Herrett v. St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd.

• Decision Date: 06 September 2018
• Docket Number: Docket No. 44567
• Citation: 164 Idaho 129,426 P.3d 480
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Rodney HERRETT and Joyce Herrett, as husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. ST. LUKE'S MAGIC VALLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, LTD., dba St. Luke's Magic Valley, Defendant-Appellant, and Business Entities I through X, and John Doe and Jane Doe, husband and wife, I through X, Defendants.

164 Idaho 129

426 P.3d 480

Rodney HERRETT and Joyce Herrett, as husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v. ST. LUKE'S MAGIC VALLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, LTD., dba St. Luke's Magic Valley, Defendant-Appellant,andBusiness Entities I through X, and John Doe and Jane Doe, husband and wife, I through X, Defendants.

Docket No. 44567

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, November 2017 Term.

Filed: September 6, 2018

Gjording Fouser, PLLC, Boise, for appellant. Bobbi Dominick argued.

Pedersen and Whitehead, Twin Falls, for respondents. Jarom A. Whitehead argued.

HORTON, Justice.

St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center (St. Luke's) appeals a jury verdict awarding Rodney and Joyce Herrett $3,775,864.21 in a medical malpractice action wherein St. Luke's admitted liability. In this appeal, St. Luke's asserts that the district court erred by denying its motion for mistrial, admitting certain expert testimony, and improperly instructing the jury as to recklessness. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Joyce Herrett has suffered from various medical conditions throughout her life and she was hospitalized at St. Luke's in December of 2013 for a septic infection. On December 24, 2013, Herrett was about to be discharged. Just as Herrett was about to leave her room, she asked about the removal of a central venous catheter (CVC) that had been placed in her neck to allow the direct introduction of medication and fluids into her blood stream. Marilou Wentz, the nurse caring for Herrett, testified that she sought guidance from her supervisor, Sheila Dutt, because she had not removed a CVC before and that Dutt told her to just pull it out slowly. Dutt denied that Wentz had sought such instruction. Wentz removed the CVC while Herrett was seated upright in a wheelchair.

As Wentz was removing the CVC, Herrett began to complain of difficulty in breathing. Herrett was placed on the hospital bed and Wentz went for help. A rapid response team was called and Herrett was transferred to the intensive care unit. Herrett had suffered a stroke resulting from an air embolism introduced during the removal of the CVC. After being treated for the stroke, Herrett was readmitted to the rehabilitation unit with Dr. Kim Wiggins as her treating physician.

After a course of treatment, Herrett was released to go home but continued to see Dr. Wiggins. After initially doing well, Herrett was readmitted to the hospital in September of 2014 for failure to thrive. Following the stroke, Herrett has had trouble caring for herself and increased anxiety.

The Herretts filed this suit on February 9, 2015. St. Luke's admitted that Wentz, its employee, breached the standard of care when removing the CVC. The case proceeded to trial to determine whether Wentz's conduct was reckless and the amount of damages. The jury trial lasted nine days.

During trial, the Herretts called Dr. Wiggins to testify about her treatment of Ms. Herrett before and after the stroke. Dr. Wiggins testified that the 2014 hospitalization resulted from the stroke. During cross-examination, St. Luke's questioned Dr. Wiggins about other pre-existing conditions that may have necessitated the September 2014 hospitalization. St. Luke's introduced some of Herrett's medical records (exhibits K and L) into evidence during this cross-examination. On redirect, Dr. Wiggins was asked about encephalomalacia, a term appearing in the records admitted at St. Luke's request. St. Luke's objected, arguing that any opinion regarding encephalomalacia was outside the scope of Dr. Wiggins’ expert witness disclosure. The district court overruled the objection.

Near the end of their case-in-chief, the Herretts called Debra DeMint-Lee as a witness. Ms. DeMint-Lee is a life-care planner who testified about the cost of Herrett's future in-home medical care. St. Luke's argues that the district court erred by overruling its objection to DeMint-Lee's testimony for lack of foundation for making this kind of opinion.

Dr. Carl Goldstein was the Herretts’ only rebuttal witness. Dr. Goldstein was called to rebut the testimony presented by Dr. Stuart Shankland on behalf of St. Luke's. The Herretts’ pretrial witness disclosure stated that "Dr. Goldstein will opine that Dr. Shankland's assessment of the effect of proteinuria and chronic kidney disease on Joyce Herrett's life expectancy is excessive, unreasonable and based on outdated information. Dr. Goldstein will reference materials provided by Dr. Shankland to establish this foundational flaw." St. Luke's contends that the trial court erred by permitting Dr. Goldstein to testify when the pretrial disclosure did not identify which of Dr. Shankland's articles Dr. Goldstein was going to criticize or explain how he intended to utilize Dr. Shankland's articles.

St. Luke's objected to the Herretts’ proposed instruction defining the term "reckless," arguing that the district court should give the instruction found in Idaho Jury Instruction 2.25. The district court gave the instruction proposed by the Herretts, stating that the instruction properly stated the law.

The jury found the Herretts were entitled to $3,850,004.83 in damages. This figure was subsequently reduced by stipulation to reflect contractual adjustments of medical expenses and an amended judgment was entered for $3,775,864.21. St. Luke's appeals, arguing that the district court erred in allowing Dr. Wiggins’ testimony because it was outside the scope of the expert witness disclosure. St. Luke's also argues that Dr. Goldstein's testimony was not properly disclosed as required by rule, the district court's jury instruction improperly defined recklessness, and Ms. DeMint-Lee's testimony was not supported by proper foundation.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"When reviewing the trial court's evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard." Edmunds v. Kraner , 142 Idaho 867, 871, 136 P.3d 338, 342 (2006). "The Court reviews a trial court's decision admitting or excluding evidence, including the testimony of expert witnesses, under the abuse of discretion standard." White v. Mock , 140 Idaho 882, 888, 104 P.3d 356, 362 (2004). "Whether a witness is sufficiently qualified as an expert to state an opinion is a matter which is largely within the discretion of the trial court." Egbert v. Idaho State Ins. Fund , 125 Idaho 678, 680, 873 P.2d 1332, 1334 (1994) (quoting Sidwell v. William Prym, Inc. , 112 Idaho 76, 81, 730 P.2d 996, 1001 (1986) ).

"The decision whether to declare or deny a mistrial is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge if the court determines that an occurrence at trial has prevented a fair trial." Van Brunt v. Stoddard , 136 Idaho 681, 686, 39 P.3d 621, 626 (2001). "After trial is commenced, at any time prior to the rendering of a verdict, the court may declare a mistrial on its own motion or on motion of any party if it determines an occurrence at trial has prevented a fair trial." I.R.C.P. 48.

In order to determine if the district court abused its discretion this Court looks to see:

Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life , 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).

"The propriety of jury instructions is a question over which this Court exercises free review." Ballard v. Kerr , 160 Idaho 674, 702, 378 P.3d 464, 492 (2016) (quoting Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co. , 151 Idaho 388, 391, 257 P.3d 755, 758 (2011) ). "Even where an instruction is erroneous, the error is not reversible unless the jury instructions taken as a whole mislead or prejudice a party." Id. "If the instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law, no reversible error is committed." Id. (quoting Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. , 153 Idaho 716, 724, 291 P.3d 399, 407 (2012) ).

III. ANALYSIS

St. Luke's argues that the district court erred in two main aspects during the trial. First, St. Luke's argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony from Dr. Wiggins, Dr. Goldstein, and Ms. DeMint-Lee. Next, St. Luke's argues that the district court erred by giving the jury an incorrect definition of the term "reckless." These assignments of error will be discussed in turn.

A. The district court did not err in the admission of expert testimony.

St. Luke's argues that Dr. Wiggins’ testimony exceeded the Herretts’ pre-trial disclosures and thus violated Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and the district court's pre-trial order regarding expert testimony. Next, St. Luke's argues that Dr. Goldstein's rebuttal testimony likewise exceeded the scope of the pre-trial disclosure. Finally, St. Luke's contends that the Herretts failed to lay proper foundation for Ms. DeMint-Lee's testimony regarding in-home care expenses.

1. The district court did not err in denying St. Luke's motion for a mistrial based on the admission of Dr. Wiggins’ testimony regarding encephalomalacia.

St. Luke's contends that the district court applied the wrong standard in admitting Dr. Wiggins’ testimony regarding encephalomalacia and that the admission of this testimony should have resulted in a mistrial.

Before trial, in response to the parties’ motions in limine, the district court entered an order relating to undisclosed expert testimony. In that order, the district court precluded "the presentation of expert testimony that has not been disclosed." The order noted that "the result is no more than what the Court's scheduling order and case law requires." Thus, the district court's order did not impose any requirement for disclosure beyond that which Idaho law already provides.

Expert witness disclosures are governed by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26. This rule divides expert witnesses into two categories and...