of dismissing the pleadings of the recalcitrant party ought not to...